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Abstract 
 
This study originates from the recognition that project management research is replete with 
normative theories on what need projects to be successful. However, it has performed worse 
with respect to assisting the understanding of how and why similar projects do not have 
similar performances during their life-cycles.  
It claims that the poor performance of major infrastructure projects, acknowledged by cost 
overruns and scheduling delays, is due to their lack of resilience when confronted with critical 
events that are inherent in their life-cycle.  
Therefore, it addresses the overarching question: How do projects cope with the critical 
events that occur at some point in their life-cycle? And why and how are some troubled 
projects able to maintain positive adjustments (cope successfully) while others cannot?  
By addressing these questions, the first goal of this study is to reveal the “resilience enablers”. 
These are factors and conditions enabling the successful coping process (maintaining 
performance after the critical event) in projects confronted with unexpected events. The 
second goal is to translate the new knowledge of “resilience enablers” into recommendations 
for practitioners to enable them to actually make use of the insight into a troubled project’s 
behavior. To study these questions, a qualitative research design was developed. It is 
articulated on the exploratory case study of one of the most important infrastructure project of 
this century. The result consists of two sets of findings, both relate to the critical events’ 
managements and the factors and conditions that enabled the project’s resilience.  
This thesis contributes to project management research with a middle range theory. The 
project performance can be seen and explained from a new and original perspective of project 
resilience. It also contributes to the project’s management practice with recommendations 
aiming to help project actors to 1) identify and assess the resilience of their project 
organization, along with the identification and management of the risks. And to 2) maintain 
project system performance after the critical event through continuous adoption of risk–
focused, and protection-focused strategies, which imply uncostly measures that enable project 
resilience.  
 
Key words:  infrastructure project, critical events management, project life-cycle, project resilience, performance, 
project system 
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Résumé 
 
Cette recherche part du constat d’une littérature scientifique relativement riche, en gestion de 
grands projets d’infrastructure, concernant les conditions préalables à réunir pour assurer leur 
mise en œuvre, mais qui ne traite que rarement des causes de leur échec. Il paraît, en effet, 
légitime de chercher à comprendre pourquoi des projets de même nature évoluent 
différemment au cours de leur cycle de vie et ne parviennent pas au même niveau de 
performance. La réflexion engagée ici, concernant cette nature de projet, repose sur 
l’hypothèse que les déconvenues observées et mesurables par des dépassements de crédits et 
des retards dans la planification, sont dues, pour l’essentiel, à leur incapacité à s’adapter à des 
événements critiques survenant au cours de leur cycle de vie. 
Les objectifs de ce travail visent, en premier lieu, à apprécier comment réagissent les 
responsables de tels projets face à des événements perturbateurs et, ensuite, à comprendre 
pourquoi certains projets en difficulté parviennent quand même à leur terme, alors que 
d’autres échouent. 
La démarche sous-jacente passe en conséquence par la recherche et l’analyse des éléments 
«facilitateurs» de la résilience ou, en d’autres termes, des facteurs et des conditions permettant 
la mise en place d’un processus d'adaptation et de réajustement des projets confrontés à des 
événements fortuits. La seconde étape consiste à traduire les connaissances théoriques et 
pratiques récentes en la matière en recommandations destinées aux praticiens engagés dans la 
conduite de projets particulièrement risqués. 
Les résultats de la recherche débouchent sur deux catégories d’enseignements relatifs à la 
gestion des événements critiques et à la mise en œuvre des facilitateurs de la résilience de 
projet. L’originalité de ce travail se manifeste ainsi par une approche nouvelle, celle de la 
résilience, appliquée aux grands projets d’infrastructure où des dépassements de budget-temps 
et budget-coût sont fréquents. Elle se distingue des approches traditionnelles, où l’anticipation 
d’événements perturbateurs est le plus souvent négligée ou ignorée, par une démarche 
permettant d’identifier et promouvoir  la résilience du projet d’infrastructure. 
 
Mots clés: grand projet d'infrastructure, comportement de projet en difficulté, événements critiques, cycle de vie, la 
résilience, structure, systématicité 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the fundamental questions in the field of project management is how projects should 
be initiated, planned, executed, controlled and closed1 in order to be completed in the given 
constraints of time, costs and quality. Different streams of the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge addressed the question from their own perspectives, which led to a wide range of 
tools aiming to ensure the project performance; for example the ones derived from “control 
and planning” or “risk and uncertainty management” theories. There is also abundant research 
on “critical success and failure factors in projects” which provides both academics and 
practitioners with recommendations on how to structure and manage projects in order to avoid 
failure.  
However, reality shows, and influential surveys2 and studies3 confirm that the rate of projects 
that fail to meet their objectives in terms of time and costs has not improved over the past 
century; in spite of big developments of project management theory and practice.  
In this context, the question “why do the projects fail” is still relevant, inciting both 
researchers and practitioners to search for new answers.  
This thesis originated from this question and is concerned with the development of project 
performance. However, along with the process of reviewing previous research, two new 
questions arose and became central to this study.  
1.1 Research questions and objectives of this study 
The objectives and questions emerged from the recognition that project management research 
is replete with normative theories on what a project needs to be successful. However has  
performed worse with respect to assisting in the understanding of project behaviour and its 
performance in the face of unexpected events.  
                                                 
1  Projects, says the PMI, have five distinct phases: initiation; planning; execution; control; and closure 
2 E.g.  Standish Group – in a study conducted  in 2004, for IT projects found that average cost overrun was 43 
percent, 71 percent of projects were over budget, over time, and under scope 
3 A very comprehensive study of cost overrun by Flybjerg et all, (2002) found that 9 out of 10 projects had 
overruns, and overruns of 50 to 100 percent were common; the fact is recurrent in each of 20 nations and five 
continents covered by the study; also overrun had been constant for the 70 years for which data were 
available. 
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Therefore the main research question addressed in this study is:  
How do the projects cope with the inherent critical events that occur at some point in their 
life cycle? 
Then a second question, which could be derived from the first one, is:  
Why and how do some troubled projects maintain a positive adjustment after a critical event 
while others do not?   
In this study the critical event, which is understood as an unexpected event, has a major 
impact on the potential survival of the project and its objectives. 
By addressing these issues, our first objective is to gain insight into the troubled project 
behaviour in order to uncover the conditions and factors enabling the successful coping 
process, which in other words is the resilient response after the critical event.  Further, 
gaining insight into the behaviour of troubled projects is seen as a first step in creating the 
premises for improving the project’s performance.  
The next objective is to translate these insights into recommendations for practitioners in 
order to enable them to actually make use of the new knowledge. 
Therefore, the main contribution of this dissertation is an increased understanding of the 
phenomenon of “troubled project behaviour” and of those conditions and factors (resilience 
enablers), which account for their positive adjustment (maintained performance) in the 
confrontation with critical events inherent in their life cycle. This will ideally provide the base 
for a midrange theory which extends/completes current project management theories on 
critical factors for project success and failure.  
From a practical approach, the second objective of this study is to offer the project 
management professionals a new perspective, enabling them to assess the project 
performance when it is confronted with critical events. As well as give recommendations on 
how to structure the project in order to confer resilience to its system.     
 
1.2 Outline of the study 
In order to achieve the research objectives stated above, the following methodology was 
adopted. The first phase is dedicated to the “status quo” analysis of the problems, causes and 
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cures associated with the cost overruns and scheduling delays. The aim of this analysis is to 
situate and ground the research topic and highlight its relevance for both theory and practice. 
Taking into account the topic complexity, the research perimeter is established in the 
beginning of the analysis. 
The “status quo” overview revealed the fact that the problem of cost overruns and scheduling 
delays in the development and implementation of infrastructure projects is a reality of today. 
This is reoccurring in spite of the continuous development of project management and 
practice.   
Looking at the causes that account for this situation suggests that these projects exhibit “life 
cycle path dependency” in the sense that they are vulnerable in the face of critical events.  
These critical events are defined as unexpected events, inherent in their life cycle, which have 
a potential impact on the project’s viability and its objectives.  In practice, in the most 
common situations, project actors (owners, managers, etc.) rely on risk management 
processes and will deal with the risk in event consequences by creating contingencies (Airbus, 
M2 Lausanne). Trying to achieve savings through these contingencies, they hope that they 
will compensate the over runs (NRLA), or implement learned lessons from similar projects 
(e.g. in construction projects).  
In order to assess how the theory of project management addresses the problem of project 
performance, the next phase of this study was to review the literature on critical success and 
failure factors. This section is concerned with the study of conditions and factors to be 
accomplished in order to develop and implement successful4 projects. The literature review 
highlighted the relative lack of empirical studies, focusing on the study of project behavior 
when it is confronted with critical events. Also there is a lack of relevant theories on how the 
critical factors change during the project life cycle and their role in maintaining the 
performance in the aftermath of a critical event. It revealed as well, that traditional project 
management literature does not specifically define the project resilience and is not specifically 
assigned to a list of critical success and failure factors found in this literature.  
 
                                                 
4 Although the definition of project success might be controversial it is common to assess that a successful 
project is the one that achieves its objectives under the given resources’ constraints of time, costs, quality 
(Lundin & Söderholm 1995, Turner 2006)  
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Taking into account the importance of this phenomenon with the lack of viable theory and 
empirical research to explain it, the next logical step was, as suggested by Van de Ven (2007), 
“to create, elaborate and justify a theory through induction” using an exploratory research 
design articulated on a single case study.  
Following the aforementioned lines, “any emergent theory should put emphasis on developing 
constructs, measures and testable theoretical propositions” as said by in Eisenhard (1989) and 
Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007). This research will propose an accommodation of the construct 
of resilience in a list of critical success and failure factors, as well as the conceptualization of 
troubled project behavior from the resilience perspective. Taken from empirical findings, the 
hypothesis will be developed about the factors and conditions (resilience enablers) that are 
believed to be accountable for the positive adjustments (sustainable performance) of a project 
system when confronted with critical events.  
The last chapter of the dissertation, is dedicated to “problem solving” (in line with Van de 
Ven 2007), and then discuss conclusions about the research problem with the implications of 
the study for theory and practice, limitations and future research.  
The methodology described above is depicted in the following diagram. This diagram 
suggests that research phases are not only connected through an input/output mechanism but 
also through an “iteration and fit” process aimed to ensure the coherence and consistence of 
this study. 
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Figure 1-1: Outline of the thesis5 
 
The next chapter will further develop the introduction above and is intended to situate, 
ground, and infer the research problem.  
 
                                                 
5 Adapted from the Engaged Scholarship Diamond Model, Van de Ven, 2007 
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2 PROBLEM FORMULATION 
“The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, 
which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill.” 
(Albert Einstein quoted in Getzels & Csikszentminhalyi, 1975) 
 
Infrastructure projects6 are often defined as 1) large-scale investments which cost more than 
US$1 billion and attract considerable public attention because of substantial impacts on 
communities, environment, and budgets (Flyvberg et al, 2003). Or 2) as initiatives that are 
physical, expensive, and public, as proposed by Altshuler & Luberoff (2003). Infrastructure 
projects include air, road, and railway infrastructures but also power and wastewater plants, 
dams, oil and natural gas extraction as well as IT infrastructure projects.  
As both definitions suggest these major projects are central to the public world because they 
are meant to enhance the economic growth and social development. However, what the 
definition does not state is the calamitous historical record of costs and time overruns7 in their 
development and implementation as illustrated in the article below; extracted from the 
Economist at the time when this research started.  
“WHEN George Stephenson built a railway from Liverpool to Manchester in the 
1820s, it cost 45% more than budget and was subject to several delays as it made its 
way across the treacherous Chat Moss bog. In the intervening 180 years the 
management of large-scale projects seems to have improved but little. At the end of 
May the reconstruction of Wembley Stadium, the hallowed home of English soccer, 
was threatened when Multiplex, the Australian developer of the site, admitted that it 
faced mounting losses on the GBP750m ($1.4 billion) project. An unanticipated rise in 
the cost of steel (which doubled in 2004) and the extra labor required to ensure the 
building is ready for next May's FA Cup Final were said to have thrown the 
management's calculations out of kilter.  
                                                 
6 Infrastructure projects definition is treated in chapter 2 
7 Cost overrun is defined as excess of actual cost over budget. 
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…………………………………….. 
Big projects today are as likely to be built on software as they are on steel. But IT 
projects are no better at meeting budgets and deadlines. 
The Standish Group, a research firm which produces an influential annual evaluation 
of IT projects, judged that in 2004 only 29% of such projects "succeeded", down from 
34% in 2002. Cost over-runs averaged 56% of original budgets, and projects on 
average took 84% more time than originally scheduled. 
(OVERDUE AND OVER BUDGET, OVER AND OVER AGAIN, the Economist, Jun 9th, 2005)” 
This article witnesses a reality that cannot be denied. The problem of cost overruns and delays 
is common and recurrent in all types of projects. In project management literature, these facts 
are documented for various infrastructure samples, in studies of Hall (1980), Kain (1990), 
NijKamp & Ubbels (1999), Bruzelius et.al. (1998), Skamaris & Flyvbjerg (1997), belonging 
to both public and private sectors (Major Project Association Study (1994); Morris and 
Hough, 1987).  
Along the same lines, a recent study by Flyvbjerg et al., (2003) examines how common and 
large cost escalations are in transport infrastructure development. This suggests that this 
phenomenon is global, exists across 20 nations in 5 continents of the 258 projects studied. 
Which is perennial since the overwhelming statistical significance proves that cost estimates 
have not improved and cost escalation has not decreased over the past 70 years for all types of 
studied infrastructure. The overruns are significant and reach 45% in rail (38 examples), 34% 
in tunnels and bridges (62 examples) and 20% in roads (30 examples).  
Although, this study focused on transport infrastructures, comparative research by Altshuler 
& Luberoff (2003), Flyvbjerg et al, 2002 cited in Flyvbjerg, 2007, shows that the problems 
identified for transportation apply to a wide range of projects including power plants, 
aerospace, dams, information technology systems, sport arenas, and museums.   
In this context, practitioners and researchers legitimately ask why the performance of projects 
has not improved in spite of continuous development in project management science and 
practice; and why the available tools and practices cannot guarantee that projects will be 
achieved within committed costs and timetables. 
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In practice, there is often the explanation that poor performance in major projects is that from 
the beginning promoters ignore or underestimate risks, sometimes due to optimism bias with 
forecasters (psychological explanations) and strategic misrepresentation of scope and/or 
budgets (political-economic explanations), as asserted by Flyvberg et al. 2003. Project 
management theoreticians suggest that the poor performance of projects is due to the fact that 
project management is saturated by ‘hard’ theories. These theories emphasize the planning 
and control dimensions of a project that are anchored in a system of engineering methods and 
related tools. Such tools are the Gant charts, critical path methods and resource leveling 
heuristic models (Morris 1998, Smith & Morris 2007, Pollack 2007). One of the solutions 
proposed is to dedicate more efforts in “soft” aspects research, such as people, social 
processes, and other “soft” factors which emphasize the contextual relevance rather than the 
objectivity and have a direct impact on project performance (Söderlund 2004, Cicmil et al. 
2006, Söderlund 2007).  
A common denominator is the idea that projects are more complex8 today than in the past and 
the traditional techniques of project planning and risk management, although form the basic 
and necessary foundation for good project management, are insufficient in order to deal 
effectively with today’s dynamic, risky, and changing projects (Eskerod, 1996; Payne 1995; 
Shenhar, 2009). 
Indeed, the project management basics foresaw that at the project inception, the actors shall 
attempt to plan for all variables in advance. To be effective, they spend time on project 
preparation – conducting surveys, analysing data, checking on key-learning from comparable 
experiences, benchmarking, and so on. Their findings are confirmed by strategists and project 
designers which then lead to a detailed, multi-year project plan that is meant to be carried out 
in the given time and budget constraints (PMBOK Guide 2004: 6-8). Yet even though lots of 
energy and resources are spent on project preparation and design, in a long run project, the 
probability of having unexpected events is high (Eden et al, 2000). This is particularly true for 
infrastructure projects that are developed and implemented in modern society, which is 
characterized by three salient features: interdependency, complexity, and rapid, radical change  
 
                                                 
8 Complexity is one of the intrinsic characteristics of major infrastructure projects explained in detail in the 
paragraph 2.2.1. 
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(Nicholas, 2001, p.9). When unexpected events occur, they generate disruptions and delays 
(Eden et al. 2000, Eden et al. 2005), which threaten the project’s objectives, even its survival, 
and will prevent the delivery of the expected social and economic benefits for which the 
infrastructure was intended (Anguera 2006; Bruzelius et al. 1998;  Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; 
Flyvbjerg 2005; Flyvbjerg 2007 (a), (b)). 
 
2.1 A changing scope in improving the project performance  
A classical approach in project management is to deal with the unexpected events to ensure 
the project’s performance9 and to rely on risk & uncertainty management processes (Nicholas 
2001, p. 306-324; PMBOK 2004, p: 237-264, Cooke-Davis, 2004; Chapman & Ward 2003 p: 
5-15; Ward 2005, p: 72-105; Turner 1999, p.233-255). These processes are continuously 
improved and reinforced through findings on “lessons learned” and “critical success and 
failure factors”. These findings are typically acquired through postmortem analysis of major 
projects that encountered distresses or even failures at some point in their life-cycle (e.g., 
Sutterfield et al. 2006; Dvir et al., 2006; Eden et. al. 2000; Graham 2000; Pinto & Mantel, 
1990).  
However, the experience of companies with highly developed risk management practices 
(EDAS – Airbus A380 project; Boeing - 787 Dreamliner; NRLA) suggests that traditional, 
well-established risk management techniques are insufficient to deal effectively with today’s 
dynamic, risky, and changing projects in which the “knock-on” unexpected events become 
part of the project life-cycle (Eden et. al., 2000; Dvir et al. 1998, Shenhar 2001, Shenhar 
2009). 
This research acknowledges the idea that in the long run a project will probably have 
unexpected events’ threatening the project objectives or survival (e.g.Williams 2005). These 
events are accountable for costs and delays, with embarrassing consequences for project  
 
                                                 
9 Performance is traditionally assessed against the extent to which the objectives set at the project outline are 
accomplished under the given resources constraints in terms of costs, delays and quality (e.g. Baccarini, 
1999; White & Fortune, 2002; Nicholas 2001, p: 10). 
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actors and delayed benefits for the economy and society (Morris & Hough 1987; Eden et. 
al.2005; Flyvbjerg 2007). Unlike other studies which look at the cause of failures or try to  
identify all possible risks, in order to propose specific counteractions (lessons learned, critical 
success factors, improved risk management process), this research suggests looking into the 
“troubled project behavior”10 in order to identify factors and conditions which enable a 
positive change after the critical event. Adjustments which could be translated into the fact 
that the performance is maintained during the project life cycle.   
As traditionally thought the capacity of entities to maintain positive adjustments, or recover 
and bounce back when they are confronted with adverse conditions which are threatening 
their goals or positive outcomes is associated with the concept of resilience (e.g. Gordon 
197811, Flach 199712, Freeman et al. 200413). We suggest using this perspective in order to 
evaluate the project system’s response and its behavior in the face of adverse, unexpected 
events. Indeed, project management research currently lacks a theoretical framework for 
understanding “how the projects cope with the inherent critical events that occur at some 
point in their life cycle”, “how can a project maintain a positive adjustment or adapt after a 
critical event”, and “can project resilience be invoked, created, or designed?”    
This research direction was encouraged by similar management studies with promising results 
in the context of permanent organizations14. They dedicate attention to the applicability of the 
resilience concept in order to explain sustainable performance and adaptability of some 
companies evolving in adverse conditions, such as high competitive environments (e.g., 
March 1991; Suttclife &Vogus ,2003; Egeland, Carlson & Strofe, 1993; Wildavsky 
1988p.:120), Sitkin 1992; Levinthal and March (1981, 1993), Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Wildavsky; Porras & 
Silvers 1991) and organizations confronted with shocks such as terrorist attacks (Freeman,  
 
                                                 
10 Troubled project behavior relates to the project system response to an unexpected, critical event likely to threat 
its objectives or even survival 
11 In material science 
12 In socio-psychological studies 
13In management studies 
14 Project are by definition temporary organizations; the full explanation is provided in paragraph 2.3.1. 
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2004). Resilience was also studied to explain how some multinational companies restored 
their operations successfully after major disruptions in their supply chains which produced a 
loss of key suppliers (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Peck 2005) as well as after natural disasters  
(Sheffi, 2005). The findings of these studies suggest that resilience could provide insight into 
“how organizations continually achieve desirable outcomes amid adversity, strain and 
significant barriers to adaptation and/or development” (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p.94-95; 
Starbuck & Farjoun 2005 p.4- 5; Weick 173-176). 
In a review of studies on the antecedents of resilience at an organizational level, Sutcliffe & 
Vogus (2003) found recurrent themes on resilience studies at different levels of analysis 
(individual, group, organizations). These suggests that resilience is enabled by structures that 
“allow flexibly, rearranging, and transferring expertise and resources” (adhoc problem solving 
networks, social capital) and “capabilities to quickly process feedback”.  On the other hand, 
McManus (2008) states that there is “little consensus regarding what resilience is and what it 
means for organizations”. These different views suggest that there is a need for empirical 
studies to make the transfer of lessons learned “on resilience” from permanent to temporary 
organizations possible.  
However, according to Van de Ven (2007), grounding a problem also requires the researcher to 
step outside of his or her boundaries, and be open to and informed by the interpretations of others 
about the problem domain. Meaning that the process of “problem formulation is not a solitary 
exercise but instead it is a collective achievement because most problems tend to exist in a 
‘buzzing, blooming, and confusing’ reality”. This suggests that grounding the problem in 
literature is only the first step of the problem formulation process. Immersion into reality is 
also advisable since “it is only by obtaining and coordinating perspectives of other key 
stakeholders, that robust features of reality can be distinguished from those features that are 
merely a function of one perspective” (Azevedo, 1997: 189-190, cited in Van de Ven 2007). In 
the attempt to ground the problem in the project management reality, and to understand if 
there were any opportunities to use this approach in practice, preliminary interviews were 
organized with different project actors. The people interviewed were projects promoters (State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs - SECO), bankers (UBS), project managers (Nestlé), and 
experts working in the European Community in funded infrastructure projects (EVATREN 
Project consortium).  The list of people interviewed is provided in Annex 1. The specific  
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scope of these interviews was to find out if the concept of resilience is in the glossary of an 
infrastructure project development and management process. In an affirmative case, the 
interview would seek to see how resilience is understood. The collateral objective was to 
receive feedback on how different actors explain details involved with the incurrence of costs 
and time overruns, which are recurrent and what are the related possible solutions. 
Considering the aim and motivation of this investigation, the interviews were meant to be 
unstructured and most of them turned into open discussions. The results, labeled in three 
categories, which are considered relevant: “resilience”, “overruns”, and “learned lessons and 
traditional methods”, revealed the recurrent themes described below.  
The significance of resilience question was answered with two responses:  “don’t we say that 
people who survived the Holocaust are resilient?” or “Is life not the example of resilience”? 
The context in which resilience was associated with a project was explained with answers 
such as:  “resilience is invoked within the power infrastructure projects in connection with the 
necessity to design technical back-up solutions in case of a system failure”; “in banking, 
resilience is employed to give a guarantee that transactions will continue in case of technical 
disruptions; it is most designed with redundant, although costly systems”. We felt a general 
agreement (suggested also in the examples described), that the concept of resilience as such, 
is understood from media and life experiences, however might have technical connotations. 
Yet it is not directly associated with the project management practice or project management 
performance.   
Relating to the reoccurring the problem of “cost overruns and delays”, the results were 
consistent with those often mentioned in the project management literature. Specifically, it 
was revealed that they are due to “long execution periods” in which it is quite inevitable for 
“unexpected instances to become part of the project and the source of delays”. Among 
relevant answers, possible explanations and suggested cures of this problem were: “although 
the risk management process is highly regarded and contingencies are created as unforeseen 
events, it is difficult to accurately plan for the coming 5-7 years in which the object will be 
finished. Meaning that, to some extent overruns are impossible to prevent”.  Therefore any 
“means to improve the project performance beyond risk management would be useful”. Also 
revealed were the eventual benefits, but also pitfalls, of this research: “we would welcome 
new modalities to deal with the unexpected” or “solutions to speed-up the decision making  
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process and avoid costly delays” but it would be interesting to know “what is the difference 
between resilience and risk and uncertainty management”, and “can it be designed”? Another 
response was “since resilience relates to unexpected events or shocks, shouldn’t it be 
embedded in the risk management process”? 
Limits in traditional research methods which seek to identify the causes of failure through 
postmortem analysis were mentioned as; “in our practice, lessons learned about risks are in 
general referenced but they are not systematically applied”, “one cannot put a figure on 
Napoleon’s15 approach and go to the banker with it”, or “troubled project behavior should be 
but is not on the ‘debriefing list’ at project closure”.    
We conclude that this investigation highlighted that the concept of resilience is not part of a 
project management glossary and the sense of “urgency in the practice of projects” does not 
normally leave time or means to make projects “proactive and flexible” in the face of the 
unexpected but rather to reinforce the “shield” through classical risk management methods. 
However, there was a general agreement among the people interviewed about the potential of 
studying the resilience of infrastructure projects in the face of critical events.  
These results and theoretical interest explained previously, drove this research to lead 
attention from those learning from failure instances (e.g. lessons learned, continuous 
improvement of risk management processes, critical success factors check-list) towards those 
factors and conditions which could be held accountable for resilient response of project 
systems in the face of critical events. Therefore, uncovering those conditions and 
understanding resilience in infrastructure projects will constitute the aim of this thesis. 
  
2.2 Research perimeter  
The context of this study is hard infrastructure projects, which is by definition characterized 
by complexity and uncertainty (e.g. Baker 1986; Morris & Hough 1987; Chapman & Ward 
2003; Chapman 2006). The following overview of definitions and types of infrastructure will 
be particularly helpful in discussing the overview of this study.  
 
                                                 
15 this says that in a plan surely something will go wrong 
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2.2.1 Infrastructure definition 
Although most people will agree that infrastructure means the assembly of tangible assets 
such bridges, roads, highways, railways, tunnels, airports, ports, water supply, others would 
define the notion wider, as being “those physical and social structures that support the life and 
interactions of a society” (Grimsey 2004 p. 22). Also, it is common to distinguish between 
“economic” and “social” infrastructure and within each of these between “hard” (physical) 
and “soft” infrastructure. On this basis, there are hard economic infrastructures, soft 
economic infrastructures, hard social infrastructures and soft social infrastructures (Argy et. 
al., 1999). 
Examples of hard economic infrastructures are highways, railways, bridges, tunnels, 
telecommunications, electricity, and gas generation. In other words, saying all tangible 
structures that provide key intermediate services to businesses and industries. Soft economic 
infrastructures comprise of vocational training, financial facilities for business, R&D 
facilitation, and technology transfer. Examples of hard social infrastructure are hospitals, 
education and training buildings, water storage and treatment facilities, etc., with the role to 
improve quality of life and welfare in the community. Soft social infrastructure takes the form 
of security systems and community services, those regarded as socially desirable (Musgrave 
1959). 
Although the perimeter of this research is hard infrastructure projects, from a project 
management perspective, hard and soft, economic and social infrastructures, are comparable 
because they all share common characteristics. Specifically, they are large-scale investments 
costing more than US $1 billion and attracting large amounts of public attention because of 
the substantial impact they have on communities, the environment, and budgets (Flyvberg et 
al, 2003).  They require high initial capital costs, have relatively long lives, and need to be 
managed and paid on a long term basis (Esty 2008). Also their potential benefits overlap in 
many respects. For instance “social” infrastructure, such as ones that enhance the health or 
quality of one’s life, may influence the productivity of an industry just as much as the 
economic structures. Also vice versa, economic infrastructure, such as transport networks, 
would definitely impact the quality of life even if it is not the first intent (Argy, et al, 1999; 
Hirschman, 1967).  
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Other shared features of infrastructure projects are the complexity and uncertainty (Nicolas 
2001, p.3-7; Esty 2008 p.5; Morris & Hough 1987 p. 14-15; Baker 1986; Chapman & Ward 
2003; Chapman 2006). 
According to Baccarini (1996) and Richardson (2002) the level of complexity could be 
computed as a multiple of organizational complexity that refers to the number of people, 
departments, organizations, countries, languages, cultures, and time zones involved. Resource 
complexity, which relates to the volume of resources (cost, time) and the technological 
complexity, which is the level of innovation involved in the product, process, or novelty of 
interfaces between different parts of that process or product.  
The definition of a project itself suggests “uncertainty related to novel organization or a 
unique scope of work” (Chapman 2003). It could also be sourced by technology, task 
difficulty, currency fluctuations, unknown inflation for long-term projects, financing (Baker 
1986) available skills, legal aspects, or natural disasters (Hirschman 1967). This will lead to 
the occurrence of critical events that threat the project’s objectives and/or survival (e.g. Sheffi 
2005, Eden 2007). 
In the figure below adapted from Nicolas 2001, examples are given of infrastructure projects 
and each one is positioned with respect to the degree of complexity and uncertainty involved.  
The time and costs will increase with the complexity.  
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Figure 2-1: Positioning Projects by Complexity (Adapted from Nicholas, 2001) 
 
Apart from complexity and uncertainty another characteristics of infrastructure projects, 
which are related to the first two, are given by human factor reflected in the decision making 
process. Specifically, the complexity and uncertainty as well as the amount of costs involved 
will give managers the incentive (and duty) to make careful, deliberate decisions in an 
environment with changing constraints (Esty 2004 p. 2-6).  
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These characteristics are relevant for the discussion of this study, generally speaking, which 
takes example of the New Railway Link through the Alps (NRLA). This is a Swiss federal 
project that is the centerpiece of the Central European rail network. This infrastructure, which 
will result in the construction of 3 base tunnels several hundred metres below the current level 
of the tunnels will guarantee the speed rail link (250kms/hour) from north to south Europe, 
across the Swiss Alps, and become “the first flat transalpine rail link with a maximum 
elevation of just 550m above sea level”.  
The project is extremely complex in all respects (organization, technology, resources) and has 
already faced a great deal of distresses, which has made its future become questioned several 
times. According to the last prospects, it will be completed in 2017.  At the time when this 
research started, the project had a cost overrun of 53% and the completion of the longest 
tunnel is already in for a 6-year delay.  
 
2.3 Definition of some concepts 
In this paragraph we attempt to provide the best possible definition of the main concepts used 
in this thesis. Some of these concepts are used in other management studies but are interpreted 
differently in various situations. These differences can lead to confusion which we would like 
to prevent. It is also worth explaining that at this stage is not possible to give an accurate 
definition of project resilience and project enablers, as their identification is part of the goal of 
this study and will be given in the findings. For these concepts, a preliminary, leading 
definition will be given, which will be repeated in the chapter in which we discuss the 
findings of this study.  
2.3.1 Project 
The common denominator in defining projects is to refer to them as a combination of 
uniqueness, defined objectives, limited time-cycle, and the three-fold constraints: cost, time, 
and quality (e.g. Turner 1999, Williams 2005, Eden 2005).  
This thesis addresses “projects” as “a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique 
product or service” (PMI, 2000), or a “unique venture with a beginning and an end, conducted 
by people to meet established goals with parameters of cost, schedule, and quality” 
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1992).  It also acknowledges that these characteristics will set the 
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management of projects apart from the management of operations, which take place in a 
permanent organizational setting (Nicholas 2001). Therefore to some extent, the management 
of the project is a challenging position since it interacts with time pressures and uncertainty of 
the results due to the fact that the project completion is something new or/and revolutionary, 
transient teams, and has risks (Lundin & Söderholm 1994, Turner & Müller 2002, Williams 
2005).  
In this thesis the project life cycle is considered as a sequence of five distinct phases: 
conceptualization, planning, execution, control, and closing which could be commonly 
represented as a function of cost and time (PMI 2004, Nicholas 2001, Perret & Jaffeux, 2002 
:68-70), as shown in the picture below.  
 
Figure 2-2 : Project life-cycle; Source: Perret, Jaffeux (2002) 
 
This representation suggests that during the project life cycle, the cost, in general, and the cost 
of changes in a particular are not constant. As an example, the project cost and staffing level 
are not high in the beginning; they will reach a peak on the execution phase and will decrease 
towards the closure. Also, the cost of changes will evolve with the project. It is clear that it 
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would be costlier to modify a project which reached the execution phase compared to one 
found in the early stages of its life cycle (conceptualization). Related to the project ability, to 
achieve its objectives within the committed budget and timeframe, we define the project 
performance. The adopted approach is known in project management basics as the “golden 
triangle”, named so because each side represent a constraint and the modification of one 
constraint will automatically impact the other constraints (Nicholas 2001, Lundin & 
Söderholm 1995, Turner 2006). From this perspective, the cost overrun is considered to occur 
when the actual cost of the project is higher than the budget. It is typically calculated as a 
percentage (actual costs minus budgeted costs) in percent of budgeted costs; or as a ratio 
obtained by dividing actual costs over budgeted costs. 
Historical examples of costs overruns include: the Sydney Opera House (1,400 %) or 
Concorde supersonic airplane (1,100 %). 
 
2.3.2 Project Organization   
The organization structure denotes the types of relationships which bonds its elements. The 
formal and informal structures coexist in any organization (Nicholas 2001 p.173-176, p.433-
445). The first element relates to the hierarchy, reporting relationships, and group tasks. It 
shows the official communication channels and is publicized in a chart. The second element 
refers to informal connections, which are stated nowhere and developed and evolve through 
interactions among people (e.g. Nicholas 2001p.433-470, Perret & Jaffeux 2002 p.75, 
PMBOK 2004 p. 24-32). 
There are several forms of project organization available. They are strategically chosen to fit 
the project’s characteristics (complexity, size, duration) and scope (product development, 
infrastructure, etc.). They are summarized in the picture below, which is adapted from 
PMBOK (2004) and Nicholas (2001). 
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Figure 2-3: The choice of project organization layout (source Nicholas 2001& PMBoK 2004) 
 
When there are complex infrastructure projects, which require a major resource commitment, 
a pure project organization form is required. This is a separate entity, similar to any 
organization, in which necessary resources are reunited with the scope to achieve the required 
objectives. Taking into account the size and complexity, undertaking such a pure project 
organization will rely on the effectiveness of liaisons16, teams, and taskforces17 (Nicholas 
2001). 
A variation of the pure project organization form, which is often used in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, is the “stand-alone project”. This concept refers to an organization 
created specifically for the purpose of completing the project from different players such as 
the owner, contractors and subcontractors, suppliers and consultants, etc. As a characteristic, 
                                                 
16 Liaison – denotes the role of a person (or group) which links to departments at lower levels 
17 Task force – is a temporary team of persons with different backgrounds reunited to solve  a problem 
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project actors are not involved in the entire project life cycle but in specific phases that are in 
accordance with their competences (PMI 2004). 
These features will be useful for the general knowledge of this study results.   
2.3.3 Critical events 
In this thesis, critical events are understood as unexpected events with a high impact on the 
project’s objectives and/or its survival. Practical examples of critical events in infrastructure 
projects are: geological surprises, unforeseen events related to technology (new, not tested, 
changes in standard requirements, not tested processes), problems with underfunding, 
disruption of material supply, safety regulation changes, contracting breaches, etc.  
According to Hirschmann (1967), it is common to assign these events as uncertainties that 
either occur on the “supply” or on the “demand” side. The supply side refers to the 
uncertainties connected with the process of production of the project’s output (the 
infrastructure itself) and the demand side refers to the service provision, or otherwise known 
as the service offered by the project output. From this perspective, the events which occur in 
the execution phase (e.g. technological and geological surprises, material supply disruption, 
etc.) will fall traditionally on the supply side. On the demand side, the main source of 
uncertainty, and therefore unexpected problems, is the disequilibrium in the service provision. 
This occurs in the case of an inaccurate demand forecast (Flyvbjerg 2006) as in the illustrative 
case of Channel Tunnel18 (Morris & Hough, 1987). Here, overly optimistic prospects of future 
traffic and a lack of consideration for ferry competition (Anguerra 2006) resulted in a rate of 
return on investment of -14%, driven by a number of users “approximately half of those 
forecasted” (Flyvbjerg 2009).   
Another way to classify unexpected events is based on the extent at which they could be 
influenced by the project management (Perret & Jaffeux 2002, p.68; Barber 2005). In this 
respect, endogenous events are those under the direct influence of the project management; 
such as management style, contractual relations, skills, etc. Exogenous events are created by 
the environment and therefore project management cannot (normally) influence them. 
Examples of exogenous events are politics (aggressive forces, unjustified political 
                                                 
18 “The final cost of the tunnel was £12 billion, and left Eurotunnel plc, the Anglo-French company that built the 
tunnel, £9 billion in debt. In its first year, it made a loss of £925 million. Its first net profit was announced in 
March 1999” (Helicon Publishing, 2009) 
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interferences), economic or institutional changes (inflation, change of regulation), 
environmentally related (the undesirable impacts of a project’s outputs on life or well-being), 
and demand related events. In the table below, we combine both perspectives in order to 
classify the critical events based on the nature of uncertainties that can occur on the 
demand/supply side of project’s output and the project management’s influence. This 
classification will be particularly useful in the selection of the research design. The events on 
the supply side relate to the process of production of a project’s outputs and human and 
financial factors. Each category contains endogenous and exogenous critical events. On the 
demand side, the main source of uncertainty that could lead to critical events remains the 
demand disequilibrium, which is by definition exogenous.  
 
Figure 2-4: Critical events classification (Based on Hirschmann 1967) 
 
It is common to say that the critical events could appear at anytime in the project’s life-cycle 
(Williams 2005, Eden 2005). As our definition suggests, their criticality does not refer to their 
drama but it is based on the significance of their consequences (Angelides 2001) and the 
meaning given to them by the players (Trip 1993). Critical incidents tend to mark significant 
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turning points or changes in the life of a person or an institution; or in some social 
phenomenon, and they are often unplanned, unanticipated, and uncontrolled (Tripp, 1993). In 
respect to the critical events, we study the troubled project behavior, which is understood in 
relation to punctual and overtime impacts on critical events in the project system.  The 
measures taken made by different actors to limit or mitigate these impacts and manifested 
factors and conditions, influenced the positive adjustment of the project system. They are 
called the resilience enablers.    
2.3.4 Resilience and resilience enablers 
In management studies, resilience is often defined as a characteristic or capacity of 
individuals or organizations to maintain positive adjustment—or even thrive—under adverse 
conditions (Sutcliffe & Vogus , 2003). 
We propose this definition of resilience, because is the most exhaustive since it encapsulates 
both images of resilience embraced by its research adepts, specifically the “’super material’ 
facet, which could be translated into a characteristic” or “attribute” (Anderson 1994; 
Anthony 1987; Werner 1990, Luthar, et al. 2000; Wanberg & Banas 2002; Cicchetti & 
Garmezy 1993; Masten 2001; Masten & Reed 2002; Kelly 2001) and the developmental 
perspective, which lead to understanding the resilience as a dynamic process of positive 
adaptation (Egeland et al. 1993;  Wildavsky 1988 p:120, Sitkin 1992; Levinthal and March 
(1981, 1993); Teece et al. 1997; Weick et al. 1999; Eisenhardt & Martin  2000; Porras & 
Silvers 1991). 
Similarly, we propose to define project resilience as its capacity or characteristic to maintain 
positive adjustments when confronted with critical events that are inherent in its life-cycle. As 
this study is concerned with the project’s performance with respect to its costs and delays, 
positive adjustment is understood here as “costs and delays to keep on track”. 
In the same area, we propose to define resilience enablers as those conditions and factors (if 
any) which facilitate the manifestation of project resilience in face of critical events. As 
recommended by Masten (2001), as well as Suttcliffe & Vogus (2003), we shall identify and 
assess these enablers in respect to the critical event (evidence of threat) and the performance / 
objectives (evidence of positive adjustment). 
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At this stage of research, these working definitions have a guiding role and are grounded 
based on the literature. The case study’s empirical findings will allow us to validate and 
update these proposed definitions.  
2.4 Research locus within the chair activities  
The Chair of Logistics, Economics, and Management is responsible for the development of 
methods and tools for systemic analysis, project evaluation, and uses logistics, as a science, 
which is applied to the management of physical and logical flows. This study is fully  
integrated into the chair’s activities, as its main objective is to shed light onto the dynamic-
ness of complex projects by analysing their system’s city with a new perspective offered by 
the concept of project resilience. The scope is to reveal those factors and conditions, which 
will help the project to stay on the track, of committed budgets and delays in spite of the 
negative impacts of unexpected critical events.  The field of this study is also compatible with 
the researcher’s background and her former working experience.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“Budding investigators think that the purpose of a literature review is to determine the 
answers about what is known on a topic; in contrast, experienced investigators review 
previous research to develop sharper and more insightful questions about the topic” 
(Yin, 1994).  
For this research, one main stream of literature was targeted. The review process covers the 
period between 1960 and 2006 on the theory of critical success and failure factors (CSF). The 
material reviewed comprises both, academic research as well as works by international project 
management organizations.  The target was to acquire a holistic image on the conditions and 
factors proposed from the literature for the management of successful project and related 
research methods. For many years, the factors denoting effective monitoring and control and 
risk management processes were considered critical in the development of major 
infrastructures (Fortune & White, 2006; Morris & Hough, 1987). Therefore, a particular 
attention was given to the review of critical success factors associated with risk and 
uncertainty management, and controlling and planning. Therefore, this part should be seen as 
a completion of the literature review done in the previous chapter, which aimed to ground the 
research problem.  
 
3.1 The Challenge of Identifying the Critical Factors Leading to Project 
Success19 
The scope of this literature is to search for the conditions essential to the success of a project 
(Turner, 2004). From a methodological perspective, research of critical success and failure 
factors includes surveys, case studies, or theoretical papers about successful and unsuccessful 
projects (Fortune & White 2006). As a general observation, there is little agreement among 
the authors as to which factors are critical to a project’s success (White 2006) and their  
                                                 
19 We understand project management success measured against the project declared objectives (De Wit, 1987). 
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domain applicability (Belassi, 1996). However, from the seminal work of Avots (1969), 
Martin (1976), Cooke-Davies (2002), and White & Fortune (2002), there are some factors that 
reoccur systematically in all studies.  They are summarized with relevant citations in Table 
3:1. This overview relies heavily on a study of White and Fortune (2002) who reported on the 
findings in a survey involving over 995 project managers. Their response rate was 27.2%. It 
revealed that: 1) “The three criteria most used in literature (on time, to budget, and to 
specification) were also the highest ranked success criteria identified.” 2) “46% of projects 
have been described as generating side effects.” 3) “The identified critical factors for a 
project’s success were realistic schedules, adequate resources, and support from senior 
management.”  The same study revealed two important criticisms of critical success factors. 
1) The CSF approach does not consider the changes occurred throughout project’s life cycle 
and 2) The CSF implementation is seen as a static process, ignoring the potential for a factor 
to have varying levels of importance at different stages in the implementation process (Larsen 
and Meyers 1999, in Fortune and White 2006). 
 
Critical factor Literature 
Common vision, 
Goal alignment, 
senior management 
support 
Avots [1969]; Morris [1986]; Pinto and Slevin [1987]; Morris and Hough [1987]; Magal 
et al. [1988]; Pinto and Mantel [1990]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Yap et al. [1992]; 
Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Tennant [1993]; Selin and Selin [1994]; The Standish Group 
[2000]; Couillard [1995]; Wastell and Newman [1996]; Munns and Bjeirmi [1996]; 
Belassi and Tukel [1996]; KPMG [1997]; McCormack [1997]; McGolpin and Ward 
[1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Kasser and Williams [1998]; Whittaker [1999]; Turner [1999]; 
Weir [1999]; Taylor [2000]; Thite [2000]; Poon and Wagner [2001]; Cooke-Davies 
[2002]; Andersen et al. [2002]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld 
[2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Clear realistic 
objectives 
 
Baker et al. [1983]; Morris [1986]; Hughes [1995]; Pinto and Slevin [1987]; Pinto and 
Mantel [1990] Tennant [1993]; Selin and Selin [1994]; Harding [1995]; Couillard [1995]; 
Yeo [1995]; Wateridge [1995]; The Standish Group [2000]; Beare [1995]; Tan [1996]; 
Cicmil [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Glass [1998]; Kasser and Williams [1998]; Clarke 
[1999]; Weir [1999]; Taylor [2000]; Thite [2000]; Poon and Wagner [2001]; Anderson et 
al. [2002]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Strong/detailed 
plan kept up to date 
 
Avots [1969]; Baker et al. [1983]; Cleland and King [1983]; Morris [1986]; Morris and 
Hough [1987]; Pinto and Mantel [1990]; Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Martinez [1994]; The 
Standish Group [2000]; Wateridge [1995]; Smart [1995]; Williams [1995]; Belassi and 
Tukel [1996]; KPMG [1997]; McGolpin and Ward [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Kasser and 
Williams [1998]; Glass [1998]; Clarke [1999]; Turner [1999]; Taylor [2000]; Andersen et 
al. [2002]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Good 
communication/ 
Avots [1969]; Cleland and King [1983]; Morris [1986]; Hughes [1995]; Pinto and Slevin 
[1987]; Curtis et al. [1988]; Magal et al. [1988]; Pinto and Mantel [1990]; McComb and 
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feedback Smith [1991]; Cash and Fox [1992]; Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Wateridge [1995]; Tan [1996]; Gowan and Mathieu[1996]; Hilderbrand [1996]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Kasser and 
Williams [1998]; Clarke [1999]; Turner [1999]; Thite [2000]; Cooke-Davies [2002]; 
Andersen et al. [2002]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
User/client 
involvement 
 
Morris [1986]; Pinto and Slevin [1987]; Curtis et al. [1988]; Magal et al. [1988]; Pinto and 
Mantel [1990]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Yap et al. [1992]; Wateridge [1995]; Smart 
[1995]; Wastell and Newman [1996]; Belassi and Tukel [1996]; Cicmil [1997]; 
McCormack [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Jang and Lee [1998]; Turner [1999]; Caldeira and 
Ward [2002]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Skilled/suitably 
qualified/sufficient 
staff/team 
Baker et al. [1983]; Morris [1986]; Pinto and Slevin [1987]; Curtis et al. [1988]; Magal et 
al. [1988]; Pinto and Mantel [1990]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Cash and Fox [1992]; 
Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Tennant [1993]; Willcocks and Griffiths [1994]; The Standish 
Group [2000]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Glass [1998]; Jang and Lee [1998]; Poon and Wagner 
[2001]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Westerveld [2003] 
 
Effective change 
management 
Avots [1969]; Pinto and Mantel [1990]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Cash and Fox 
[1992]; Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Martinez [1994]; Willcocks and Griffiths [1994]; 
Smart [1995]; The Standish Group [2000]; Hougham [1996]; Cicmil [1997]; McGolpin 
and Ward [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Weir [1999]; Taylor [2000]; Thite [2000]; Poon and 
Wagner [2001]; Cooke-Davies [2002]; Yeo [2002] 
 
Competent project 
manager 
Avots [1969]; Baker et al. [1983]; Morris [1986]; Pinto and Slevin [1987]; Pollalis and 
Frieze [1993]; Martinez [1994]; Pinto and Kharbanda [1984]; Belassi and Tukel [1996]; 
Dvir et al. [1998]; Glass [1998]; Weir [1999]; Taylor [2000]; Andersen et al. [2002]; 
Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Strong business 
case/sound basis 
for project 
Avots [1969]; Smart [1995]; Pinto and Kharbanda [1996]; KPMG [1997]; McGolpin and 
Ward [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Whittaker [1999]; Poon and Wagner [2001]; Cooke-
Davies [2002]; Andersen et al. [2002]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Yeo [2002]; 
Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Sufficient/well 
allocated resources 
Morris [1986]; Pinto and Slevin [1987]; Morris and Hough [1987]; Yap et al. [1992]; 
Tennant [1993]; McCormack [1997]; The Standish Group [2000]; Belassi and Tukel 
[1996]; Gowan and Mathieu [1996]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Kasser and Williams [1998]; 
Turner [1999]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
  
Proven/familiar 
technology 
Morris [1986]; Pinto and Mantel [1990]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Cannon [1994]; 
Williams [1995]; Yeo [1995]; KPMG [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Glass [1998]; Poon and 
Wagner [2001]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Yeo [2002] 
 
Realistic schedule Cleland and King [1983]; Morris [1986]; Morris and Hough [1987]; Pinto and Mantel 
[1990]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Tennant [1993]; Selin and Selin [1994]; Dvir et al. 
[1998]; Glass [1998]; Kasser and Williams [1998]; Weir [1999]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld 
[2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Risks 
addressed/assessed/ 
managed 
Morris and Hough [1987]; Selin and Selin [1994]; Williams [1995]; KPMG [1997]; 
Baldry [1998]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Whittaker [1999]; Weir [1999]; Cooke-Davies [2002]; 
Yeo [2002]; Westerveld [2003] 
  3-40
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
  
Effective 
monitoring/control 
McComb and Smith [1991]; Cash and Fox [1992]; Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Selin and 
Selin [1994]; Cicmil [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Weir [1999]; Thite [2000]; Poon and 
Wagner [2001]; Cooke-Davies [2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Adequate budget Baker et al. [1983]; Cleland and King [1983]; Morris and Hough [1987]; Dvir et al. 
[1998]; McComb and Smith [1991]; Tennant [1993]; Glass [1998]; Caldeira and Ward, 
[2002]; Westerveld [2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Organisational 
adaptation/culture/s
tructure 
Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Cannon [1994]; Willcocks and Griffiths [1994]; Martinez 
[1994]; Couillard [1995]; Hougham [1996]; Taylor [2000]; Thite [2000]; Cooke-Davies 
[2002] 
 
Good performance 
by 
suppliers/contractor
s/ consultants 
Morris and Hough [1987]; Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; McCormack [1997]; KPMG [1997]; 
Glass [1998]; Jang and Lee [1998]; Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Yeo [2002]; Westerveld 
[2003]; Turner [2004] 
 
Planned close 
down/review/accep
tance of possible 
failure 
Avots [1969]; Cleland and King [1983]; Pinto and Kharbanda [1996]; Munns and Bjeirmi 
[1996]; McCormack [1997] McGolpin and Ward [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998] 
 
Training provision Magal et al. [1988]; Yap et al. [1992]; Pinto and Kharbanda [1995]; Pinto and Kharbanda 
[1996]; McCormack [1997]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Caldeira and Ward [2002] 
 
Political stability Morris and Hough [1987]; Pollalis and Frieze [1993]; Tennant [1993]; Sauer [1993]; Yeo 
[1995]; Pinto and Kharbanda [1996] 
 
Correct choice/past 
experience 
methodology, tools 
Hughes [1995]; Munns and Bjeirmi [1996]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Glass [1998]; Jang and Lee 
[1998]; Turner [2004] 
 
Environmental 
influences 
 
Morris [1986]; Cleland and King [1983]; Archibald [1992]; Pinto and Kharbanda [1996]; 
Caldeira and Ward [2002]; Westerveld [2003] 
 
Learning from past 
experience  
 
Yap et al. [1992]; Dvir et al. [1998]; Jordan et al. [1988]; Sauer [1993]; Cooke-Davies 
[2002] 
 
Large, complex, 
duration (over 3 
years) 
 
Hughes [1995]; Selin and Selin [1994]; Cannon [1994]; Cooke-Davies [2002] 
  
Table 3-1: Critical success factors in infrastructure development projects (Based on Fortune & White 
2006) 
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The general aim in these studies is to identify those factors that impact project performance. 
Therefore, it overlooks their relative importance during a project’s life cycle and the 
relationships it has with project components. Belassi and Tukel (1996) were a step ahead 
when they proposed a more systematic approach to CSF research.  They proposed a new 
framework in which critical success / failure factors are assigned to different areas: 1) project 
related 2) management and staff related and 3) organizational and project environment 
related.  This conveyed the identification of statistically significant relationships between 
critical success factors and project structural attributes. (E.g. “When project size and value are 
critical factors, projects will need a matrix organization; when time is used to measure project 
success, the project management’s skills and communication among team members become 
critical to the project’s success”). Another study that addressed CSF dynamics, was Pinto & 
Slevin (1987). They focused on the relative importance of CSF for each stage of a project’s 
life cycle development (strategic vs. tactical) over the entire project’s life cycle. They found 
that the relative importance of success factors varies and depends on the measures used. 
The number of articles covering CSF in infrastructure projects is not overwhelming. As a 
common denominator, there are cases of large complex projects with great economical 
potential, as in Morris and Hough (1987), and Pinto and Slevin (1987, 1989). The identified 
CSF’s patterns relate to common vision, senior management support, and strong monitoring 
and control. 
The first conclusion that stands out after reviewing the literature on CSF is that it does not 
offer insight into which factors contribute the most in maintaining performance in case of 
crises.  
 
3.2 Criticisms of CSF to Project Performance 
The critical successes and failures are supposed to supply a formula for the desired end of the 
project. However, very often this list is long and difficult to implement in practice. As stated 
above, there is limited knowledge on how these factors will evolve during the project’s life 
cycle, their relative importance, and their relationships with the project components.   
Another drawback is that it does not take into account how project environmental changes 
will impact them. We can see that “one size does not fill all,” or that one set of factors does 
not apply to all situations (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007).  
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The next sections discuss why Risk Management Processes, Planning, and Controlling, 
indicated in a majority of the cases as essential CSF, cannot alone ensure an infrastructure’s 
project performance.  
 
3.2.1 Risk Management Processes  
The concept of risk describes the assessment of the frequency of occurrence and magnitude of 
consequences associated with hazard (stressor) activity (Hood and Jones, 1996). Risk 
management implies a mixture of anticipation (looking forward) and resilience (bouncing 
back), conferring upon risk management models to encapsulate perspectives that cover 
growth and distress.   One limit of this approach comes from the risk management process 
itself. According to the PMBOK20, the risk management process consists of four phases: a) 
risk identification, b) risk quantification, c) risk response development, and d) risk response 
control. PMBOK described it with a two-time period model. In time 1, the present, (a) risks 
are identified and (b) future states are analysed. Their probability distributions lead to a 
rational plan of outcomes that maximizes the probability of positive outcomes. In time 2, the 
future, the plan is implemented (c) and the consequences of the risks are controlled (d). As a 
consequence, this approach implicitly assumes that the project management during the project 
is essentially passive. This is so because it follows the implemented plan and the risks are 
known and constant. However, reality of projects proves that in practice, this assumption does 
not hold. 
Another limit from assuming that futures states are known and definable, is that the 
probability based paradigm overlooks the uncertainty with regard to human actions, thus 
making the future unknowable. A related limit from assumptions, is that the derived methods 
are predominately quantitative and therefore normative (PMBoK, 2004, PMI 2002). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Project Management Body of Knowledge 
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3.2.2 Planning and Control 
Planning and control are essential functions of project management. Planning is needed to 
coordinate people’s activities, deliver materials, and allocate resources. “Deciding and 
specifying what to do is the function of project planning. Making sure that this is done right is 
the function of project control” (Nicholas, 2001:159). 
It is a fact of life that planning and control, although indispensable, cannot alone guarantee a 
project’s performance for at least two reasons. 
On one hand, the embedded idea in traditional project management that planning is the cure 
for project uncertainty turns out to be not true in the reality of projects. It is costly to elaborate 
a detailed plan and requires a lot of time, while it cannot totally eliminate the uncertainty in a 
project. The side effect of detailed planning is a complicated plan, which is often hard to 
understand and change (rigid). This is illustrated in Annex 8 - Limitations of Planning Tools. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
The literature discussed in this chapter leads to the following concluding remarks: 
 There is no research that connects the non-performance of projects to their lack of 
resilience when faced with unexpected events that are inherent in their life cycle. 
 The traditional theories and tools to ensure and control the project performance have 
limitations, mainly due to their key assumptions. 
 There is no explicit research on the evolution of the critical success factors during a 
project’s life cycle. 
 “Project management has long been considered as an academic field for planning-
oriented techniques and, in many respects, an application of engineering science and 
optimization theories.” Although it has received a wider interest from other academic 
disciplines lately, very limited literature exists on analysing projects or their 
management from other disciplines’ perspectives. 
 A large amount of research has been devoted to the search for success factors, but less 
effort has been allocated to studying the conditions and factors that enable the 
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project’s system to cope successfully with the unexpected events. This implies that 
relationships between projects’ structural elements and CSF are underexplored. 
 Knowledge about project behavior when confronted with unexpected events (troubled 
project behavior) is limited.  
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4 A QUALITATIVE EXPLORATORY RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is common to say that making the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research 
could often be misleading. Research is rather distinguished, between deductive and inductive 
or hypothesis testing and theory building, but all are carried out with the scope of adding 
value to an existent body of knowledge. The choice for the research design of this study takes 
into account the status quo of the current research into the behavior of the project when 
confronted with critical events and the goals of this study. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
suggested that researchers should use qualitative research design when there is a need for 
deep understanding, local contextualisation, and exposing the points of view of the people 
under the study.  
Looking from their perspective at our research problem, qualitative research in this study will 
consist of:  
Collecting empirical data to identify the enablers of resilience, or otherwise said, the 
factors and conditions enhancing the successful completion of projects confronted with 
critical events 
Collecting empirical data, which are qualitative in nature; they are primarily drawn 
from interviews with project stakeholders involved in the design and construction of two 
major infrastructure projects21   
Data analysis will focus on the interpretation and conceptualization of the phenomenon 
of troubled project behaviour 
 
                                                 
21 Lötschberg rail tunnel basis achieved in 2007 and Gotthard  rail tunnel basis actually under construction 
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Furthermore, according to Yin (1994) every research design (surveys, experiments, case 
studies) can be either exploratory, explanatory, or theory testing. The logic behind this 
division is given by the level to which the phenomenon under study has been elaborated in 
theory. Exploration is needed when a theory is lacking credibility and research is needed to 
uncover which attributes of the phenomenon (variables) are important for further research. 
Description is concerned with the frequency of the reoccurrence of variables, while 
explanatory research aims to test a hypothesis on causal relations of variables. Given the lack 
of theory about the behaviour of troubled projects and their capabilities of coping when 
confronted with critical events, it becomes clear that this study should be exploratory in 
nature. Our main concern is to collect and analyze rich data on project behaviour when they 
are confronted with critical events in order to develop a middle range theory22. 
 
4.2 Why case studies 
Within an exploratory qualitative research design, several research strategies could be 
adopted. A case study is an inquiry into an empirical phenomenon which has a close 
relationship and unclear boundary with a real-life context (Yin 2003). The case study strategy 
is appropriate if the following three conditions exist: a (1) “how” or “why” question is asked 
about (2) a contemporary set of events (3) over which the investigator has little or no 
control.(Yin 1994,2004). 
The in-depth information about a troubled project’s behaviour cannot be gathered by 
addressing the “who, what, where, how many, or how much” questions, they should rather 
look into survey strategies or analysis of archival, as in economic research (Yin, 1981a; 
Edmonson & Manus 2007). Similarly, the questions formulated in this research are the “how” 
and “why” questions and they deal with the “operational links needing to be traced overtime, 
rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin 1994, Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). 
Furthermore, the study’s focus is on a “contemporary set of events” because it concerns the 
study of events that have occurred recently in the project life cycle as opposed to older events.  
                                                 
22 Middle range theory, developed by Robert K. Merton “is an approach to sociological theorizing aimed at 
integrating theory and empirical research”. Middle-range theory starts with an empirical phenomenon and 
abstracts from it to create testable hypothesis (Merton, R.K. "Social Theory and Social Structure” (1968) 
Enlarged Ed ed. Free Press. ISBN 0029211301 
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Historical data would have not been appropriated in this study for at least two reasons; 
collection of rich data about how the event and its impacts unfolded over time would have 
been dependent on the interviewed person’s capacity to remember and it is known that 
people’s memory alters over time. In the same respect, uncovering resilience enablers in 
projects to be used today, the reference must be made in contrast with modern management 
theories and therefore historical projects will not have complied with these criteria.  
Moreover, an event that has occurred in the past and was already studied ensures that the 
researcher did not have any control over the event under study and could not influence its 
project behaviour.  
Last but not least, as explained by Siggelkow (2007), “if only limited theoretical knowledge 
exists about a particular phenomenon, an inductive research strategy that lets theory emerge 
from data can be a valuable starting point”.  
The arguments highlighted above support the fact that this study is justified by a 
phenomenon-driven inquiry, for which there is a lack of viable theory and limited empirical 
evidence, and therefore the case study strategy is appropriate. The next step is to design the 
case study. According to Yin (1994, p.20-25) the “five components of research design that are 
especially important for case studies are 1) a study’s questions, 2) its propositions, if any, 3) 
its unit of analysis, 4) the logic linking the data to the propositions, and 5) the criteria for 
interpreting the findings. Each of these elements will be addressed in the following section. 
 
 Components of research design in case studies 
Study questions were previously discussed in respect to their suitability for a case study 
strategy in this research. The main study question is: How do projects cope with the critical 
events that occur at some point in their life cycle? 
And the supporting study question, which could be derived from the first one, is:  
Why and how could some troubled projects maintain a positive adjustment after the critical 
event while others cannot?   
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Their scope is to shed light on the behavior of a project’s system when it is confronted with 
critical events, and to reveal those factors that might enhance its positive adjustments after the 
critical events. In comparison to the question “why do projects still fail?” which drove this 
research in the first place, these study questions are more precise and directly relate to the 
phenomenon under study (troubled project behavior).  
Study propositions are not necessary in research strategies in which the topic is focused on 
“exploration” (Yin 1994, p: 21). However every exploration should still have some purpose.  
From this perspective, the scope of our exploration is to study how critical events unfolded 
and impacted the project’s objectives and related performance. This will be done by capturing 
their effects, positive and negative, in the aftermath of the critical event and the overtime. 
The unit of analysis is the project system itself; its selection resulted from specifying, as 
accurately as possible, the research questions. The focus is on its behaviour when confronted 
with critical events. This is understood with respect to (1) the critical events unfolding but 
refers as well (2) to the actions made by a project’s actors to limit or eliminate the punctual or 
overtime impacts of the critical events. From the methodological perspective, critical events 
are seen as a useful way of managing great volumes of qualitative research data (Angelides, 
2001). For this research study, they are particularly appropriate because they “qualify” the 
threat (one cannot come to a conclusion about the eventual positive adjustment of a project 
system without evidence of a potential threat to its expected performance and objectives).   
 The case study’s physical boundaries are given by the project’s system components, as 
described in chapter 6, while the time boundaries result from the project life cycle.  
Another important element of the research design refers to linking the data to propositions 
and setting the criteria for interpreting the findings. This is in reference to the data analysis. 
Since the “current state of art does not provide specific guidance in this respect” (Yin 1994), 
the data analysis process in this study will follow the model and insights of the most quoted 
authors. They are those who based their research on case studies such as Mintzberg and 
Waters (1982), Hargadon and Douglas (2001). We have also followed the recommendations 
of the authors who are particularly sympathetic to qualitative research. These are the authors 
who wrote about: building theory from case studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), the 
properties of rich description in case study (Weick, 2007), ethical issues in qualitative data 
analysis (Miles & Hubermann, 1994), the persuasion power of case study research  
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(Siggelkow, 2007), and the importance of methodological fit in any type of research 
(Edmonson & Mcmanus, 2007).  
As a result, this case study is in a “narrative that is interspersed with quotations from key 
informants and other supporting evidence with the aim to demonstrate the close connection 
between data and emergent theory”. The last was developed by “recognizing patterns of 
relationships among constructs and their underlying arguments”.  
For the critical event analysis, some elements of systems’ theory were used as suggested by 
Williams 2005 (Cicmil et. al 2006). This approach facilitates to define the critical events and 
understand their dynamics in relation to the project structure. Technically, the project was 
represented as a system of components linked to reach a final objective. By visualizing the 
complex interdependencies between the various parts of the project, we set out to capture the 
causal feedback induced by the critical events and their punctual and long-term effects.  
A data analysis process concluded with an assessment of the theoretical contribution (Whetten 
1989) with terms of: proposed concepts and constructs relevance (what), how are they related 
(links), causality explanation (why), and a general overview (who, where, when).  
 
4.3 Data collection  
As with Miles & Hubermann, 1994 (34:37), our case fits into the situation in which there are 
exploratory and confirmatory times, with exploration at the outset and confirmation near the 
end. Consequently, little prior implementation with structured instrument designs will be 
alternatively used. In this respect, the concern during data collection was to allow for “open 
ended” interviews. This allows for the interpretation to occur along the way (the interviewed 
person is allowed to discover new relationships or patterns on the spot) combined with highly 
structured control (critical incident technique) in order to avoid deluding the interviewer to 
total control. Also, it ensures the quality of the data collected and the way the analysis was 
carried out. In establishing the data collection method, we deliberately wanted to cover the 
contextual conditions, which we believe to be highly pertinent for the study of troubled 
project behaviour. The main validity factors considered were:  
Ensure that the interviewers presence will not disturb the interview’s setting  
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Have well-grounded concepts 
Get comparable measured responses from different people 
Primary and secondary data collection from different sources was combined in order to tackle 
a broad range of chronological, attitudinal, and behavioural issues. Primary data collection 
prioritized the unstructured interviews with the various project actors. The discussions 
focused on the critical event that was unfolding and were carried out according with a 
technique adapted from disaster management research. This technique has an advantage of 
minimizing the biases given by both interviewer and interviewee.  The fact that the object of 
the study received long lasting media coverage and public attention, offered the unique 
opportunity to use data from the media broadcasts that were realized at different moments 
within the project life cycle. However, this is also obliged to careful triangulation of the 
information from primary data sources. This must be done in order to be able to discern the 
facts beyond actors’ testimonies, to look for patterns, and similitude of the data collected.  
Collected data is qualitative in nature. The data on which this report is based will include: 
interviews transcripts, feedback reports, ails, phone conversations, T.V. broadcast reportages, 
information from the web sites, and company documents.   
The primary data was mostly comprised in semi-structured interviews. The informants 
included political personalities, high level managers, operation managers, outsourcing 
companies’ managers (Lötschberg), and the managing director of the company in charge of 
all technical feasibility studies of the Gotthard tunnel base.  
As in any qualitative research, the processes of data collection, data analysis, and the 
development and verification of relationships (and theory-building) were interrelated.  
Specifically, the first round of data collection was followed by an analysis. This led to new 
questions, or refining old questions, for the second round of data collection; which in turn led 
to discover new patterns and relationships in the previously collected data.  
The process is pictured in the figure below and served as the “grounding of themes and 
findings to the data”, in accordance with Glasser and Strauss (1967) and Eisenhardt (1989).   
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Figure 4-1: Data collection process 
Another source of primary data was written records. Written internal documents were offered 
by the respondents. They encompass the common procedures related to quality and safety 
management, on-site communication roles, and the responsibilities matrix.  
The secondary sources of data include reports, press releases, newspapers articles, and 
company web sites. They were mostly used to gather information at the organisation level. At 
the project level, other sources of data were meeting minutes, project progress reports, activity 
scheduling and planning, and budgets.  
Taking into account the amount of funding and the strategic importance of this project, the 
organization and its control integration of the authorities, different organizations and services 
(OFT23, DETEC24) represent the confederation’s interests and they issue several reports on a 
regular basis. These are publicly available on their websites and have been used as secondary 
sources of data.  
 
4.3.1 Interviews  
The semi-structured interviews were the first source of empirical data in this study. Four sites 
were visited and interviews were performed with high–level managers from the two different  
                                                 
23 « Office Fédéral de Transport » (French) 
24 « Département Fédéral de l’environnement, transport de l’énergie et de la communication » (French) 
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project organizations, security specialists, consultants (designers) and political representatives 
(see Annex 2, and Annex 4).  
At each site, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a prepared list of questions, 
lasting from two to four hours.  Technically, the critical event interview method was adopted. 
This is derived from the critical incident technique developed by Flanagan (1954) and has the 
advantage to “minimize the biases introduced by both interviewer and interviewee”. It was 
successfully used in the research of the failure of high reliable organisations (nuclear power 
plants, airlines) and disaster management research. Annex 3 provides details about this 
technique that were considered relevant for this study.   
Whenever appropriate, questions “not in the list” were asked (questions and discussion topics 
in Annex 5). Eight in-depth interviews were realized (minimum two hours each) in two 
rounds. The additional information, whenever needed, was requested by e-mail.   
Interview transcripts elaborated within 3-5 days after the interviews; these were the main 
source for primary data. Other primary data sources included phone conversations and e-mail 
exchanges between May 2008-March 2009.   
Agreement among sources within the same project organization was found to be moderately 
high. It was estimated that the percentage of agreement between sources was in excess of 
85%. Between interviews and written records, consistence was also moderately high. 
Discrepancies were clarified by telephone or mail whenever possible. The critical events were 
chronicled based on the sources above. The main criteria for providing details about the 
critical events, which were not publicly mediatized, were as follows: for factual statements 
and intervention strategies that involved several participants, we required at least one source 
to agree and no source to deny that the event happened.  Personal statements and anecdotes 
were reproduced in the narrative, as they were told.  
 
4.3.2 Rationale for the choice of NRLA case 
It is common to say (e.g.  Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007; Yin 1994; Miles and Hubbermann, 
1994) that in case study research, theoretical, and not random or stratified, sampling is 
appropriate. Furthermore, the same authors assert that the theoretical sampling of single cases 
should be straightforward.  
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“They are chosen because they are unusually revelatory, extreme exemplars, or opportunities 
for unusual research access”. The case25 of the “New Rail Link through the Alps” (NRLA) 
project was strategically selected for this study because of the following reasons: 
This case is revelatory for the topic under study in the acceptance of Yin (1994; 2004), and 
Flyvbjerg (2006), in the sense that it offers the unique opportunity to study, in-depth, one of 
the largest infrastructure projects of this century. Also, it consists of “two projects in one,” 
meaning that it offers the unique chance to gain insight into two different project 
organisations. This turned out to display different coping capabilities and approaches to their 
confrontation with similar critical events. 
The proximity combined with the access to several sources (political, practitioners, scientists, 
and the media) offered the opportunity to develop a significant case study as defined by Yin 
(2004).  The proximity was a particularly valuable attribute in gathering empirical data 
(testimonies) from the actors who quit the project immediately after the life cycle phase; in 
which their involvment was completed (e.g. designers and engineers who participated in the 
feasibilities studies). 
Last but not least, during the process of data collection it became obvious that the NRLA case 
had the attributes of a “paradigmatic case” as described in Flyvbjerg (2006). Meaning in the 
sense that it “transcends any sort of standards because it sets the standard” in connection to 
the topic under study. Indeed the case displays a variety of critical events, which troubled the 
project’s course in all of the project’s life-cycle phases. In spite of huge cost overruns and 
delays, as well as a set of never ending critical events, the project was not closed. Moreover, 
its achievement was justified by the fact that the project is “the chantier of the siècle” in all  
respects26; it became a strategic objective of the Swiss transport policy. There is also a general 
belief that all the efforts put into the implementation of this infrastructure are justified, and 
will be paid back when the NRLA project will be completed. In spite of the incurred delays 
                                                 
25 Yin, (2004) argues that the “case” is the real set of events from which data will be drawn. In contrast, the “case 
study” is the substance of the research inquiry, consisting of research questions, theoretical perspectives, 
empirical findings, interpretations, and conclusions. (14-15)  
 
26 Financial, technical, geographical challenges 
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and cost overruns, the neighbouring countries show their “boundless admiration” for the 
tunnel and Swiss transport policy.27     
For the above reasons , it was considered that the interpretation of such a case could provide a 
unique wealth of information. The theories will emerge and allow the formulation of testable 
propositions about the factors and conditions (resilience enablers) that account for their 
positive/negative adjustments (performance).  
 
4.3.3 Rationale for the single-case study selection 
The previous paragraph highlighted the fact that the NRLA case is, at the same time, 
revelatory and paradigmatic, allowing for development of a significant case about a topic 
which received relatively little attention in project management literature.  As explained by 
Yin (1994; 2004), these attributes “are likely to involve only single cases, by definition, 
because the rationale for single-case design usually cannot be satisfied by multiple cases”. 
Indeed, similarly to the methodologies which use multiple experiments, (Yin 1994) the choice 
of cases in a multiple-case design research strategy must follow the replication logic. This 
means that the “same results are predicted for each of the three cases, thereby producing 
evidence that the cases did involve the same syndrome”. 
If we put the rationale for choosing the NRLA case in perspective, it becomes clear that it 
would have been difficult (if not impossible) to find representative cases of hard 
infrastructure projects exposed to similar critical events with as convenient proximity that will 
grant the same amount of access to information from various sources. Another inadvertence 
of this design would have been given by the status quo of knowledge and available theory 
about the behaviour of projects when they are confronted with critical events that are inherent 
in their life-cycle and their performance, understood here in terms of committed costs and 
delays. Specifically, as explained by Yin (1994) and Miles and Hubermann (1994), 
considering the actual status quo of research on this topic, it would have been hard (if not 
impossible) to develop a rich theoretical framework stating the conditions under which a 
                                                 
27 Cited from the article: “A tunnel that provokes “boundless admiration” by Doris Lucini and Andreas Keiser, 
swissinfo.ch 
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particular phenomenon is likely to be found (literal replication) as well as the conditions it is 
not likely to be found (a theoretical replication).  
Therefore a case study strategy used in this single case is at the same time paradigmatic and 
revelatory. It was chosen as being the most appropriate investigation tool to shed light into the 
phenomenon of troubled project behaviour when it is confronted with critical events.  
 
4.3.4 Operationalization 
In this research, the real meaningful concepts and constructs will emerge from the “analysis 
of the process itself, rather than being clearly specified a priority”, as explained in Eisenhardt, 
1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994. Nevertheless, the exploration is guided with literature 
based working definitions, sharp research questions, and clear boundaries of the research 
perimeter.    
 
4.3.5 Analytical generalization 
Case studies rely on analytical generalization (Yin 1994).  Consequently, the basis of the 
generalization in our case would not be on typical points of the project but on the existence of 
particular factors (attributes, processes) that influence the behaviour of troubled projects; in 
the sense that they could enable projects to respect the committed budget and time lines. 
These attributes and processes are revealed through the analysis of project behaviour from an 
original perspective, which is the resilience approach. In this light, the scope of analytical 
generalization in this study is to produce a middle range theory on the applicability of the 
resilience construct in the management of infrastructure projects and conceptualization of 
troubled project behaviour. This theory will contribute to an increase of the understanding of 
those conditions and factors which account for the positive adjustment when a project faces 
critical events.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the choice of the research design retained for this study. The 
arguments given aimed to demonstrate that a qualitative, exploratory strategy, articulated on a 
single case, is consistent with the phenomenon-driven research questions (chapter 2) and 
tightly scoped with the formulated problem (chapter 2) for which there is a lack of plausible 
existing theory (chapter 3).  
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5 THE NEW RAIL LINK THROUGH THE ALPS (NRLA) 
CASE STUDY   
A case study is expected to catch the complexity of one single case. A single leaf, even 
a single toothpick, has unique complexities, but rarely will we care enough to submit 
it to a case study. We study a case when it itself is of very special interest. We look for 
the detail of interactions with its context. A case study is the study of the particularity 
and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances.  
…………………………………………. 
“The case is one among the others. In any given study we will concentrate on the one. 
The time concentrating on the one may be a day or a year, but while we so 
concentrate we are engaged in case study.  
  From the “The Art of Case Study Research” by Robert E. Stake 
 
The case study presented in this chapter is described at two different, but related levels. The 
first level captures the “objective” side of the case. This is the project’s organization which 
provides a static view of the project’s system with a focus on the characteristics of the 
organization and management processes; specifically the decision process, controlling, and 
contract and risk management. The second level is the critical events, which capture the 
“subjective side” of the case. Contrary to the first level, the critical events provide a dynamic 
view on the project system. Here, the project behavior in the face of critical events is 
described based on the collected qualitative data, with the help of a systemic model developed 
for this purpose.  
 
5.1 Background 
In this section, the context of the New Rail Link through the Alps (NRLA) project, its 
challenges, and the financing structure will be described. The facts mentioned will finally 
highlight the following, very specific, features of this project: 1) the project is backed by the 
Swiss government 2) it was conferred an indubitable legitimacy by the fact that its  
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implementation will not only respond to a clear formulated demand, but it is also aligned with 
both the European and Swiss transport policies and long term objectives 3) St. Gotthard base 
tunnel is, as of today, over the initial timetable and over budget, while Lötschberg was 
achieved “on time” but with a non-negligible modification of the original design (one rail 
instead of two). Although the statement as to its “on time” completion it might be contested, 
the Lötschberg tunnel base is not valid because of the important modification to the original 
design was made. This was the way the project achievement was communicated in all official 
documents and media, and asserted as well by the project’s organization. 28  
As any emblematic infrastructure project, the NRLA has an historical ground. The idea of 
building a base tunnel through the Alps, in the mythical passage of St. Gotthard, can be dated 
back to 1947, although the first studies were carried out in 1962 and 1963. This was when the 
Swiss government founded the commission “Railway Tunnel through the Alps” (KEA). Since 
then, the concept of future alpine crossings suffered radical modifications in content and 
form.  
The concept today, also known as the “New Rail Link through the Alps” (NRLA)29, was 
approved in 1992 by popular vote, but the first political talks about its necessity were dated to 
1980. Indeed, the inauguration of the road Gotthard tunnel in 1980 attracted traffic from all 
over Europe and led to an animated ecological debate at a national level.  To limit this traffic 
affluence, Switzerland implemented a vehicle fee for vehicles over 28 tons, but Europeans put 
more and more pressure on obtaining permission for 40 ton vehicles to pass through the Alps.  
Challenged to prove more flexibility towards the European transport policy and to find a cure 
for the ecological problem, the Minister of Transport, at the time, developed the NRLA 
project. He promoted it as the best strategic compromise in order to show that Switzerland 
was not against the mobility but that its objective was mobility by rail because of its 
environmental friendliness.  
 
                                                 
28 « Nous pouvons nous féliciter d’avoir réalisé un ouvrage aussi important en respectant les délais 
ponctuellement à la semaine près » cited from the speech of Moritz Leunberger at the inauguration ceremony 
of Lötschberg tunnel basis.  
29  French: NLFA (Nouvelle Liaison Ferroviaire Alpine) ; German : NEAT (Neue Eisenbahn-Alpentranversale) 
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As a consequence, the European Community’s members were convinced by the project 
opportunity and agreed to the heavy vehicle limit of 28 tons, but only on the condition that 
Switzerland builds two base tunnels, which would become the NRLA.   
This was the ground on which this project was born. As shown in Figure 5-1, it mainly30 
consists in the construction of two masterpieces which are the St. Gotthard Base Railway 
Tunnel and the Lötschberg Base Railway Tunnel. At 57 km, the St. Gotthard Base Railway 
Tunnel will be the longest railway tunnel in the world, along with the Lötschberg Base 
Railway Tunnel, which is 34 km long. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: NRLA Project Concept 
The NRLA project encapsulates many meanings for many parties. Swiss people are known 
for their enthusiasm about railway usage: the average Swiss person travels roughly two 
                                                 
30 The Monte Ceneri base tunnel is part of the NRLA; it will be completed before 2019, and it will be a very 
important feeder in the south for the Gotthard Base. The execution of this Monte Ceneri base tunnel is not 
treated on this case study.  
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thousand kilometers by train each year and railways have always been considered a factor in 
national cohesion; bringing the different language regions closer together31. 
Also, for the Swiss electorate, the project is a dream in having the roads relieved from freight 
traffic, while preserving the future generations’ environment and the Alps. For Europe, the 
NRLA will bring a flat rail link that will set up a new era for 21st century travel through the 
Alps. New high-speed lines for passenger and freight trains, designed for interoperability will 
connect Europe and make it the first high-speed link from North to South.  
It will provide a travel time decrease to 2.5 hours from Zürich to Milan, and the possibility 
freight trains of over 4,000 tons to pass through the Alps as if they did not even exist. These 
are only two aspects among many other major improvements expected to come from this 
project; which perpetuates Switzerland's pioneering tradition in tunnel construction.  
In concerns of the country, the new alpine crossing will increase the capacity of the existent 
axis from 20 to 50 million tons per year. This makes Switzerland more appealing for the 
business by respecting, simultaneously, the transport policy strategy and its objective in 
achieving an environmentally compatible system of mobility. The infrastructure will improve 
people's life quality by offering a real alternative to journeys by car or plane. Also, "very 
many Swiss citizens are proud to see such a vast and sophisticated project undertaken by so 
small a country."32  
At a higher level, the commitment to build this major venture, with its own finance endorsed, 
and the Swiss political promise to integrate its public infrastructure into the European 
network. This triggers admiration for the Swiss self-financing transport policy compared to 
other countries in which the “transport policy is always in the middle of disputes between 
transport and finance ministers”33.  
The acceptance, by the Swiss electorate, of the above described concept provided the basis for 
planning and the start of construction in September 1993. Simultaneously, the sites of 
Gotthard and Lötschberg, each project was confined to a different project organization 
(Maîtres d’ouvrages), specifically AlpTransit Gotthard AG and BLS AlpTransit AG.  
                                                 
31 Source : article “Alptransit, a record-breaking tunnel,” swissinfo.ch, October 2009 
32 Said by spokeswoman Monica Knapp in article “Alptransit, a record-breaking tunnel,” swissinfo.ch, October 
2009 
33 Minister Moritz Leuenberger tells swissinfo.ch. 
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The first proposed financing structure, according to which the government credit should have 
entirely covered the future benefits in the service provision, raised questions on the economic 
viability and therefore, it was replaced in 1998 with the actual financing structure, depicted in 
the figure below. This financing scheme foresees the NRLA embedment into the Rail 2000 
project; which has a scope of the existent infrastructure improvement and the implementation 
of the structures for “noise reduction.” 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Financing scheme (FinöV fund) Source: Alp transit information brochure 
 
The whole package (FinöV) is financed through a special fund alimented with a tax on oil 
products, the heavy-vehicle tax, and the value added tax (VAT). The figure b) on the right 
shows the forecasted investment’s repartition between the three projects. According to it, 
almost half of the total amount (approximately 30 billion Swiss francs for over 20 years) will 
be used to cover the costs of the NRLA project.  
 
 
b) a) 
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Today, similarly to other major infrastructure projects worldwide, the construction of the St. 
Gotthard base tunnel is running over time and over budget. Although its completion has been 
projected for 2011, the tunnel may not be completed before 2017. Various unexpected events 
troubled the course of the project and required an additional investment representing 53.4 % 
more than the original cost estimate. In September 200834, the Swiss parliament approved a 
total credit of CHF 19.1 billion (price level 1998, excluding inflation, value added tax, and 
construction interest). Of this amount, CHF 13.157 billion were reserved for the Gotthard 
route: the Gotthard and Ceneri base tunnels. The current estimate of the final costs for the 
AlpTransit Gotthard project is CHF 12.25 billion: Gotthard CHF 9.83 billion and Ceneri CHF 
2.42 billion.35 
On their official website, this overspending is mainly justified in terms of “greater safety and 
latest technology, but also because of politically motivated delays and the difficult geology.” 
Meanwhile, the completion of Lötschberg was accomplished. In June 2007, the Lötschberg 
base line was handed over to the operator BLS AG, marking the construction achievement of 
the Lötschberg Base Tunnel. The project was finished on time but with one major 
modification to the original design; two tubes were constructed but only one was equipped 
this resulted in one rail instead of two as originally conceived.  
 
5.2 Part A: NRLA – Two Projects in One  
This section focuses on the NRLA project structure with a highlight on the output description, 
its execution, organization structure, project risk management, controlling, and the decision 
making process. This description is based on facts as stated in the data collected (secondary 
data), and therefore gives an objective, static view of the project system.   
The NRLA project is also known as the “chantier of siècle.” The reasons for this surname 
include not only the amount of the money invested, but also the technological and 
geographical challenges, as well as the complexity of work and the management processes 
that were carried out in order to build this infrastructure.  
                                                 
34 Swiss Government decision on the amendment of  the NRLA total credit (Alp Transit Financing decision) 
35 Source Alp Transit web site updated in October 2010.  
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Another feature that makes this project unique, is that the construction of both two base 
tunnels were confined to two distinct entities (“maître d’ouvrages”). AlpTransit Gotthard AG, 
a fully owned subsidiary of the Swiss Railway, is building St. Gotthard base tunnel. While the 
construction at Lötschberg was completed by BLS AlpTransit AG, which belongs to a private 
railway operator with the same name. Therefore, the NRLA is a 2-in-1 project between two 
different project organizations that share similar controlling systems.   
In this case study, the St. Gotthard base tunnel and Lötschberg base tunnel will be presented 
either separately or at the aggregate level (NRLA) based on the relevance of the discussed 
topics for this case and the importance of their structural differences. 
 
5.2.1 St. Gotthard base tunnel 
“A route through the mountain – the longest ever made. The first tunnel under the Gotthard 
was finished in 1882, linking Germany, Switzerland, and Italy and was a record 15 kilometres 
long. Just over a century later, history has repeated itself. On October 15, 2010, the last 
breakthrough will be made in the new rail tunnel and the Gotthard will once again be the 
scene of a record.”36 
 
Physical Infrastructure and Service Provision 
The St. Gotthard base railway tunnel is being built on the Gotthard axis, which runs from 
Arth-Goldau to Lugano.  
It consists of two, 57 km, 37 long bores between the portals of Erstfeld and Bodio, connected 
every 325 meters by emergency escape passageways. Its itinerary is shown in Figure 5-3 and 
is the result of the prevision made by experienced geologists endorsed with the results from 
exploration tests. The open-air section itinerary, linking the St. Gotthard base tunnel to the 
existent railway, was chosen in order to conciliate both requests formulated by habitants and 
political decisions. The itinerary layout was approved by the Federal Council in 1995. To 
limit the construction times, it was decided to head the excavation from the two portals and, at 
                                                 
36 Source : swissinfo.com on September, 2010 
37 There are also approximately 13 km of approaches.  
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the same time, from three intermediary access points: Amsteg (1782 meters), Faido (2646 
meters) and Sedrun (800 meters). The geology represents a complex dimension since “the 
tunnel crosses crystalline rocks belonging to three important geological units: the Aar massif, 
the St. Gotthard massif and an area of Penninic gneisses.”  These units are separated by 
sedimentary areas, namely the Tavetsch massif and the Piora formation. The maximum 
overhead rock reaches 2,300 meters in the St. Gotthard massif area.  The Gotthard base tunnel 
is built in a traditional open track method. A system of approximately 180 communication 
branches and exchange diagonals enhances the passage from one rail to the other and allows 
each tunnel to serve as a security tunnel for its pair, in case of accidents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3 St. Gotthard base tunnel itinerary 
 
The execution technology is classical and the tunnel is created through the use of explosives, 
partial excavation, and a tunneling machine (TBM).  
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After completion, the Gotthard Base Tunnel will be the most important element of the NRLA. 
The flat line, no higher than 550m above sea level, will reduce the travel time from Zürich to 
Milan by one and a half hours, will allow for a capacity of 40-60 passenger trains per day and 
200-210 freight trains per day. The speed range will be as follows: 
• Passenger trains (200 km/h) 
• High speed passenger trains (230-250 km/h) 
• Freight trains (100-160 km/h) 
The estimated cost at the 1991 price level was CHF 7.6 billion. The project is financed by 
public funds in a proportion of 100%, but private financing for certain elements may be taken 
into consideration in the 2nd phase (Ceneri tunnel). Its construction started in 1998 and its 
completion was first foreseen for 2011. Today, it has been readjusted to where the tunnel will 
not be fully completed and finished before 2017.   
Project Specifications and Risk Management  
The new created infrastructure will be part of the European high-speed network. The 
infrastructure requirements are based on the UIC38 standards and Swiss railway guidelines as 
well as on general Swiss and CEN39 standards. The operational requirements and the basic 
technical parameters were defined by the Swiss Federal Railways and approved by the 
Federal Office of Transport. The detail specifications were elaborated by AlpTransit Gotthard 
AG and stated in comprehensive specification documents concerning civil works, railway 
installations, and the future survey and maintenance (Schalcher, 2000).  
AlpTransit Gotthard AG believes that risk management is the key to control risk and it has 
developed its own method in risk assessment. This method is based on the theory of system 
dynamics and all actors involved in the project; such as consulting engineers, contractors, and 
suppliers who are all obliged to apply this technique systematically and periodically. In order 
to control the important risks, Alp Transit Gotthard AG has implemented an extended quality 
management that is project oriented and applicable in all phases of the project’s life cycle, 
from design to the execution. 
                                                 
38 UIC = International Union of Railways  
39 CEN = European Committee for Standardization 
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Project Corporate Governance  
Project governance structure is presented in the Figure 5-4 below.  
The assigned roles and responsibilities are:  
Owner 
The Swiss government is represented by the Ministry of Environment, Transport, Energy, and 
Communication. Its task is to ensure the strategic monitoring of the project, free-up the 
necessary funding, decide on the utilization of the reserves, and credit augmentation in order 
to cover VAT, interests, and inflation. It has delegated the Federal Transport Office (FTO) to 
the overall project’s controlling on a governmental level and the reporting to Parliament. 
Therefore, 15 employees from the Federal Transport Office are in charge of the AlpTransit 
project. They have multidisciplinary (engineering, finance, transport specialists) backgrounds. 
The FTO is committed to fulfilling various tasks starting with the establishment of planning 
norms and finishing with the approval of exploitation authorizations. They work in 
collaboration with the future operators, elaborate the submission procedure, and ensure the 
free competition among the subcontractors.   
Builder 
The role was assigned to AlpTransit Gotthard Ltd.  The project company was founded on 
May 12, 1998 and is fully owned company by the Swiss Federal railways, with approximately 
130 employees.  
Operator 
Once the project is completed, the Swiss Federal Railways will operate the infrastructure, 
which is the largest public Swiss based transport company (over 28,000 employees). 
Design  
AlpTransit Gotthard AG executed the layout design in collaboration with private consultants 
for the framework of four design contracts. 
Project Management 
AlpTransit Gotthard AG is in charge of the project management, which is carried–out from 
their head office in Lucerne. In parallel, there are management offices in Altdorf, Faido, 
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Sedrun, and Bellinzona. Local site supervision is provided by the engineering companies, 
which were, in general, also responsible for the design. 
which were, in general, also responsible for the design. 
 
Figure 5-4: Corporate Governance St. Gotthard Base Tunnel 
 
Contractors 
A consortium of different contractors will carry out the construction work. Five main 
contracts for the civil work and one for the railway installation have been drawn up. In 
addition, there will be approximately eight minor contracts and numerous small contracts. 
Decision Making Process 
As explained in the beginning, the decision about the project concept and the construction 
belonged to the Swiss people; who approved them through two important national votes in 
1992 and 1998.   
A notable point is that in a country where the direct democracy principle is one of the main 
shared values, the public opinion matters. Meaning, Swiss people are actively involved in 
political decisions, and in connection with this project, their open attitude towards the NRLA 
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endorsed the project’s political legitimacy conferred by the government. This pro-tunnel 
attitude is exemplified through the fact that, in general, the Swiss people are known 
worldwide as supporters of public transportation. Either as a citizen or a contributor, they are 
always enthusiastic about transportation infrastructure projects. As a self-speaking example, 
projects submitted to the popular vote in the past years gave the authorities the power to 
allocate the Swiss Railway implementations of “2,674.1 million francs and a package of 
1,143.7 million francs is for the construction of NRLA at St. Gotthard”40.  
In 1995, the Swiss Government made the decisions about the general itinerary and time 
schedule. The environmental impact assessment was carried-out in accordance to Swiss law 
for environmental protection. The final report was approved in 1998, after intensive 
negotiations between the federal representatives, the cantonal authorities, and with a couple of 
compromises to the open-air sector trajectory. In finance concerns, the Swiss Parliament 
approved, in autumn of 1999, an overall credit of CHF 12.6 billion for the first phase of the 
NRLA project. However, the credit was insufficient and therefore further augmented. The 
yearly credit contributions for both the Gotthard and Lötschberg base tunnels were subject to 
Parliament release. 
Contract Management 
A consortium of different contractors will carry out the construction work. AlpTransit 
Gotthard AG is fully responsible for the contract’s management; meaning that they are 
accountable for tendering, contract negotiations, and closing, execution, and fulfilment. In 
most cases, bid and performance guarantees are requested from the contractors. On the 
client’s side, AlpTransit AG acts as a contractual party.  
The contracts are prepared in accordance to the Swiss Law and standards of the Swiss Society 
of Engineers and Architects (SIA). Additionally, the contractors are invited to submit 
alternatives at their own risk and cost. The contracts include a price index clause, which is 
based on the cost variation of salaries, transport, energy, materials, and other main cost items. 
Project modifications that do not affect the functional criteria, the milestones, or the budget, 
are negotiated and agreed upon between the contractor and the builder on the basis of a 
                                                 
40 Source: http://sbb-gb2009.mxm.ch/?lang=2 (Swiss railway web page) 
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contract variation and corresponding addendum. However, it is mandatory to have all the 
major changes approved by the Federal Transport Office.   
Claim management – “There are standardized procedures for the claim management, 
according to the Swiss VSS code”.      
Project Controlling  
Project controlling is based on the “NRLA Controlling Regulation,” which is issued by the 
Ministry of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communication. This regulation defines the 
controlling elements at the governmental level and the related measUring methods.  Project 
controlling is AlpTransit AG’s main task. “The consulting engineers who supervise the sites 
provide support for controlling but they are not authorized to make any important decisions.” 
FTO is responsible for the NRLA project’s overall controlling, reporting to Parliament, and 
issuing related reports for DETEC and the Confederation. Four to six times per year, FTO 
writes reports on the current situation of the projects for the Parliamentary Delegation; which 
was assigned to NRLA for monitoring.   
The FTO is also responsible for updating the directives related to the NRLA controlling, the 
establishment of exams and audits, technical hand-over of those projects elements which are 
ready for exploitation, the management of information systems, and updating the conventions 
between the Confederation and the two project organizations. Like in the traditional project 
management, the work’s breakdown structure framework, defined by the Federal Office of 
Transport, enables controlling. The work breakdown structure is output-oriented and is 
divided into six levels: the top level covers the NRLA’s assembly while the lowest level is 
defined by the project elements. AlpTransit AG is responsible for detailing the work 
breakdown structure into each single contract. 
There is also an entity which is in charge of surveying the NRLA on behalf of the Parliament 
(“Délégation de surveillance de la NLFA”). Its main responsibilities consist of high financial 
control on the current and post execution of NRLA; parliamentary control of the project 
administration; permanent control in respect to the interpretation of legal basis; provision of 
services, costs, delays, and credits for all project components; as well as the responsibility of 
auditing and controlling the project’s organization structures and management processes.    
Controlling Elements 
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The controlling elements consist of the quality, time schedule, performance cost, and 
finances. 
 
Quality  
The quality of the work’s execution is assured by a quality management system of the 
contractor or consortium. Although this quality management system should be in line with 
ISO 9001 requirements, the official certification is not compulsory. Quality is tested (ordinary 
testing) against the control/inspection plan, which is part of the binding contract. In addition, 
a project-oriented quality management, in accordance with SIA 2007, is practiced. Its main 
focus is on the major risks involved. For each identified risk, the responsible contractor must 
elaborate and implement a quality plan. 
Cost & Time 
Cost controlling is done against the contract items that have already been invoiced. Periodical 
cost information is given and includes target costs, actual costs, forecasts, and comments on 
the cost development and controlling. The periodical cost’s information objective is to ensure 
that the final costs do not exceed the targets, to provide transparency, and to allow cost 
variations to be identified at an early stage. Time control is organized similarly like cost 
control. 
Performance 
The performance is measured against the actual degree of completion in a percentage for each 
“unit of work”41 in the breakdown structure. The site supervisors prepare estimates and 
forecasts of these values on periodically basis.       
Reporting 
According to the reporting concept, the site managers will report to upper-level management 
in alignment with the work breakdown lines. They will send monthly reports to the section 
managers, who in turn will send quarterly reports to the AlpTransit AG management. The 
board or directors of AlpTransit AG and the Federal Office of Transport will receive 
comprehensive reports twice a year.  This report will contain the following points: summary, 
                                                 
41 Traditional contracts are based on a bill of quantities and unit prices.   
  5-71
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
performance/progress (actual status vs. forecasted), scheduling (status vs. forecast), cost 
(status vs. forecast), financing (status vs. forecast), organization, and project environment 
(overall evaluation of the project’s chances and risks). The Federal Office of Transport will 
control only the information coming from the four upper levels of the work breakdown 
structure.  Lastly, Parliament will also receive a comprehensive report from the Federal Office 
of Transport twice a year concerning the status and the forecast of the NRLA project’s 
assembly.  
In case of unusual or unexpected events the reporting concept foresees intermediate 
reports.  All the documents are on paper. The tools used in the project organization are 
Primavera for scheduling, KOFAT for cost and finance control, CAD software, Document 
Management system, E-mail. 
Project Organization Chart 
The project organization chart of AlpTransit AG is depicted in Figure 5-5. 
According to the PMBoK (3rd edition 2004), its structure corresponds to a Functional 
Organization.  
In this type of organization, there is a clearly defined hierarchy in which each employee has 
one clear superior. Employees are grouped by specialty; in this case there are tunnel and track 
construction, railway engineering, and commercial division employees with legal, planning, 
and quality employees at the top level.  
Track construction may be further subdivided into functional organizations at the site level. In 
this kind of organization, it is traditionally assumed that the scope of the project is often 
limited to the boundaries of its function. Also, each function will do its work independent 
from the others according to a consecutive concept of planning. A job will start when the 
work of a previous function is finished (e.g. track construction and railway engineering).  
Communication Channels and Protocol 
Different departments have (mainly) monthly meetings. The coordination among departments 
is organized in the executive management meetings (every 14 days). The departments are also 
organized in special working groups for technical coordination, time schedule coordination, 
and quality control. Their meetings are held monthly or quarterly. 
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The project’s construction drawings or changes have to be approved by the Tunnel and Track 
Construction department and the Railway Engineering department. 
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Figure 5-5: Alp Transit Organization Chart (Source: primary and secondary data collection) 
The detailed roles and responsibilities are described in the Table 5-1. 
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ROLE RESPONSIBILITY 
CEO The CEO is the leader of the executive management and the main representative of the 
company towards the federal government, board of directors, and the public. 
Legal  Procedures This lawyer is responsible for all legal aspects concerning public law (authorizations, 
environmental aspects, commissioning). 
Contracts These are responsible for the legal aspects of the contracts with the engineers and 
constructors (elaboration of tender documents, tendering, finalization of the contracts, 
claims). 
Media Office Responsible for relations with the media and the site visitors, they also coordinate the 
communications with the Federal Office of Transport. 
Tunnel & Track 
Construction 
Gotthard 
 
They are responsible for the design and construction (only civil works) of the NRLA from 
Altdorf to the south portal of the Gotthard Base Tunnel (including the 57 km long 
Gotthard base tunnel) within the predefined restrictions (cost, time, technical standards, 
environmental aspects, safety etc.).  DUring construction, this department is the main 
partner in negotiations and the daily business with the contractors and the engineers. 
The Sections The sections have the same responsibility as the whole department but only on a smaller 
part of the project. 
Final Project and 
Mechanical 
Equipment 
This is a group of engineers that has responsibility for the coordination and approval of the 
design (which will be done by private engineering companies). 
Tunnel and Track 
Construction 
Ceneri  
This department has the same responsibilities of the sister organization from the Gotthard. 
They are responsible from the southern portal of the Gotthard Base Tunnel to Lugano 
(including the 15 km long Ceneri Base Tunnel). 
Railway 
Engineering 
This department is responsible for the engineering, implementation and commissioning of 
all the railway equipment. They are the partners of the contractor for the railway 
equipment. 
Financial & 
Management 
Services 
This department has a centralized support function for cost controlling, compliance, real 
estate, human resources, and quality management. 
Table 5-1: Roles and Responsibilities in Alp Transit AG project organization (Source: primary data 
collection) 
 
5.2.2 Lötschberg base tunnel   
In passing through the Lötschberg tunnel from north to south "we have made our way 
from the watershed of the Rhine to that of the Rhone": “water that we saw flowing 
past us before entering the Lötschberg tunnel was on its way to the North Sea; that 
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which now comes into view, in the Lonza gorge, will flow into the Rhone and be 
carried by that river into the Mediterranean." 
Cited from Cecil J. Allen42 in “Lötschberg tunnel makes rail history” Swiss info, April 2005 
 
The Lötschberg base tunnel is the second part of the NRLA master project and thus, in most 
aspects, projects controlling, methods, and tools employed are similar to the St. Gotthard 
project. However, the project organization itself, BLS Alp Transit, differs from the Alp 
Transit AG organization. The purpose of this section is to present the differences between the 
two projects, with respect to the principles of the first part of the case study. This will provide 
a static view, based on facts, of the project organization, governance, and basic management 
processes.   
Lötschberg Base Tunnel: Physical Infrastructure and Service Provision 
The Lötschberg base tunnel itinerary is depicted in Figure 5-6. As shown, the tunnel links the 
canton of Bern, from Frutigen to the canton of Valais, in Raron.  
The tunnel has a length of 34.6 km and is designed as a two-tube, single-track rail tunnel; 
where each tube carrying trains run in opposite directions. 
The Federal Council phased the tunnel expansion as the result of a decision on April 24, 1996, 
to re-dimension NRLA (New Rail Link through the Alps) for costs reasons. In the phase 1, 
the two, single-track tunnels were supposed to have drilled over the whole length. However, 
only one track will be completely installed for operation. As for the second track, only the rail 
between Ferden and Raron (approximately 13 km) will be put in operation. The completion of 
the second track and the connection to Steg both belong to the second phase of the project. 
The Steg/Niedergesteln portal western branch and the western tunnel between Ferden and 
Mitholz will remain as a shell construction and has plans to further adapt them in several 
stages dependent of the needs triggered by the demand.  
Similarly to the St. Gotthard base tunnel, the construction of the Lötschberg base tunnel is 
sub-divided into sections (Mitholz, Ferden, and Steg as intermediate points). In terms of the 
construction method, the tunnel was realized with repetitive machines (TBMs with a 9.6 
                                                 
42 Cecil J. Allen: railway writer and historian 
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meter diameter in the Steg lateral adit/base tunnel and the first 10 km of the eastern tube from 
the southern portal at Raron). 
 
Figure 5-6: Lötschberg base tunnel itinerary 
 
In areas with variable geology or rock, the traditional method of blasting was used because of 
the level of difficulty. 
Considering that the geological conditions were assessed as favourable and the tunnel design 
was well thought, the construction time, including installation of the rail equipment, was 
estimated at approximately eight years. The reality proved that this estimation was correct. 
According to BLS Alp Transit AG, the construction was completed safely and efficiently by 
2007, in part thanks to the “meticulous planning and ultra-modern technology.”  
The Lötschberg base tunnel started operating in June 2007 and it brought multiple advantages 
with its opening.  
First, together with the existing dual-tube Simplon tunnel, it constitutes the first high-speed 
North-South rail link through the Alps and a unique connection of its kind for many years still 
to come. It created important reductions in journey times for long-distance domestic rail 
travel. Thus, Switzerland will become the railway ‘turntable’ for European rail traffic. Service 
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provisions allow for a capacity of 30 passenger trains per day and 80 freight trains per day. 
The speed range is as follows: 
• Passenger trains (200 km/h) 
• High speed passenger trains (230-250 km/h) 
• Freight trains (100-160 km/h) 
Secondly, the tunnel opening marked the moment when Switzerland will finally be able to 
collect the full rate for the mileage-related heavy vehicle tax. This constitutes a major revenue 
stream for Switzerland and finances the St. Gotthard project. It represents as well, a 
regulatory tax for Europe, which will increase the attractiveness of railway transportation. 
Thanks to the modern Lötschberg transit axis and the Mileage-Related Heavy Vehicles Tax 
(MRHVT), it will be possible to shift the goods traffic from road to rail in stages.  
The estimated cost at the 1991 price level was CHF 3.1 billion. The project was financed 
100% by public funds.  Its construction started in 1994 and was completed as scheduled in 
2007. Its costs have been higher than estimated, but most people seem to agree that this was 
money well spent.  
Overall, it was considered a big success. At its inception, NRLA critics argued that 
Switzerland did not need the Lötschberg. Today, 75 percent of its capacity is already 
exploited and with an increase in freight traffic, it will soon be at a 100 percent. As foreseen, 
Bern and Brig are “now within commuting distance” and therefore, the tunnel has changed 
many people’s lives.  
Project Corporate Governance 
As a part of the NRLA, the Lötschberg base tunnel corporate governance evidently follows 
the same structure model as the St. Gotthard base tunnel. The main differences are that the 
operator of Lötschberg is a private company and not a public one.  It owns a 100% of the 
company in charge of the infrastructure design, construction, and management.  
There is also a difference of scale (size) and organization structure. The differences are 
relevant for the result’s analysis, discussion of validity, and the general terms. They are 
detailed in the sections that follow.  
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Builder 
BLS Alp transit AG, the constructor of Lötschberg axis, was founded in 1993 as a fully 
owned company of the private railway operator Bern-Lötschberg-Simplon Bahn (BLS). It has 
a small organization of 30 employees.  
Operator 
The infrastructure is operated by the private company Bern-Lötschberg-Simplon Bahn (BLS). 
Design  
The design was executed by BLS together with two other private consultant firms.  
Project Management 
BLS was in charge of the overall project management carried-out from their head office in 
Thun, with management sites in Brig, Bern, Mitholz, Raron, and Steg. Specific project 
management was provided by private engineering companies, which contrary to the case of 
St. Gotthard, are different from the design companies.  
Contractors 
There are eight main contracts for the civil works; in addition, there are approximately 30 
minor construction contracts and one contract for the railway installations.  
Project Controlling  
The basic approach to the project controlling is similar to that of the St. Gotthard base tunnel 
project; the NRLA Controlling Regulations issued by the Ministry of Environment, Transport, 
Energy, and Communication apply and are mandatory for this project. The Federal Transport 
Authority has the same duties and responsibilities as in the Gotthard base tunnel.    
Special Features of Lötschberg Base Tunnel 
One special feature of the Lötschberg base tunnel, when compared to the Gotthard, is in fact 
that BLS, the project and site management services, have been outsourced. Consequently, 
BLS Alp Transit performs only the overall project management, whereas the site management 
and supervision serivces, including the local contract management, are carried out by private 
consulting firms. This impacts the project organization number and its functional structure, 
which is considerably smaller than that of AlpTransit AG, and is explained in the next 
paragraph.  
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Project Organization Chart 
The project organization of “BLS AlpTransit AG consisted of a team of 33 employees who 
have set a goal for themselves in implementing the construction of the Lötschberg base 
tunnel, on time, within budget, and with due regard for future expansion”43 
The project organization depicted in the figure below corresponds to a flat one, in which the 
different competencies and roles are clearly defined. The direction of work is ensured through 
people whose backgrounds match those competencies and skills. There is a direct link 
between the BLS representatives, those who have the deciding power, and the sites managers.  
 
 
 
Figure 5-7: BLS Alp Transit Organization Chart (Source: primary and secondary data collection) 
    
The task force is formed with people of different backgrounds. It is supposed to intervene in 
the case of unexpected events and could loop the formalized communication channels.  
                                                 
43 Goal is emphasized on the web site in the presentation of project organization  
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Conclusion 
Part A of the case study was concerned with the description of structural aspects of the NRLA 
project, with a focus on the description of the physical infrastructure (project output), service 
provision, project organization, governance, and basic management processes. It aimed to 
explain the duality of the NRLA project (two projects in one) and the structural differences 
between the two project organizations.  It also introduced the status quo of these projects, 
which are actually in different life cycle phases: execution (Gotthard) vs. exploitation 
(Lötschberg)   
Part B of the case study is dedicated to the analysis of critical events identified in the process 
of data collection and the phenomenon of troubled project behavior.    
 
5.3 Part B: Critical Events and the Troubled Project Behavior 
Phenomenon  
 
Events are the natural units of the social process; events are what key actors do or  
what happens to them. (Abbott, 1990)  
In this study, critical events are defined as unexpected events that have a major impact on the 
project’s objectives and/or its survival; meaning that they have the potential to threaten the 
future of the project (chapter 2). In connection to them, troubled project behaviour is 
understood here in respect to: 
1) The impact of critical events, and their “punctual” and “over-time” effects on the 
project system.  
2) The coping process, which is how the critical event unfolded; including the actions 
taken by project actors to limit or eliminate the critical event’s effects and maintain 
performance. 
Therefore, the reconstruction and interpretation of a troubled project will go through the 
following phases in altering its processes: identification of critical events, analysis of their 
impacts on the project system, and analysis of the coping process, including the decisions and 
measures taken by a project’s actors. The focus is to spot those factors and conditions, which 
aim to keep the project on track in terms of committed costs and delays, and enhanced, 
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positive adjustments on the project system. We attempt to provide a narrative description of 
the facts and highlight relevant aspects while citing various sources.     
5.3.1 Critical Events Identification Process 
In order to identify the critical events, two rounds of data collection and analysis were 
necessary. The first round of data collection led to the identification of twelve critical events. 
They were brought to our attention because they all received high public attention, were fully 
reported upon in the media, and, even more importantly, had significant, acknowledgeable 
consequences. These events and their over-time effects are listed and coded in chronological 
order from CE1 to CE12. Each code denotes one event which occurred one time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Identified events after the first round of data collection: 
 
 1993 – Political conflict (Financing scheme is contested and thus the economic viability questioned) 
 1995  – 1999 Work is frozen due to the political conflict 
 1999 – New financing strategy is voted upon 
 1999  – Concession for 40 tons 
 1999 – Miscommunication of the price index 
 1999 – Decision to build Lötschberg with one rail 
 2000 – URI canton habitants addressed to OFT 900 oppositions for project trajectory on environmental issues 
 2003  – Geological problem at Sedrun (Gotthard) 
 2003 – Tunneler is stuck 
 2005 – Claim against the award for the Erstfeld tunnel construction 
 2007 – Water infiltrations 
 2007 – Connection solution with the Italian network is questioned 
 2003 – 2007 Safety and technology changes 
 
Consequences: 
a) 6 year delay for Gotthard construction (2017 vs. 2011) 
b) Investment increase from CHF 12.8 to 34 billion 
c) Under-capacity at Lötschberg (one way instead of two) 
d) Doubts on the opportunity of the project layout (connection with Milan questioned by the fact that the infrastructure and 
the political and economic environment changed over the last 20 years) 
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In the next step, we have grouped the events in four categories based on their nature, as 
explained in chapter 2, pg. 19-20.   
The exogenous critical events (the project’s management cannot exercise any control over 
them) that were identified in the first round of data collection and analysis were political and 
strategic (Table 5-2), geological (5-3), organizational (5-4), environmental (5-5), and 
technology/process related. They apply to the whole project system (listed in bold are the 
critical events that have been chosen for the exposition in this thesis).  
 
 POLITICAL + STRATEGIC 
CE 1 1994-1995 – Financing scheme is contested and thus the economic viability questioned 
CE 2 1995 – 1999 The work on both sites, Gotthard and Lötschberg, are frozen  
CE 3 1999 – A new financing strategy is voted upon 
CE 4 1999 – Concession for 40 T 
CE 5 1999 – Miscommunication of the price index 
CE 6 1999 – Decision to execute Lötschberg as a on one – way rail tunnel 
CE 12 2007 – Connection solution with the Italian network is controversial 
Table 5-2: Critical events related to politics and strategy  
 
CATEGORY ORGANIZATIONAL 
CE10 Contracting in 2005 – Claim against the award of the Erstfeld tunnel construction 
Table 5-3: Critical events related to the project organization 
 
CATEGORY TECHNOLOGY/PROCESS RELATED 
CE 13 Safety regulation changes44 
Table 5-4: Critical events related technology/process  
                                                 
44 Refers to the changing expectations regarding state-of-the-art technology and safety due to thelong planning 
and construction time of more than 25 years. 
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CATEGORY ENVIRONMENTAL 
CE7 2000 – 900 oppositions addressed by URI canton habitants to OFT  
Table 5-5: Critical events related to the environmental issues 
Interestingly, the first round of data collection and analysis revealed that the exogenous events 
were perceived more as a “fatality” rather than “critical” (since they were out of the control of 
the project management). The events of a political nature were seen, in particular, as 
dangerous to the project’s outcomes because of their straight impact on the project’s financial 
resources.  “Political work is like taking out a sailing boat. The wind keeps blowing from 
different directions and you constantly have to find a majority for each of these bills - the New 
Rail Link through the Alps (NRLA), the Performance-related Heavy Vehicle Fee, the bilateral 
agreement with the European Union on overland transport and the fund for the financing of 
public transport.”45 
The endogenous events identified in the first round of data collection were of geological 
nature (Table 5-6) and relate to the Gotthard tunnel base.  
 
CATEGORY GEOLOGICAL 
CE8 
CE9 
CE11 
2003  – Geological problem at Sedrun  
2003 – Tunnel worker is stuck 
2007 – Water infiltrations  
Table 5-6: Critical events of Geological Nature 
 
They were perceived as being ones with a bigger probability of occurrence and this, “in spite 
of forecasts made by experienced geologists and sample bores, gave a reasonable degree of 
certainty.” The general belief that “what tunnellers actually experience at the rock face, can 
never be predicted in advance” or “a tunnel is only built after the breakthrough” assumes the 
                                                 
45 Transport Minister Moritz Leuenberger for swissinfo.ch. on September 15, 2010 
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same sense of fatality embedded in the project, as in the case of exogenous critical events. 
Every person interviewed seemed to agree that this gigantic construction was a risky venture 
particularly because of the geographical challenges. It was even suggested that dUring certain 
periods46, the critical events of geological nature could be considered as a continuous event. 
When it comes to the Gotthard, where “every day may bring a new problem, which may put 
the future of the tunnel under a question mark.”  
These first results of data collection and analysis showed the necessity of running a second 
round of interviews with the various project actors. This was done in order to gather detailed 
information about the actions triggered after exogenous events at the project organization’s 
level. More importantly, about how both project organizations behaved when there were 
endogenous events of geological nature.  Lötschberg’s tunnel base was finished on time. This 
raised the legitimate inquiry of how this performance was achieved: did the drilling go 
smoothly as predicted or was this performance attained in spite of geological surprises that are 
by definition associated with drilling in the Alps? 
As a consequence, the second round of data collection and the analysis’ scope was to gather 
more data about the endogenous critical events dUring the construction of the two tunnels. It 
was also to reveal the differences (if any) of how the two project organizations handled the 
geological surprises.  
The result was a very long list of identified critical events. At Lötschberg, 38 critical events 
and related actions were identified and described in the project chronicle (Annex 5). Another 
60 unexpected events relating to the Gotthard tunnel execution are mentioned in a report 
from the Federal Transport Office from 2007. They refer not only to the geology but also 
strikes, accidents, and contractual breaches, since they are not publicly available, their 
criticality could not be validated.  
Recurrent themes, from which the critical events unfolded, emerged from the beginning of the 
second round of data collection and analysis.  Interestingly, patterns apply to both the 
intervention strategies employed and the event’s consequences for all critical events, no 
matter what their nature. This finding was, to some extent, expected and could be explained 
by the fact that the construction started more than 15 years ago. The lessons learned were, in 
                                                 
46 Periods that coincide with the drilling of the most difficult sectors e.g. Sedrun - Faido 
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general, referenced and put in practice whenever possible, and the risk management processes 
were extremely well developed in both project organizations. Considering these specificities, 
and in the light of post-collection data analysis, we selected ten critical events for exposition 
in this thesis. The selection criteria obeyed the following rationale. These events were 
recognized as critical after their consequences were known. In the case that they were 
exogenous, they were criticality reinforced by the fact that they marked turning points in the 
project’s life-cycle. In the case that they were endogenous, their criticality was justified by 
their major impact on project performance, acknowledged through important costs overruns 
and scheduling delays.  Last but not least, the selection ensured a significant number of 
different events (by nature) in order to confer strength in the argument. The endogenous 
events of geological nature are described separately for each of the two project organizations. 
This was decided after the second round of data collection because the intervention strategies 
and their underlying concepts, revealed differences between organizations. For simplicity and 
clarity reasons, but also justified by patterns discovered in the level of impact of critical 
events on the project’s system, the geological events at Lötschberg were given the 
overarching code CGL “Critical Event Geology Lötschberg.” Those related to Gotthard were 
similarly coded CGG. The events selected are described in the following tables:  
 
CATEGORY GEOLOGICAL  
CGL November 14, 2001 – lowering of the ground level (first information to the St. German 
population) 
2002 - At the northern edge of the Gastern granite, sedimentary carboniferous rock was 
encountered  
April 11, 2002 - Driving the tunnel boring machine in Steg is stopped because of rock containing 
asbestos 
December 31, 2003 – The southern tunneling operations in Mitholz unexpectedly encounter 
sedimentary rock, which was unexpected 
April 24, 2004 – The two tunneling teams driving south from Mitholz are at a standstill because 
of problems with the rock. The trial bore, which had been started, has to be aborted. 
June 20, 2005 – DUring the excavation work on the Widi tunnel, the construction crew 
encounter a rock line which was substantially higher than the geological survey predicted. 
CGG 2003  – Geological problem at Sedrun (Gotthard)  
2003 – Tunneler is stuck 
2007 – Water infiltrations  
Table 5-7: Critical events related to the geology (Source: 2nd round of data collection) 
  5-85
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
As suggested in Williams, 2005, Cicmil et al., 2006, elements of systemic modeling have 
been used in order to capture the interdependencies between project elements. Specifically, 
we developed the model47 presented in Figure 5-7, which represents the project’s system for 
interpretation and analysis of the collected data. It is built with the project’s structural 
elements, which are standard for any infrastructure project. The project output (project 
finality), the physical infrastructure itself, is located in the center of the system. This is 
comprised above in links (e.g. tunnels trajectory) and related capacity. Both structural 
elements were decided in the very first stages of the life cycle. Together they will define the 
type of service(s) provided and, implicitly, the mission of the project (service provision). The 
economic feasibility study will determine the revenues expected and decide on the most 
suitable financing structure. The bottom side of the diagram suggests that in order to obtain 
the project output, its components should be built first (e.g. the base tunnels of Gotthard and 
Lötschberg). This requires a certain amount of resources to be brought together. The 
resources are represented as the technology and all the necessary processes, including people. 
From the perspective of data collected (specifically, knowing the level in the project system at 
which the critical events occur), this model is sufficient enough to understand the critical 
event that is unfolding. It is also simple enough to ensure the clarity of interpretation without 
ignoring the complexity of the interdependencies between project elements.  
Furthermore, the model shows that the resources should be planned and related costs should 
also be determined. In the system, the costs will be logically linked to the financing structure, 
which is supposed to cover them. On the right side, the financing box reaches the service 
provision through the “impact measures” box. This suggests a common theme in the 
development of transport infrastructure projects; and states that finding funds may imply 
measures with a direct impact on the service provision (e.g. Eurotunnel). The absence of 
arrows in this basic project system model means that “a priori” among the interdependencies, 
and between these elements, could go in any direction.  
 
 
                                                 
47 There are two main concepts underlying this representation. The notion of system refers to the interdependent 
components which together perform/have a specific objectives and the model is an abstraction of this system 
(Source: modeling and simulation in PM course support)   
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Figure 5-8: Infrastructure Project System (Source: PhD Research Proposal48)  
 
The next step in reconstruction of the troubled project’s behavior was to situate the identified 
critical events into the project system. This led to the Figure 5-8 below, showing the punctual  
                                                 
48 There are differences between the model presented in the research proposal and this presented here, since the 
last was updated with the results from the data collection.   
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impact of events on the project’s system. The numbers allocated in the Table 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-
5 are retrieved in the project system, at the level of impact.  
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Figure 5-9: Positioning of critical events in the project system 
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As an example, CE1 was a critical event of political nature that occurred in 1994. Since the 
financing scheme and the economic viability associated with the event were contested, 
we positioned the event in the box “economic feasibility.” Following that same logic, each 
of the critical events that we chose for the exposition in this thesis were represented in the 
project system model in the box corresponding to the project’s component that was first 
impacted. This “’association’ represents the project system from the point of impact” where 
the critical events started to effect and propagate to the other parts of the system. The next 
logical step was to reconstruct how the critical event unfolded in order to uncover the coping 
process. Specifically, we created a rich description of the critical event’s impacts and the 
measures taken by project’s actors to limit and counteract them.  For each event exhibited in 
this thesis we described the context in which it appeared its nature, and the punctual and 
overtime effects.  We also highlighted the project actors’ actions that were triggered by the 
events’ occurrences.  
Political conflict due to the contestation of economic feasibility – CE1 (1993-1995) 
The inauguration of the Gotthard road tunnel in 1980 attracted traffic from all over Europe 
and led to a national animated ecological debate. To limit this traffic affluence, Switzerland 
implemented the 28-ton heavy vehicle fee. The European community’s reaction was 
immediate pressure on Switzerland to give them permission for 40-ton vehicles to pass 
through the Alps.  
Challenged to prove more flexibility toward the European transport policy and to find a cure 
for the ecological problem, Adolf Oggi, Minister of Transport at the time, developed the 
NRLA project. He promoted it as the most suitable strategy for both the European community 
and the Swiss nation. The European community’s members were convinced about the 
project’s opportunity. They accepted and pursued with the heavy vehicle limit of 28-tons with 
condition that Switzerland builds the two base tunnels.  
With this commitment in mind, Adolf Oggi carried out an energetic campaign in order to 
persuade people to spend millions of the public’s money on the NRLA. “Try to imagine what 
would be our country will be without the NRLA! The answer is chaos on our roads; if you still 
doubt, think of 3-4 million trucks that we are going to shift from road to rail.” His enthusiasm 
and mantra discourse were endorsed with a strong argument that will be contested later. He 
promised the people that the project would finance itself and the rail operators will pay the 
investment off in 60 years.  
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This information is reiterated in the voting information brochure, which clearly states that the 
“prudent traffic forecast, and realist assumptions of costs evolution guarantee the economic 
viability of the project and thus the railway operator could reimburse the investment, 
evaluated at 14 billion francs, in 60 years.”  
This last argument brought Oggi’s campaign to fruition. On September 27, 1992, the NRLA 
project was approved in a large majority, and within one year the construction began at 
Gotthard and Lötschberg.  
In the month following the inauguration of the construction of both sites, Gotthard and 
Lötschberg, Otto Stich, the Minister of Finance at the time, started to openly contest the 
NRLA financing plan. He said that, for obvious reasons (weak revenues generated by rail 
freight traffic) the payback period of 60 years is not realistic, and thus the project is not 
economically viable.  
He also said that the financing solution retained, “reflects either stupidity or lack of honesty.” 
As an alternative, he suggested to reconsider the project’s detailed design in order to reassess 
the decision of constructing the base tunnels at the same time. He proposed building the 
Gotthard tunnel first, and then waiting and to see if the “after-completion environment,” 
would make the second base tunnel construction still relevant. 
But the project developer, Alfred Oggi did not want to hear this argument. According to Otto 
Stich, Oggi “took these critics personally, as an offense to himself and his department.” 
Instead of openly and objectively discussing the problem and trying to find a solution 
together, as expected by Stich, Oggi “felt excluded from the team” and blamed Stich for a 
lack of fair play. The dialogue between these two stakeholders was impossible; even in 
general meetings face-to-face communication was avoided. One of their colleagues 
remembers that “behind their smilingly attitudes, the relations were tense.” Today, Oggi 
affirms that the conflict was necessary but he regrets for not having dealt with it differently.  
The political conflict marks a turning point the project’s course.  
The NRLA project could not be continued until the disagreement was solved. Meanwhile, the 
Swiss people did not suspect anything. This event is considered critical not only because it 
questioned the project viability (it could have been stopped), but also because it had a 
significant impact on its future course.  
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The consequences of this critical event led to the occurrence of another critical event at the 
execution level. The construction of the two tunnels had to stop and the work was frozen for a 
four year period. Peter Testoni, Vice-Director of the Federal Swiss Office at the time says 
that “even today, after ten years, we still feel the disastrous consequences in the realization 
that our main work is in tunnel drilling.” 
In February 1995, the Federal Council met on the shore of Lake Neuchatel in order to find a 
solution to this conflict. The discussions lasted until late into the night. The empty boxes of 
pills and crumpled papers left in the conference room proved the intensity of the board. 
DUring the discussion, the scenario from the Finance Minister, Otto Stich, promoting the 
building of the Gotthard base tunnel alone and renunciation of Lötschberg in a first phase was 
not kept.  
The council decided to have the two tunnels built at the same time, meaning that they adopted 
the network scenario. Otto Stich is marginalized, although further decisions will prove that he 
was right in his decision to contest the project’s financing structure. In August 1995, Otto 
Stich convoked a press conference “à l’improviste” and officially stated his demission. This 
decision was not without consequences to Adolf Oggi’s career, which will soon be 
constrained to give up power.  
Andrea Hämmerle, specialist in transport policy, orchestrated the transfer of power and stated:  
“a change was necessary, NRLA needed a new head” but we knew that was going to be 
difficult. He remembered: “Oggi did not want the change; he was convinced that we should 
build the tunnels and the cash will come; when the change became obvious he said that he 
will only get down to the second league.”   
In the end, the Federal Council cut off the issue. It was unanimously decided that the NRLA 
project would not be stopped. Adolf Oggi, the project developer, was given other 
responsibilities.  In 1995, the council appointed Moritz Leunberger as the new Minister of 
Transport. He received the NRLA file and its first mission was to find new financing sources 
to save the project.  
The effects of this critical event on the project system are depicted in Figure 5-9 below. 
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Figure 5-10: Political conflict generated by the contested economic viability  
 
The causality relationship represented by the red arrows is interpreted as follows: the payback 
period in the case of self-financing could not have led to an economically viable solution. The 
accuracy of calculated revenues was contested and implicitly the service provision; finding a 
new financing strategy took four years. The time lap had a direct impact on the costs which 
further impacted the planning, since the work on both sites was frozen, which we assimilated 
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with CE2. To mitigate the time effects on costs, a compromise on which project components 
to further was made. Specifically it was decided that in the tunnel base of Lötschberg, only 
one rail would be equipped (Lötschberg at one rail CE6) instead of the two initially designed. 
This decision affected the future link capacity and hence the service provision, thus why it is 
resented today. On the left side, the first critical event was not without consequences. It led to 
the new financing strategy from the other sources (FinöV49 CE3), which became possible due 
to a new compromise, the Heavy Vehicle Fee Tax50 (CE4). The decision to introduce the 
heavy vehicle tax was approved through a referendum in 1998, and had, by definition, an 
impact on the service provision.   The project chronicle in Annex 5 reconstructs, in detail, the 
decision making process for the period of 1992–1998. It states all the important instants of the 
project (67 in total), ranging from design studies and call for tenders, to media events 
organized for lobbying the network’s scenario with both tunnels being constructed 
simultaneously. 
In addition, Moritz Leunberger also evokes this chain of decisions and compromises in his 
speech at the Gotthard breakthrough celebration on October 15, 2010. “DUring these 15 years 
in which I defended the project in parliament, there were always malicious, doubting voices 
who predicted that it wouldn’t succeed, but there is always a solution when compromises are 
sought and found”; the “Swiss voters demonstrated their courage for the challenge of such a 
tunnel at the ballot box.” They:  
Said yes to the Gotthard and Lötschberg tunnels  
Said yes to the financing, namely  
•Yes to a special fund  
•Yes to the heavy vehicle fee that feeds it  
•And yes to the agreement with the EU 
The description of the CE1 unfolding, denotes that although this critical event had serious 
punctual and long term impacts on the project system, and alone led to the occurrence of three  
 
                                                 
49 This financing scheme was described in the first part of the case study  
50 RPLP « La redevance sur le trafic des poids lourds » 
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other critical events, it did not halt the project. Parliament decided to retain the “network 
scenario” stating that two tunnels to be built at the same time. The Swiss people approved by 
saying yes to a series of measures necessary to degage the finance required for their 
construction. The trade-off was that some of these measures approved through these 
referendums affected the service provision. 
Geological problems at the Gotthard tunnel basis (2003)51: CE 7, CE8, CE9 
At Faido, on one cold morning in January 2003, the engineer, Matthias Bucher, entered the 
tunnel. He noticed immediately that a serious problem had arisen with the tunnel’s walls in 
the excavated area. The alarm was set off at the site in Faido because deep open cracks 
showed the mountain’s tendency to change with temperature fluctuations. On that morning, 
the engineer assessed that the situation was not dangerous but that it could not be solved 
underground. When he commented, he said: “for a couple of days, we must go to the surface 
and study the issue quietly, in the office.” Two days later, they went to the site but 
underground there was a bad surprise. The pressure exercised by the rocks, had broken the 
steel reinforcement on the tunnel’s walls.  The crevasses and collapsed reinforcements were 
signs that the zone had squeezing conditions (the rocks behaved as if they were plastic). By 
extraordinary chance, there were no victims but everyone became aware that huge and costly 
problems were likely to occur. On the unpredictability of this event, Rinaldo Volpes, 
Geologist in Chief on the Faido site, remembers: “we were all surprised to find such a 
geology in the base tunnel; just before reaching this zone we excavated the access gallery of 
2.7 km where the rock is of good quality; yet, as soon as we passed over the multifunction 
station at the foot of Faido we found the “tachylite” a very bad rock and thus we are in a very 
uncomfortable situation.” Indeed, MFS Faido was intersected tangentially by a fault zone 
running from southeast to northwest which had not been predicted in the geological forecasts 
and therefore required additional supporting measures. 
As shown in Figure 5-11, geological critical events hit the project system either at the 
“technology” (CE8, CE11) or “processes” level (CE 9) or at the both levels at the same time. 
The association of critical element’s level of impact resulted from the data collection and 
                                                 
51 Although it does not speak for the assembly of the events of same nature, the post-data collection revealed a 
lot of commonalities in terms of both impacts and actions taken;  
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critical events, which are geology related, require measures for changing or adapting the work 
processes and/or the drilling technology. These measures led to cost and delay escalations as 
shown by red arrows in the figure below. The accumulated over-costs that impacted the 
financing, put further delays on the “mise en service” of the infrastructure and on the service 
provision. 
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Figure 5-11: Critical events of geological nature (CE 7, CE8, CE9) 
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We illustrated this causality with the Faido example. It was found that present commonalities 
with other geological events, in respect to the level of impact, effects the project system and 
the measures taken to mitigate them. 
In the case of the Faido geological problem, the solutions were extremely demanding on the 
resources. Additional work was required for reinforcing the tunnel walls after they were 
excavated. This work induced a two year delay for the Gotthard base tunnel excavation and an 
estimated CHF 285 million overage of the budget. After this critical event, at the end of 2003, 
the NRLA budget reached CHF 15.8 million; which represented CHF 1.1 million over the 
forecast costs. Moreover, nobody could guarantee that the future would be exempt from 
further surprises. But the Federal Council decided again that the project must pursue its 
course and approved CHF 900,000 in credit extensions with the hope that saving elsewhere 
could achieve the difference of CHF 200,000.  
Giovanni Lombardi, whose company was in charge of the Gotthard tunnel underground 
design, states: “the excavation methods and technology were chosen based on in-depth 
analysis; various aspects have been taken into consideration involving geology, geo-technics, 
the rate of advancement, the cost of construction and the possible reuse of rock muck. 
However, due to the length of the tunnel and the necessity to limit the number of test bores in 
advance, the occurrence of such underground conditions always remains a possibility when 
constructing tunnels.”  
Data collection revealed that Gotthard geology was more problematic than expected.  
The following hazardous scenarios had to be managed: squeezing rock, rock fall, rock burst, 
and the occurrence of methane. On overcoming these problems, the Chief Construction 
Officer of AlpTransit remembers: 
“Some people doubted whether the tunnellers would get through the Piora Fault Zone, where 
initial tests had suggested ‘running ground’, a granular dolomite mixed with water.” Work 
was put on hold - and the whole project was threatened while engineers debated what to do. 
“Extra bore holes were ordered which found that the poor quality stratum did not, as feared, 
extend to the deeper tunnel level. Work was able to resume.  
There was also a difficult area just north of Sedrun where the rock was crumbly and subject 
to severe pressure. This called for thinking outside the box.” 
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The manager of the tunnel and track construction of the Gotthard base tunnel, in reference to 
the impact of the geology on the execution of Gotthard, states that” there were periods in 
which every day was a challenge and one could safely say that from punctual critical events, 
we actually moved to a continuous one. With all these bad surprises, not once had we thought 
that the project will be closed one day or another; but each time we found a solution.”  
The communication channels allowed the decision makers to become aware of each critical 
event very quickly after it happened. To find solutions to these problems, they relied on their 
specialists (who have special competencies and skills within the organization), and their 
contracting practices. Technology used for drilling played an essential role in mastering these 
difficulties. “Thanks to the high flexibility of conventional tunnelling, all of these difficulties 
could be mastered. Additional working groups and equipment could be mobilized very 
quickly. Nevertheless the very unfavourable ground conditions caused a delay of two years in 
the excavation work and additional costs of more than 200%. TBM52 drive would not have 
been feasible in the encountered conditions.” 
To cope with the unexpected, formalized procedures for trouble shooting are in place and the 
site engineers have the power to decide “on the spot” for extra expenses (the amounts are 
limited to four-zero sums). Problem solving follows the formalized decision making process 
and might involve legal representatives. An important role is in the contract practices, which 
are adapted to conventional tunneling: the drilling process of tunnel excavation.  
Specifically included in the contracts of the Gotthard base tunnel project is the clause 
allowing for rapid approval and certification of changed or varied works. Meaning that the 
responsibility of the excavation method is to be selected by contractors under the rock 
conditions and limits those set by the designer. Risk-sharing mechanisms are fair and 
equitable and result in reasonable contingencies for the contractors as well as sufficient 
reserve funds for the client to address unforeseen conditions. 
There is also a highly developed management of quality systems and tight controls of costs 
from entities such OFT and DETEC, empowered by the project owner (as explained in first A 
of the case study). 
 
                                                 
52 TBM = Tunnel Boring Machine 
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To compensate for delays when they occur, the project organization tries to planning for 
instances but this is not always possible. The works are executed in a sequencing logic (tasks 
are consecutively realized), in order to enable the efficient use of resources available within 
the company. They also try to take advantage of any opportunity that may occur by trying 
continuously to spot “those factors which might enable a faster achievement of the 
objectives.” 
On the 15th of October, 2010, when miners drilled through the last 180cm of rock and pierced 
through the Gotthard Base Tunnel, Switzerland became the world leader in tunnel 
construction with the longest tunnel worldwide. It was the day in which the Alps’ varied 
geology was overcome. "Yesterday we sought to move mountains. Today we have bored right 
through and created the world's longest tunnel." 
As stated in the media,53 “although there were some negative headlines in the run-up to the 
breakthrough – with the Tages-Anzeiger newspaper reporting calls for an extra SFr. 350 
million for the project or that there had been problems with faulty drainage pipes – 
excitement was high.” 
 
Lötschberg – Geological problems (CGL) 
In the case of Lötschberg, the predictions of the geological conditions were close to what was 
actually encountered. However, the tunnellers were surprised by several factors which had not 
been predicted. We identified twelve critical events from the period between November 14, 
2001 and March 26, 2006. These are described in full detail in the project’s chronicle in 
Annex 5. We would like to highlight the three examples, found from data collection, which 
reveal some interesting differences on how BLS Alp Transit project’s organization managed 
their geological critical events.  
At the northern edge of the Gastern granite, sedimentary carboniferous rock was encountered. 
In February 2001, in spite of any expectations, the ground collapsed in a big area. In the 
south, karst water, which had drained away, led to subsidence in the village of St. German.  
 
                                                 
53 “Switzerland has its record-breaking tunnel” by by Isobel Leybold-Johnson for swissinfo.ch 
 
  5-98
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
The root cause remains unexplained even today.  To cope with the impacts, BLS AT launched 
an informational campaign for the population and created a parallel working group whose 
mission was to find solutions and remediate damages incurred. “Expensive and time-
consuming actions to secure the rock were needed to drive these sections of the tunnel.” 
Measures were taken to dry the water that had penetrated the ground, so that the ground 
would become stable. In January 2002, this allowed the tunnel passage under the village of 
Saint German to be finished. 
“The lesson learned from Saint German was that surprises can always arise in spite of 
careful risk analysis and related mitigation measures, which had been carried out.”  
Another unexpected event was finding (on October 6, 2002) natural “amiante” (asbestos), an 
extremely dangerous rock for the miners’ health, in the southern direction. BLS AT 
interrupted the work temporarily and “pursued with the application of a « protection 
program » already elaborated with SUVA in the previous spring, when another mineral 
“actinolit” from the same family was encountered dUring the drilling process at Steg.” The 
solution to preserve the working conditions in response to the “amiant” effects (polluted 
working atmosphere) was found with the help of a professor: an academic specialist in 
“amiante” from the University of Geneva. Actions had to be taken “regularly or sporadically 
for a length of 3.5 kms in order to protect the miners health.” In the Ferden section alone, 
these measures led to an additional cost of 1.46 million Euros and delayed planning further. 
However, one month later this delay was practically regained. “At Steg, the 142 meter long 
tunnellers (TBM) were drilling the rock starting from the Niedergesteln portal. By midyear it 
reached 7,637 km and advanced well in spite of this unexpected surprise which had stopped 
the work for 11 days.” The unexpected events lasted until the end of the tunnel drilling. In 
January 2004, “the geology made the drilling process difficult on the last kilometer of 
Mitholz.” Here difficult and unpredicted geological conditions were encountered, namely 
sediments had carbon instead of granite as expected. This made the drilling difficult in the last 
six months. “The mountain had the tendency to considerably converge and diminish the 
advancement rate.” Pursuing the work was supposed to “reinforce the rock with steel arches 
and make long anchors.” These measures consequently dropped rate of advancement even 
more (1.3m compared to 9m, which it would have been if there was granite as expected).  
“Therefore the planning should be adjusted in order to compensate for the delays.” In the 
end, also in this sector, another unexpected event occurred: “one of the transversal galleries 
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went down just before boring.” However, the miners quickly adjusted this situation: “she was 
saved thanks to the intervention of the ‘élite mineurs’ who secured it with wood trunks.” 
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Figure 5-12: Critical events of geological nature at Lötschberg Tunnel Base (CGL) 
 
The red arrows in Figure 5-11 show the effects of critical events on the project system.  
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Not surprisingly, the way in which the events impacted and spread into the project’s system is 
identical to the graph’s representation of the unfolding geological critical events at the 
Gotthard base tunnel. Indeed, since the occurrence of the geological event required an 
adaptation or change in equipment (execution technology) as in the case of Ferden or of the 
work process Saint-Germain. It is appropriate to understand that these events first impact the 
system at the technology and/or process level, then they spread, following the same rationale 
as in the case of Gotthard. Specifically, there is an immediate impact on planning and costs. 
Then, the financing will be directly affected and therefore, the future revenues from the 
service provision (project finality) will be affected as well. 
To compensate for delays induced by critical events, BLS AG constantly and systematically 
puts efforts into better planning and in most cases this had been possible because of the 
technology and work processes used. For instance, the work related to the railway equipment 
was executed in a parallel logic. For example, the assembly of the railway equipment was 
done in containers at the same time as the excavation. When it was finished at last, the 
containers were brought into the gallery and the equipment was quickly put in place. The 
containers protected the expensive equipment from unfavorable external conditions.  
Daniel Blaser, the Head of Management Services, and Elmar Lambrigger, On-Site Manager 
for the south tunnel, believe that the high quality relationships they have with their contractors 
are key for finding and implementing solutions quickly. The outsourcing partners who are in 
charge of the work are highly reliable; “it’s true that we have in place good controlling tools 
but this is less important than our collaboration based on mutual trust and good 
communication (sometimes we over communicate). We solve problems together and our long 
experience enables us to see immediately if external experts are needed to help us out. They 
also think that is easy to work with us.” 
Here, the site manager can decide “on spot” for sums with more than four zeros (several 
hundred thousands in extra costs).  In relation to the accountability of people managing the 
sites and their capacity to take quick decisions, BLS managers say that “on site, it is necessary 
to have an aged person with large experience who is not afraid to make decisions because he 
has no fear to fail and ruin his professional career.”  According to BLS Alp Transit AG, the 
actions described above, partially explain “how and why the planning elaborated 10 years 
before the project completion”.   
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Claim against the award of the Erstfeld tunnel construction (CE 12, 2005) 
A press release announced that on August 11, 2005, Marti Consortium filed a claim against 
the award of the Erstfeld tunnel construction lot by Alp Transit AG. The work consisted of 
“driving the two, single-track tunnels, 7.8 kilometers-long, Gotthard Base Tunnel section 
from Erstfeld to Amsteg, with an excavation of 23 connecting galleries, and construction of 
the underground branch-off for subsequent implementation of the ‘Long underground’ 
route.” The approximate contract value was CHF 430 million. 
“Until the Federal Appeals Commission for Public Procurement reachs a decision, the work 
contract with the Gotthard Base Tunnel North Consortium (Murer-Strabag AG, Erstfeld, and 
Strabag AG, Spittal/Drau, Austria) cannot be signed and construction work on the last 
construction lot of the Gotthard Base Tunnel cannot begin.”  
The federal counselor Moritz Leunberger ordered a quick decision on this issue in order “to 
avoid the construction of Saint Gotthard base tunnel to be reported for an undefined period 
and the important consequences for the project costs and the strategic objective of traffic 
transfer from road to rail.”   
However, the decision was reached only six months later, on February 13, 2006. It stated that 
”the complaint of the Marti Consortium against the award by AlpTransit Gotthard Ltd. of the 
tunnel construction lot Erstfeld-Amsteg was upheld and returned for reconsideration of the 
offers submitted by the Marti Consortium and the Gotthard Base Tunnel North Consortium 
(Murer-Strabag).” 
In May 2006, following the request of the Federal Appeals Commission for Public 
Procurement, AlpTransit Gotthard Ltd. did a sensitivity analysis on the two tenders together 
with consulted external specialists. The board of directors of AlpTransit Gotthard Ltd. 
ensured the Federal Transport Minister, Moritz Leuenberger, that the criteria to be used in 
settling the award would be drawn up by independent experts.  
On October 16, 2006, both claimers confirmed that “they had no objections to this procedure 
and to such a request being made to external experts.”  
On January 22, 2007 (one and half years later) the experts presented their concluding report.  
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They concluded that “the award procedure had been correctly conducted, no tenderer had 
been systematically put at an advantage or disadvantage, and that in the technical 
clarification of the tenders, and the main problem areas of the respective tenders had been 
clarified.” They confirmed that the original decision for this award was correct. With this 
decision, the work on the Erstfeld tunnel started again in April 2007. The causality above is 
described and represented in Figure 5-12.  
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Figure 5-13: Claim by constructor to change the decision of lots allocation (CE 9- 2005) 
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The critical event first hits the processes and has a direct impact on planning. This will lead to 
cost escalations, more credit needed, and therefore an increase in the payback period and 
delayed availability of the service provision. Interestingly, this critical event occurrence led to 
the opportunity to issue a new law that will protect a project from this problem in future. 
Specifically, according to the new law, any claim that might induce delays on scheduling is 
prohibited. This positive effect is represented in green in the “impact measures box.”  
Environmental issues: Oppositions of Uri habitants against the project trajectory  
In 2001, another critical event occurred that could not have been anticipated by the project’s 
promoters.  In the canton of Uri, the site preparations generated a strong opposition from the 
inhabitants. They materialized 900 claims addressed to the Federal Office of Transport to 
control the organism of the NRLA. Since, at the time, the project was already “approved,” 
financed, and started, it was obvious that this would lead to significant delays and extra costs. 
Figure 5-13 below explains the effects of this event on the project’s system.  
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Figure 5-14 : Opposition from Uri canton (CE 7) 
 
Since the claims raised the negative impact of the project’s trajectory on the environment and 
quality of life (e.g. noise), it can be safely said that the critical event hit the project’s system at 
its very heart, namely the project’s output. The work was frozen until a solution could be 
found, however with negative impacts on planning. The conflict created between project 
promoters and habitants, along with negative publicity on the front page of all newspapers, 
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significantly delayed the date foreseen at the start of exploitation of Gotthard tunnel base. The 
Federal Transport Office ordered two feasibility studies in order to ameliorate the project’s 
trajectory. In the end, the project organization tried to gain on planning and studied the 
possibility of tendering of Gotthard northern sector together with Erstfeld sector. The results 
of this study were submitted to the Federal Transport Office for approval. In 2003, the project 
with the proposed ameliorations for the population of Uri was publicly discussed. This time, 
only 360 claims were encountered vs. the 900 in 2001.  
Similar to the last time, the claimants pointed out the same concerns of the noise and not it not 
being sufficiently consolidated underground. On one hand the new layout displayed a lot of 
improvements compared to the former one, and on the other hand the owners willingness to 
compromise for work’s execution was low. This meant the habitants were required to agree 
on the sequential schedule of work. The issue was then considered solved, and the project free 
to pursue its course, however after two years of delay.  
 
Controversy on the opportunity of the connection solution with the Italian network 
(CE11) 
In 2007, the controversy over the opportunity for NRLA to connect with the Italian network 
was highlighted in the media. In an interview given by a Swiss television network, Mauro 
Moretti, the General Director of Italian railways, stated that in the last 20 years the 
transportation and logistics environment suffered from important changes that had not been 
foreseen in the project’s concept. These changes led to new “transport and logistic 
philosophies. These are consistent in design with the Italian railway infrastructure in order to 
avoid the traffic of goods in big centers already supersaturated as in Milan; the whole 
strategy needs to be changed, and everything should be revised in every detail!” Andrea 
Hämmerle, the Swiss specialist in transport who was commenting on this affirmation, 
admitted that: “the Italians are deeply convinced that any traffic of goods must skip Milan.”  
In this context, the solution to link rails with Lötschberg could be more appealing since it is 
directed towards Novarre; this is the hub (“plaque tournante”) for the combined traffic of 
goods. Following the same logic, the construction of the Ceneri base tunnel, which will 
connect the Gotthard base tunnel to Bellinzona, Chiasso, and Milan, does not seem 
appropriate., In order to direct the traffic on the eastern side of Milan everything in the 
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project’s scope would have to be reviewed. This is reflected in our systemic representation 
where the event impacts the links, outputs, and the service provision, which represents a 
serious threat for the project’s objectives.   
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Table 5-8: Opposition from Uri canton (CE 12) 
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However in Bern, the Federal Counselor, Moritz Leunberger, does not doubt that the concept 
of Gotthard will not change since we are speaking of the “chantier of siècle.” He also said that 
the Gotthard tunnel base is naturally directed towards Milan, and without this link, the NRLA 
project does not make any sense unless we want to assist a “Gotthardus interruptus.”  
Indeed, the NRLA project concept was foreseen as to link “Northern and Southern” Europe. 
The construction is protected by legal contracts and endorsed by the EC with a commitment 
to support the construction of the connection, which will link Switzerland to Europe and 
contribute to the high-speed railway infrastructure development.  This commitment was 
reinforced after the final breakthrough of Gotthard took place on October 15, 2010. The 
acting director of policy for the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), Jean Eric 
Paquet, stated “as far as the Gotthard is concerned, it is part of a priority project which runs 
from Rotterdam to Genoa and whose alignment goes through the Gotthard and the 
Lötschberg… This priority project ensures that the two transversal alpine tunnels in 
Switzerland are fully taken into account when we develop a European transport 
infrastructure.” 
Italy, who will profit a good deal from the tunnel after it opens in 2016 or 2017, praised 
Switzerland and its National Rail Link through the Alps project at a conference in September 
in Rome. The senator of Ticino, Filippo Lombardi, said: “I’ve never before felt the desire and 
determination in Italy to support rail transport so strongly.” However, he emphasized the 
necessity of having the connection at Gotthard properly developed in order to cope with the 
additional traffic. “Otherwise we’ll have a Formula 1 tunnel but the access routes will be like 
mule tracks.” 
 
5.3.2 Case study summary 
The case study of the New Rail Link through the Alps project was presented at two different, 
but related levels. The first level illustrated the structural characteristics and management 
processes of two, stand-alone project organizations that were given the responsibility of 
building one of the most important infrastructures of this century. This aimed to offer an 
objective “view” of the project system and to highlight the differences and commonalities 
between the two project organization’s attributes, summarized in Table 5-8.  They mainly 
relate to the parent organization’s ownership structure (public vs. private), the project’s 
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organization layout (highly vertical/functional vs. flat/weak matrix), and the performance in 
terms of committed delays (Lötschberg’s on time achievement vs. Gotthard’s eight year 
delay).  
 
 ALP TRANSIT AG BLS ALP TRANSIT 
Organization Fully owned by Swiss Federal 
railways (public)  
“In house” competencies 
Resources/Layers allocated based 
on need 
Fully owned by a private railway 
operator, with strong culture, and 
goal oriented ;Outsourced 
resources  
Small (33 employees)  
Contract Management Construction is executed by a 
consortia of different contractors; 
accountable for tendering, 
contract negotiations, and closing  
Site management services have 
been outsourced 
PM Controlling  “NRLA Controlling Regulation”;  
The consulting engineers who 
supervise the sites are not 
authorized to make any important 
decision 
“NRLA Controlling Regulation”; 
Enhanced decision power at the 
on-site level 
Quality   Quality management system of 
the contractor or consortia 
BLS responsible for the overall 
project management 
Specific PM is provided by 
private engineering companies  
Cost and Time Periodical cost information 
includes targeted and actual costs, 
forecasts, comments on cost 
development, and controlling 
Within BLS’s responsibilities  
Completion time  2017(18) vs. 2011 2007 vs. 2007,  
Now generates revenues that help 
finance Gotthard 
 
53.4 % increase in costs 
explained through safety, 
technology, politically motivated 
delays, and difficult geology.  
On time 2007 vs. 2007 “On time but with a major change 
to the concept” 
They also had geological 
surprises 
 
Table 5-9: Alp Transit AG vs. BLS Alp Transit 
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In the next section, the analysis presented will verify, in the light of case study findings, the 
fact that these differences are responsible for the different coping capabilities of the two 
projects. 
At the second level, the case study provided a rich description of the project’s behavior when 
confrontated with unexpected, critical events. The narrative story is supported by a systemic 
representation of the project, which was developed for this purpose and facilitates 
understanding critical events that unfold overtime. The list of observed events is long. From a 
methodological perspective it is very important to see these events in order to produce 
“stronger, inductive arguments” (Singleton and Straits 1999: 53). The exploration offered an 
insight into the measures taken by the project’s actors in order to counteract the critical 
event’s effects and maintain an overall performance level. These include the intervention 
strategies at the corporate (project governance) and project management levels (project 
organization). The events presented for exposition in this chapter marked turning points in the 
project’s life-cycle and had major impacts on cost overruns and scheduling delays.  
Although the data collection and analysis overlapped in this thesis, the case study analysis 
was presented in a separate chapter for the purpose of clarity. It focused on the interpretation 
and explanation of the project’s behavior, the New Rail Link through the Alps, when it 
encountered critical events in its life-cycle, which emerged from the exploratory case study.   
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6 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
“A theory simplifies and explains a complex real world phenomenon” (Whetten, 1989) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this section, we present evidence on the NRLA’s project resilience and its enablers. We 
cite examples from the case and discuss those conditions and factors that enabled the 
resilience to manifest and develop along the project’s life cycle. At the end of the chapter, the 
insights of this analysis will be translated into guidelines for project practitioners aimed at 
offering a new way of seeing and assessing project performance. Also giving a more accurate 
rendering of a project system confronted with critical events, from the resilience perspective, 
which is lacking in current project management literature.   
As previously mentioned, the data analysis began in the field during the data collection 
process, as notes were recorded and initial interpretations were made during discussions. The 
complexity of the data analysis process was increased because of an overload of data, a multi-
site study with interviews held in French, German, and English, and many people interviewed 
were Swiss-German native speakers in the majority of cases. This also led to a more cautious 
interpretation of the findings. Different techniques were used to organize and systematically 
review large amounts of qualitative data. Part of the data analysis involved content analysis 
techniques (Strauss 1987, Diesing 1971, Miles and Huberman 1984). In parallel, as suggested 
by Yin (1994), the individual interviews were recorded and “written-up” in the attempt to 
demonstrate and document converging (or diverging) evidence from different sources. The 
contents of the interviews were first coded into different categories corresponding to the 
components of the project system, as represented in Figure 5-8, and project management 
process, as described in chapter 5. The first round of data analysis revealed that certain 
categories were not useful given that nobody mentioned them in the interviews, and some 
were too broad. This resulted in a reclassification of the reference levels, as shown in the 
Annex 6, in P (personal), O (organizational) and G (project governance). Within the last two 
we used the following subcategories: 1) technology, 2) communication, 3) performance, 
control, and outcomes, and 4) goal statement and culture. The last includes solidarity, risk 
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attitude, and “bricolage”. In addition to these subcategories, which are common for the level 
of reference “organizational” and “project governance”, the category “organizational” also 
includes the subcategory 5) “process issues,”which covers collaborative behavior, social 
networks, and positive relationships.  
The analytic focus was on the examination of the interrelationship among categories and their 
impacts on the outcomes. Firstly, within the study of project system’s behavior when in 
confrontation with critical events of a different nature, either endogenous or exogenous, then 
finding recurrent themes and finally making comparisons across the two project organizations 
to reveal similarities and differences. Quotes collected under each category and subcategory 
were further subdivided based on causal relationships that emerged from the empirical 
evidence. (E.g. process issues, bricolage, relate to restoring work process efficacy, 
communication relates to the decision making efficacy, etc.) This logic is also described in 
Miles and Hubermann, 1994, p92-93.  
From our interpretation of the data, two sets of findings emerged that describe how the NRLA 
project system responded to its critical events. One set relates to the critical event’s 
management and its contribution to the project resilience development. The other set of 
findings relates to the factors and conditions, which contributed to the positive adjustments of 
project system (maintained performance) after the critical event and thus enabled resilience to 
manifest.  
In this section, we describe and situate each finding within existing literature in order to 
highlight this study’s contribution. Based on the empirical evidence, we propose to extend the 
theory of resilience with the emerging concepts of project resilience and resilience enablers, 
which could form the basis for a midrange theory of resilience in a temporary organization 
setting (infrastructure project). Consequently, the working definitions of these concepts, 
presented in chapter 2, were updated in light of the case study findings and graphs.  
 
6.2 The Importance of the Critical Event’s Dynamics in Management 
Our first observation from the data was enabled by the systematic representation of the project 
and relates to the importance of the critical event’s dynamics for their effective management.  
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The NRLA project faced a number of endogenous and exogenous events. Although, at the 
beginning, their sources were clearly defined and their nature was clearly stated, time elapsed 
and actors looked for a solution as they changed and became more complex. For example, the 
occurrence of geological surprises required, in almost all cases, modifications of the work 
process and/or technology used. For instance, the “squeezing rock” critical event, which 
appeared at Faido/Gotthard, challenged the engineers and geologists to find new process 
solutions to reinforce the tunnel walls. Similarly, the unexpected “ground collapse” combined 
with “water infiltrations” at Saint Germain/Lötschberg required innovative measures to dry 
the infiltrated water and secure the rock. These solutions were found by working groups with 
different competences. In general, when geological surprises happen, both technology and 
processes need to be adapted/changed.  As a recurrent theme, solutions leading to these 
changes were the fruit of multidisciplinary groups of people.   Based on the observations we 
propose, the management of critical events require specific and adapted processes and the 
intervention of multidisciplinary teams. The proposition is consistent with Sheffi’s (2005) 
claim that solutions requiring fast thinking to unknown problems are better achieved through 
collective diversity. An example is the case of the UPS drivers, coming from different 
background and experiences, who teamed up to find solutions for delivering parcels in the 
aftermath of the Katrina hurricane. It provides empirical support for Freemann’s et al. (2004) 
argument on the role of requisite variety in enhancing creative thinking in people: like in the 
case of the recovery of Sandler O’Neill investment bank after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center.   
The second finding in a critical event’s dynamics refer to the actions done by actors to 
counteract the negative effects. From many observations while critical events are unfolding, 
ones described in chapter 5, we noticed that: “some interventions appeared to facilitate the 
occurrence of other critical events and thus led to an exacerbation of feedback loops, which 
make the over-runs worse.” This finding is particularly well illustrated in the case of 
exogenous events, like the political conflict presented in the preceding chapter. This critical 
event occurred in 1994 as a consequence to the questions that arose about the economic 
viability of the project. The time needed to find a solution to the crisis, combined with 
delayed decision-making led to the occurrence of other critical events, which generated 
further delays and associated overruns. These downside effects are “resented even today, 15  
 
  6-114
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
years after the project started”. The finding is consistent with the Eden et al. (2000) et Eden et 
al. (2005) argument in that managerial action is required in response to any disruption but 
may cause further delays. According to the logic, “a delay has led to a disruption, which has 
led to a further delay.” A positive feedback loop is then formed, where both disruption and 
delay feedback come together, causing further disruptions and delays. It also bores the 
resemblance of a “vicious circle” as described by Masuch (1985). It encapsulates the idea that 
in trying to avoid the undesired outcomes of critical events, the actors may actually create 
these outcomes.  
Interestingly, although the study of other exogenous events displayed patterns leading to the 
same finding, in some cases we found evidence of desirable side effects. They are due to the 
actions taken purposefully by the project’s owner representatives in order to ensure a future 
positive adjustment on the system in case a similar event should occur again. As an example, 
the measures taken by the project owner to solve the consequences of the critical event – 
generated by a complaint from Marti Consortium against the award from AlpTransit Gotthard 
to the tunnel construction lot of Erstfeld, Amsteg – led to issuing a new law. This new law 
guarantees that the consequences of such events cannot harm the project course anymore. 
Similar cause-effect relationships leading to desirable side effects were noticed in other 
circumstances, as in the critical event due to an environmental problem in canton Uri. This 
time, the measures taken by the constructor were to approach the environmental organizations 
USO (Pro Natura, Rheinaubund, Schweizer Heimatschutz, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz 
Schweiz, Schweizer Vogelschutz, Verkehrsclub der Schweiz and WWF Schweiz) and carry 
out regular inspections of the NRLA sites together. For the constructor, these inspections 
were important means to show the habitants open and transparent information and prevent 
further claims. Also, during the construction the representatives of USO could see on site the 
concrete implementation of measures for air pollution prevention, watercourse protection, etc. 
This transparency prevented stops for time consuming audits or to obtain of new 
authorizations.   
We interpret these measures as an example of efficient critical events’ management aiming to 
create the premises for future resilient responses of project systems, in case similar events 
should occur. Based on this evidence we propose that in the NRLA project system, the 
capacity for resilience was developed overtime from continually handling critical events.  
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This finding is consistent with the Egeland, Carlson & Stroufe (1993) and Wildawsky (1988) 
argument that an entity not only strives toward current adversity but also in the process of 
responding, it strengthens its capabilities to make further adjustments. It can also be 
associated to the developmental perspective of resilience as described by Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen (1997), Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfel (1999) or Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). In their 
acceptance, resilience is adaptability, meaning that the way in which a project organization 
will respond to future challenges depends on response alternatives derived from a previous 
experience.  
The last finding related to critical events refers to the way they spread and impact the project 
system overtime. From our observation of the data, supported by figures, we developed each 
critical event and gave a narrative description, provided in chapter 5. It suggests that “the 
ultimate impact of any critical event, no matter of its nature, is on the project’s output and 
therefore it will overtime affect the service provision.” As an example in the Lötschberg 
tunnel case, the lack of funds (after the period in which the project was delayed due to 
political conflict) led to the decision to equip only 16 km of the second tube at Lötschberg. 
This resulted in a diminution of transport capacity, resented today, three years after the tunnel 
was handed over to the operator.      
This finding is consistent with other research dedicated to the project system. It claims that 
the “whole produces more than the sum of its parts” or the effects, and the positive feedback 
is a key explanation for a project’s behavior (e.g. Eden et. al., 2005 or Williams, 2005).  
The findings above provide indirect evidence that the management of the critical events could 
be improved if the intervention strategies took the systemic representation of critical events’ 
dynamics, with project components, into account. By using this system, project actors can 
take decisions that will impede the occurrence of positive feedback loops and thus the 
propagation of negative impacts into the system. They could also take measures to 
purposefully increase of the capacity of adaptation in the future. By doing so, they will confer 
resilience into the system.        
The second set of findings that emerged from our interpretation of the data concerns the 
conditions and factors that enabled the resilience to manifest by contributing to the restoration 
of the project system’s overall efficacy after the critical event. They aimed to maintain the 
overall performance, understood here as “keeping the project’s costs and planning on track.”  
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We have named them resilience enablers. They are 1) a shared vision of the stakeholders on 
the project mission and its legitimacy, 2) effective communications and relationships based on 
trust, 3) culture of risk management and safety, and 4) capabilities to restore efficacy. 
 
6.3 The Importance of Legitimacy and Common Vision for a Project’s 
Mission 
“If we possess our ‘why’ of life, we can put up with almost any ‘how’” 
Nietzsche (1968, p.23). 
 
The first observation from the troubled project behavior analysis suggests the importance of 
“a shared vision of the political stakeholders on the project mission and its legitimacy.” 
Legitimacy is understood as the result of a process by which the key stakeholders 
(government officials) accept a venture as appropriate and right, given the existing norms and 
laws (Aldrich 1994). This project was born from political willingness. Even when it 
encountered political controversy, its legitimacy and mission to support the Swiss-European 
transport policy were never doubted. This made all decisions related to the changes of the 
project structure (financing, components) possible and needed their approval by popular vote. 
As well as raising the funds, which were added to the initial credit whenever needed. In this 
respect, this study proved by collateral finding that public funding is appropriate for financing 
major infrastructure projects in countries where “direct democracy” is the guiding principle in 
the decision-making process. This is accurately captured by the Minister of Transport, Moritz 
Leuenberger:  
“During these 15 years in which I defended the project in Parliament, there were 
always malicious, doubting voices who predicted that it wouldn’t succeed. A tunnel is 
only built after the breakthrough. Before that there are very many geological risks. We 
very clearly warned people about this before the referendum and voters still said yes. 
The Gotthard was proof that the country showed solidarity, no private business would  
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have been able to assume that risk. Only a political community/alliance is in a 
position to do so.”54 
Within the project organization, the political stakeholders’ cohesion was enabled by shared 
values and federal state characteristics, which form the foundation of political stability in the 
country. To illustrate that, Adolf Oggi, who promoted this project from the beginning, and 
Moritz Leuenberger, Federal Councilor and Minister of Transport, under whose mandate the 
project was actually built, were present at the Gotthard base tunnel breakthrough ceremony. 
They represent two generations of politicians with different political views who both believed 
in and fought for the project.  In the speech given at this event, Moritz Leuenberger stated 
that: "This breakthrough is a symbol of what policy can do, when we make it together.” At his 
end, Adolf Oggi expressed his admiration and thanks for the “ verticality and determination 
shown in the last 15 years to prevent the project from being stopped in spite of huge 
problems”. In relation to the political stakeholders in Italy, the cohesion was insured by 
contractual agreements signed within the EU regulation framework. Even if the connection 
with Italy today is controversial, due to the agglomeration of traffic in Milan, the Italian 
government is committed to cooperating and finding a solution. This becomes mandatory in 
the context where the successful breakthrough is acknowledged as “a clear demonstration, 
and a signal given to Europe, that Switzerland is doing its part in building the European 
freight corridor from Rotterdam to Italy." 
This finding bores some resemblance to the Pinto and Prescott (1988) claim that a project’s 
mission and its acceptance is a dominant, critical success factor in the first two phases of the 
project’s life-cycle (conceptualization and planning). In addition, this case brings empirical 
support of the hypothesis that in public projects, legitimacy is of great significance 
throughout the project’s life-cycle. It is also consistent with Morris and Hough (1987), 
Pollalis and Frieze (1993), Sauer (1993), Yeo (1995), and Pinto and Kharabanda (1995), who 
argue that legitimacy, political stability, and goal alignment all are critical factors for the 
development and implementation of infrastructure projects.   
 
 
                                                 
54 Minister of Transport Moritz Leunberger for swissinfo on 15th of September 2010 (A tunnel which provokes 
“boundless admiration” by Doris Lucini and Andreas Keiser) 
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Also, with the empirical evidence presented, we interpret legitimacy, in concert with 
solidarity, as key factors for maintaining the positive adjustments of the NRLA project 
when confronted with critical events, and therefore an enabler of resilience. This was 
proved on several occasions through efforts done to find and allocate resources necessary to 
overcome the crisis and to help the project pursue its normal course.  
 
6.4 The Importance of Effective Communication and Trust 
When responding to the geological critical events, a structure that allows direct 
communication and creates conditions to develop relationships based on trust, solutions to the 
incurred problems were found quicker. This observation was made by comparing how both 
organizations managed the unpredictable geological surprises.  They both have implemented 
mechanisms to ensure the effective communication of unpredictable events, and have 
practiced collaboration to solve them. However, the effectiveness of their actions seems to 
differ. Interestingly, the Lötschberg project organization, which was quasi flat, seemed to be 
more reactive when dealing with unpredictable geological problems and more efficient in 
finding solutions to restore efficacy. This affirmation is confirmed by the elapsed time in 
which actors found a solution, as well as by the efficacy of the measures taken to “gain on 
planning”. Otherwise said, to keep the timetables in spite of the incurred delays. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the differences between the two organizations could be 
explained by the differences in their structural attributes. The organization of the Lötschberg 
base tunnel project allowed for a certain autonomy in decision-making, given that the on-site 
manager had the power to decide for hundreds of thousands of Swiss Francs over cost. This 
was possible thanks to the trusting relationship developed with their subcontractors (33 
people were supervising over 1,500 people working for the subcontractors’ account), and 
direct communication (24 hours of direct communication available over the phone). 
Interestingly, the empirical evidence suggests that “there is no substitute for experience.” 
Indeed, within the BLS project organization the quick decision-making process was enhanced 
by the project managers. They were people of a certain age, and therefore they were not only 
experienced but also trustworthy since they were not afraid of taking wrong decisions or 
jeopardizing their professional career.  This finding is consistent with the argument of Sheffi,  
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2005, about “driving the power to make decisions down in the organization” as an important 
principle of resilience: as in the case of Zara, the clothing manufacturer, in dealing with a 
disruption in demand.  
Face-to-face communication, enabled by weekly meetings, was also considered in both 
organizations key for ensuring a rapid decision-making process. This observation supports the 
argument of Weick (1993), from according to which, the development of meanings among 
two or more communication layers can be developed in rapid changing environments. They 
can be through face-to-face interaction as well as the claim of Sutcliffe & Vogus (2003), or 
Dutton & Heaphy (2003), on the role of the effective channel’s communications in 
organizations confronted with disruptions.  
In the case of the Gotthard project, the effective communication was enforced by practices 
aiming to promote dialogue between partners. First, the “dispute review board” in which 
three independent, experienced, but impartial members are selected to hear and address 
disputes. The rule requires that one member is appointed by the contractor, one by the client, 
and one by the chairman. The board’s role is to propose solutions to “unsolvable problems”. 
This experience proved to have good results which reflected in “less acrimony at the job site 
and timely, cost-effective solutions” to various problems. 
The second practice relates to the partnering process which seeks to “minimize disputes and 
prevent them from escalating over time.” It encourages dialogue between the client, the 
contractor, the engineer, and the construction manager in order to resolve disagreements 
reasonably. The bottom line is to act in the best interest of the project and to try to solve the 
problem at the lowest possible level in order to prevent conflict escalation and attorney 
involvement.  
Based on the empirical evidence found, we propose that “effective communication” is an 
enabler of project resilience because it leads to prompt decision making after the critical 
event’s impact. The proactive actions taken by ALP Transit Gotthard to stimulate dialogue 
with partners and the informal communication developed at BLS Alp Transit are both 
interpreted as efforts to increase the information’s richness: which is necessary in the decision 
making process. This finding is consistent with Weick’s (1993) argument that communication 
channels are extremely important in problem solving, given that they represent the only way 
to enable rational and documented decision-making. In addition, the empirical evidence  
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presented here suggests that informal communication channels are “faster” than the formal 
ones.  However, the management of projects with big stakes call, in general, for highly 
formalized procedures. They result from a mix of inherited routines from the parent 
organization and work in compliance with the norms of “public works”. Therefore, 
establishing informal communication could be very challenging. BLS, as a private and 
relatively small organization, was best positioned to develop and make use of the informal 
communication channels. 
This finding provides empirical support to claim that communication is an enabler and valued 
principle in cultures of resilience in the works of Sheffi (2005), Burke (2005), who studied 
resilient companies that communicate obsessively, and Peck (2005), in the analysis of 
network infrastructures’ resilience.     
 
6.5 The Importance of Risk Attitude and Safety Culture 
Our exploration resulted in finding that risk management and safety culture is one of the 
pillars of resilience and is a recurrent theme in the empirical findings associated with both 
project organizations. Inherent in the nature of the work (tunneling), the risk supervision and 
control processes needed to be further developed in order to ensure that they achieved the 
project’s objectives. Starting from two basic questions:  “what are the factors that may 
endanger the project’s objectives or its viability?” and “what are the factors that could support 
the objectives attainment?” the two organizations put concrete actions in place in order to 
mitigate the risks and exploit the opportunities.  
“Many people think we are exposed to the complete arbitrariness of nature, but this is 
not correct,” explained Kalman Kovari, an emeritus professor of tunneling at the 
Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and a consultant to the project.  “Geologists 
and rock mechanic experts make detailed surveys of the area. The best route is 
decided and the tunnel is then designed by a group of experts.”55  
 
                                                 
55 Source: swissinfo, September 2010 
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Both project companies and their contractual partners are responsible for regularly analyzing 
the risks, anticipating the hazards related to their domain of activity, and adjusting the 
exposure by planning and applying the proper procedures. Aware of the problems induced by 
the complex, unpredictable events, a special focus was put on accurate monitoring and 
detection in order to ensure effective risk management.  
Interestingly, in the NLFA project redundant measures to specific procedures, for accurate 
monitoring and detection, are enabled by the employment of the newest technology. The 
creation of redundant capacities and abilities for monitoring and detecting hazards in complex 
processes meet here. It remembers the best practices implemented in order to enhance the 
operational resilience in firms active in: financial services (telephone banking, ATM 
networks), telecommunication services (mobile phones, managed data networks), 
transportation service providers (air traffic control), and warehouses (just-in-time or 
automated operations) as described in Frost et al. (2001).   
The safety culture in NRLA is interlinked with the risk management culture. Both are 
embedded in the work and management process and people’s attitudes. Their principles apply 
to both people and operations. Both base tunnels are long and therefore safety is exceptionally 
important. For example, according to AlpTransit Gotthard, the consideration of work safety in 
the planning phase, when inviting tenders, in the work contracts, and the strict enforcement of 
contractual and legal regulations “creates an exemplary safety culture with low accident rates 
on the construction sites.”According to the medicinist Irene Kunz, who was in charge of the 
health and safety of the employees on Gotthard’s56 building site for ten years, “the accident 
rate has fallen by around 40 percent since boring began.  This means that despite the big 
Gotthard Base Tunnel construction site, the tunneling work accident rate is only a little over 
the construction industry sector rate as a whole.”  
This is partly explained by the prevention measures implemented. When it comes to people: 
“Health check-ups are carried out on all mining candidates before they were allowed onto 
the construction site; those who were found to be at risk were, where possible, given work on 
less exposed sites. We would never have been able to build the Gotthard Base Tunnel with so 
little damage to health and life without these check-ups. Getting the personal responsibility 
message across is another prevention factor.” 
                                                 
56 with the exception of the Sedrun shaft 
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Interestingly, the safety failure lessons, encountered in the construction of other tunnels, were 
taken into account in the NRLA project. In this respect, Swiss Federal Railways – in 
collaboration with other European railway operators and supervisory authorities – has defined 
safety goals for the operation of their new transportation facilities. “Safety planning will be 
successively refined right up to the time when the Gotthard Rail Link goes into operation and 
experience of incidents like the fire in the Channel Tunnel will be taken into consideration the 
safety measures planning.” 
Also, the evidence showed that there are regular experience exchanges with the project teams 
of other major European tunnels (Brenner, Mont d’Ambin, Semmering and Channel tunnels). 
These findings are consistent with the arguments of Bigley & Roberts (2001), Weick, 
Suttcliffe, & Obstfeld, (1999) and Wildavsky (1988) about the positive relationship between 
safety culture, implementation of lessons learned, and the resilience of high–reliability 
organizations (nuclear plants, airline industry).  
However, we also found evidence that the implementation of safety could become a bottleneck 
in achieving the project’s objectives.  
In the case of the Gotthard tunnel construction, the person in charge of monitoring the safety 
system on-site was authorized to make any changes needed to ensure safety, even if it would 
delay the planning goals. As an example, when the water that was pumped into the tunnel to 
cool and clean the machines, as well as to dampen the dust, produced a rise in humidity which 
implied a risk for the miners’ health. It was necessary to “weigh up certain risks from an 
occupational health point of view and take measures which necessitated some pioneering 
work.”  
The fact that safety measure implementations require time and extra costs, is a recurrent 
theme in major project developments. The safety standards, which are likely to change, are 
needed over a long period and are necessary for a project’s execution. In case of the NRLA 
project, safety reasons are also described as one of the principal causes of delays and over 
costs. In spite of these apparently diverging findings, we interpret the risk management and 
safety culture as an enabler of resilience, in the context of the NRLA project for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the holistic analysis, on which the risk management processes are based on, is 
one main reason. Secondly, the monitoring and detection practices described above, which 
imply a prompt acquiring of the information necessary for rapid decision-making, are a case 
of critical events. This relationship leads to increasing chances for resilient responses of the 
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project system. The finding bores resemblance with arguments to Sheffi (2005) and 
Christopher and Peck (2002) about the role of risk management and safety culture for the 
positive adjustment of companies confronted with disruptions in their supply chains. It is also 
consistent with Starr’s et al., (2003) argument about the role of safety culture for the 
resilience network infrastructures. It brings empirical support to the claim of Hamel (2002), 
Freemann (2004), Starr et al., (2002), and Burke (2005) that companies who overcome shocks 
due to unfortunate events (terrorist attack, lost market position, loss of key supplier) are those 
with an advanced risk culture. 
 
6.6 The Capability to Restore Efficacy  
The factors described in the previous sections enable quick decision-making and are therefore 
accountable for fostering the project’s resilience.  Besides those, we identified factors, which 
alone or in concert with others, create the favorable conditions for restoring the overall 
efficacy of the project systems. Therefore, they lead to the performance maintenance after the 
critical events. They are 1) Flexibility57, 2) Proactive planning, 3) Diversity58, 4) Positive 
relationship59, and 5) Work experience and motivation.  
In the following paragraphs we will explain the context in which these findings emerged and 
situate them in the existing literature by evoking studies that suggest similar themes.  
 
6.6.1 The Importance of Flexibility 
This finding emerged in connection with 1) the selection of technology that confers flexibility 
in changing the work processes and related equipment when needed (critical events, standard  
 
changes): and 2) the contract practices which give legal flexibility to actually make changes. 
We illustrate it with empirical evidence on the flexibility of the boring process, due to 
                                                 
57  
58  Reflected in task force components and tunnellers (“mineurs d’élite from 16 nations).   
59 Reflected in solidarity and social relationships 
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adequate technology selection and flexibility in contracting practices, found in both project 
organizations. This enabled rapid approval and the ability to obtain the certification required 
to implement changes, as well as the fair risk allocation/sharing with contractors.  
Although, we only present the case of boring process and related contracting practices, 
observations of other work and management processes converge to same evidence. (e.g. 
“concrete system, changing the concrete mix” and contracting practices with related 
suppliers). 
 Flexibility and Technology Choice  
In the case of the NRLA project, the empirical evidence shows that the selection of the 
appropriate excavation technology was a key factor in minimizing hazards and maintaining 
the drilling performance. This selection was based on the careful assessment of risks and 
opportunities. If geological conditions are predicted with high variance, as in the case of the 
central construction section at Sedrun, they “expected from very good, hard rock to very poor 
rock, with a high squeezing potential and an overburden of 1.0 km. Eventually karstic rock 
zones were expected, and in the southward drive, the tunnel had to be excavated close to a 
concrete arch dam.” The owner selected the conventional tunneling instead of TBM. In turn, 
this led to the necessity of addressing major logistical challenges for the unpredictable 
surprises that occurred (e.g. squeezing rock). An example is the driving equipment that had to 
cope with enormously different dimensions (e.g. tunnel faces from 65 m2 to 135 m2). Also, 
due to “the limited amount of space in the temporary base of the tunnel, which restricts the 
extent to which machines can pass each other, large parts of the installations had to be 
placed on a hanging platform.” On the Sedrun section, 50 tons had to be suspended from 
overhead rails and the whole excavation process needed to be adapted. However, this led to a 
breakthrough nine months ahead of the contract schedule. “The average advance rate was 
constantly around 1.3 meters per day. Also, the costs were slightly lower than foreseen. A 
very successful chapter in the history of conventional tunneling has been written.” 
For the excavation in the sectors Bodio (12 km drive) and Amsteg (11 km drive), the method 
selected was TBM, a revolutionary technology.  
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“It's like a millipede,"60 with “a length of 440 meters it looks like a construction site in itself.” 
Over the whole TBM drive, the average advance rates reached 11.5 meters per working day in 
both sectors, which was far better than foreseen. 
We consider that in the case of the NRLA project, the selection of the technology was a key 
factor in conferring the flexibility to change and adapt the work process as well as the related 
equipment based. It was also key in being able to maintain the drilling performance in case of 
geological surprises. As illustrated above, with the case of Sedrun, this is particularly true in 
the selection of conventional tunnelling. It is a classical technique that “allows response in 
both directions – depending on the rock changing; this flexibility makes conventional 
tunnelling the most advantageous tunnelling method in many projects, which can be located 
at a shallow depth or under a high overburden, in stable or loading ground, under genuine 
rock pressure, below the phreatic surface or in dry conditions” (Ehbar, 2008). 
This finding was recurrent in all drilling sections of both tunnels. It is particularly explained 
by “years of experience, both in Switzerland and abroad, that enabled engineers to decide 
what kind of machine is best for the specific circumstances.” At Lötschberg, the excavation 
method was different: 80 percent of the tunnel was blasted, and 20 percent bored, but the 
drilling performance was maintained in case of critical events (see chapter 5 for full 
description).  
Our finding could be summarized as “the right selection of technology creates the right 
conditions for achieving flexibility of work process and contributes to the maintenance of 
performance in the case of critical events.” 
 Flexibility and Contracting Practices 
Interestingly, the empirical evidence suggests that the flexibility to change or adapt the work 
process and related equipment is not enough without flexible contracting practices, which 
allow the constructor, from the legal point of view, to actually make the changes. The Alp 
Transit Gotthard experience proved that: “The contract conditions especially for conventional 
tunnelling must allow for rapid approval and certification of these changed and/or varied 
works. With reference to the possibility of encountering changed conditions, the contract 
                                                 
60 Maurus Huwiler of AlpTransit Gotthard, the company overseeing the tunnel construction 
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should be based on a measurement version. This will help to respond to changed conditions 
even if relevant provisions for all possible consequences could not be already included at the 
time of contract award.” 
The data shows that contracting flexibility could be achieved through a clear delimitation of 
responsibility, accountability, and risk-sharing principles in accordance to core business and 
skills. “The owner should prescribe the method of excavation only if there are compelling 
reasons to do so based on project restrictions. The responsibility for selection of the 
excavation method should be left to the contractor, based on the owner’s description of the 
rock conditions and the limits set by the design engineer project restrictions.” 
In the case of the Lötschberg tunnel, the same flexibility in the work process was achieved 
through outsourcing. “We figured out the right balance between rigor and flexibility based on 
agreed performance levels, reviews, rewards and penalties for meeting or failing the 
requirements.” The fact that the outcome (the what) is managed rigorously and the inputs (the 
why) are not, increase the operational flexibility.  
Based on this insight, we propose that in the case of NRLA, the flexibility to change led to a 
capacity to restore efficacy in the case of critical events. Specifically, the selection of 
technology, in concert with flexible contracting practices, allowed changes to the work 
process and related equipment and created conditions for process performance maintenance. 
This finding is consistent with Rice’s (2003) claim that flexibility is one principle method to 
create resilience in the supply network. Like in the NRLA case, it refers to the flexibility of 
work processes (manufacturing, distribution network) to change and adapt in case of 
disruptions in the suppliers’ network. It also brings empirical support to the arguments of 
Bigley & Roberts (2008) and Burke (2005), that the importance of operational flexibility for 
organizations in overcoming crises is significant. 
 
6.6.2 The Importance of Proactive Planning 
To everyone’s surprise, BLS achieved the project on time, according to planning that was 
elaborated 12 years before. The post-data collection analysis proved that one of the enablers 
of this outstanding performance was, in Lötschberg case, that compensation for delays of 
planning had always been possible. This was founded on a “parallel work philosophy” 
enabled by use of adequate technology and equipment. This practice was systematically 
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applied to the execution of all work packages belonging to the critical path, as well as other 
time consuming activities.  
A relevant example relates to the railway equipment preparation and installation, which were 
carried out according with this parallel logic. Specifically, the assembly of the railway 
equipment was executed in containers concomitantly with the excavation of the gallery. When 
it was finished, the containers were brought into the gallery and the equipment was quickly 
put in place; the containers protected the expensive equipment from unfavorable external 
conditions.  This finding is relevant when it comes to the differences between the two project 
organizations. Indeed, the underlying logic of planning at Alp Transit AG was the sequential 
work (derived from diagramming methods). It had the advantage of ensuring optimal use of 
resources that were internally available, but was difficult to change. 
According to the project managers, this planning approach was in anticipation. It was meant 
to distribute the unknown geological risks enabled by outsourcing. Meaning that, in the case 
of unexpected surprises, a stop in boring and equipment installation will not multiply. The 
finding shows resemblance to the contention of Starr et al. (2003), that in the context in which 
not all risks can be anticipated, there is a growing need for organizations to be adaptive and to 
respond flexibly to uncertainties.      
 
6.6.3 The Importance of Diversity  
The case study revealed the positive relationship between the diversity of skills and 
backgrounds to the quickness in finding solutions to unknown problems. This contributed to 
restoring the project system’s efficacy after the critical event. We illustrate this finding with 
two examples. 
The first is the case of purposeful diversity in task forces’ compositions. The second is the 
case of observed “ad-hoc diversity” leading to “bricolage” solutions from people on-site. 
They teamed-up together to overcome difficulties. In both cases, diversity creates conditions 
for avoiding work to be stopped for long periods.  
 Task Forces 
They are intervention teams foreseen to find solutions to complex problems and were 
purposefully created in both project companies in order to respond to the lessons learned at 
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the beginning of the project. In the case of critical events, these teams would do a quick 
assessment of the situation and decide on the necessity to involve external people of other 
backgrounds (e.g. academics, consultants) to the project. This is very often the case, as 
described in the narration of critical events in chapter 5.  The guiding principle seems to be 
that the variety of opinions enhances optimal solutions.  
“I am extremely impressed by how all the disciplines involved work together; geologists, 
engineers, builders, entrepreneurs, logistics experts, and cantonal and government 
representatives have built a multi-layered network and worked well together. It is just 
brilliant that the breakthrough is nearly ready” (Irene Kunz- occupational health doctor at 
ATG sites). 
This finding is recurrent in studies of organizational resilience such as Beunza and Stark 
(2003) who analyzed the role of diversity in the revival of operations of the trading rooms of 
Lower Manhattan after 9/11. Or Weick (1987) who analyzed the role of requisite variety in 
achieving reliability and resilience.   
 
  “Bricolage: Response to crisis can be seen as a particular instance of innovation”61 
We use this term to describe the creative and resourceful use of materials on hand (regardless 
of their original purpose) through people working on-site in order to overcome the escalation 
of critical events’ impacts. From the narration provided in chapter 5, describing unfolding 
critical events, we take the example of one Lötschberg tunnel’s geological surprise to 
illustrate this finding: “The geology made the drilling process difficult on the last kilometer of 
Mitholz. In the end, another unexpected event occurred: one of the transversal galleries went 
down just before boring.” However, the miners quickly adjusted this situation, “she was 
saved thanks to the intervention of the ‘élite mineurs’ who secured it with wood trunks.”  
The empirical evidence suggests that on-site, people worked in a team to find solutions to 
unexpected difficulties. They seemed to be convinced that together they would succeed. “We 
are different and debates are animated but I have never doubted that we wouldn’t make it…  
 
                                                 
61 Beunzaand Stark (2003) 
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Sometimes you only move a few centimeters forward, but you always go forwards.” Diversity 
is enforced by skills, origins, and cultures: “It is nothing new for the miners not to be Swiss. 
Traditionally it was Italians who provided the muscle but today people from 16 nations built 
this tunnel.” 
Bigley & Roberts (2008), Burke (2005), and Beunza and Stark (2003) also highlighted the 
role of diversity in successful improvisation. This enabled solutions in crises such as the fire 
fights and the 9/11 terrorist attack.  
     
6.6.4 There are no Substitutes for Experience, Positive Relationship and 
Engagement 
Many of the quotes collected under the subcategory “bricolage” indicated that “experience 
combined with positive relationships” can create conditions for developing the miners’ 
engagement in the successful achievement of the tunnel. This created the conditions for 
maintaining performance in case critical events happened.   
This causal relationship is not an unexpected finding. We consider that challenges 
traditionally associated to tunnelling cannot be overcome without the efforts of dedicated 
people. Alaosin Switzerland said that drilling tunnels “is an ability born out of necessity and 
continuous activities over almost 150 years.” 
Aware of the miners’ role for the successful completion of this project, project owner 
representatives used every occasion to thank and praise their work. “Together we risked a lot. 
Together we achieved a lot, because we know the mountain is large but we are small.”62  
At the breakthrough ceremony on the 15th of October, the Chief Executive Officer of 
AlpTransit Gotthard AG singled out numerous miners in his thanks. “Through their years of 
tireless commitment, they have made this world record possible. The miners are the heroes of 
today’s celebrations.”  
 To ensure their engagement, the management adopted a work policy which: 1) Promoted an 
adequate incentives system to reward their work. “If I earned the same at home I’d hardly  
 
                                                 
62 Swiss Transport Minister Moritz Leuenberger at the ceremony organized at the breakthrough event 
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ever be there, it’s the same, too, for my colleagues. We earn a good salary but it has its 
price.” “I’d like to stay in Switzerland, the social security is much better than in the rest of 
Europe.” 2) Practiced a hiring policy which strengthened their positive relationships: “a 
particular aspect is that in addition to their families at home, miners have a second “family” 
on the construction site.” “The teams are tightly knit; they often come from the same village 
and are friends or even members of the same family” 3) Ensured high quality work and safety 
conditions: “today's workers live in specially built, neat, prefabricated blocks; in videos 
displayed at the Gotthard information center, several say how much they appreciate being in 
Switzerland.” 4) Challenged their potential to further hone their capabilities: “steering the 
TBM is a skilled job, done from a cabin with a bank of screens; most of the other miners are 
involved in the logistics of getting the right equipment to the right place at the right time. 
Teamwork is also vital.” 5) Cultivated the pride of being a part of building a “world wonder”. 
We suggest that positive relationships are one of resources that enable resilience. 
Examples of studies that link resilience to positive work relationships at the organizational 
level are Cameron, Bright and Caza (2004), Spreitzer, Sutcliffe et al. (2006), Gittel et.al 
(2006), Burke (2005), and Beunza and Stark (2003). In same vein,  Seeman (1996) and Ryff 
and Singer (2002) link resilience and recovery to individuals with positive work relationships. 
Our finding offers empirical support to these arguments.  
In addition, we propose a response to the underexplored question: through which mechanism 
do positive relationships contribute to resilience? Based on the NRLA case study, we suggest 
that positive work relationships, in combination with experience and an adequate incentives’ 
system, activate the dedication and sentiment of competency, which further triggers 
resilience.  
This argument is consistent with Harland’s et al. (2005) contention that employees “who feel 
more competent and valued may be more likely to engage in positive appraisals of the 
situation because they feel more capable to meet the challenge and less afraid of negative 
consequences if they fail.” 
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6.7 Findings Summary 
This chapter set out to present empirical evidence on how the NRLA project system behaved 
in confrontation with critical events of a different nature. From the data analyzed, two set of 
findings emerged. One set relates to the critical events’ management and its contribution to a 
potential development of project resilience. The other set of findings relate to the identified 
factors and conditions that enabled the positive adjustments of the project system after the 
critical event. The positive adjustments represent a resilient response and are understood as 
successful efforts to help the project pursue its course while keeping the costs and timetables 
“on the track”.    
The first set of findings led us to propose that the effective management of critical events 
requires specific and adapted processes and the intervention of multidisciplinary teams. It is 
enabled through strong knowledge of interdependencies between a project system’s structural 
elements and the level at which the critical event impacts. Critical events management creates 
the potential for resilience development (otherwise said, continuous handling of critical events 
lead to the increase of the capacity of adaptation). 
The second set of findings led us to propose that in the face of unexpected critical events, 
project organization and corporate governance should follow two directions in order to 
enhance resilient responses. The first is to create the premises for a fast decision making 
process through 1) ensuring project legitimacy and goals alignment, 2) increasing face-to-face 
communication, developing informal communication, and building dialogue with partners, 
and 3) enforcing a risk management and safety culture. Secondly, to create a premises to 
restore the project system’s efficacy through providing a context for 1) flexible change of 
work processes, related technologies, and equipment in the case of critical events, 2) create 
operational slacks for anticipated problems (proactive planning), 3) foster a set of diverse 
skills and capabilities to find solutions to complex/unknown problems, and 4) develop 
positive work relationships.  
Based on these emerging concepts, we propose the extension of the theory of resilience to a 
temporary setting, the infrastructure project organization. 
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6.8 The Resilience in Infrastructure Projects 
“What does not kill me makes me stronger.” Nietzsche (1968, p.8) 
 
In chapter 2, we proposed literature based working definitions of resilience and resilience 
enablers. We said that they would be updated (completed and/or validated) in the light of our 
empirical findings.  
We suggested the following definition for a project’s resilience: “resilience is the project’s 
capacity to maintain positive adjustments when confronted with critical events that are 
inherent in its life-cycle.” 
This study is concerned with the project’s performance in respect to costs and scheduling 
delays. We proposed to understand the positive adjustments as successful efforts for “keeping 
the project’s costs and planning on track.”  
For resilience enablers, we suggested “those conditions and factors (if any) which facilitate 
the manifestation of project resilience in the face of critical events.”  
As recommended in Masten (2001) and Suttcliffe & Vogus (2003), resilience enablers were 
identified and assessed in respect to two qualifiers. They are evidence that a threat (critical 
event) can be overcome and that the project system can continue to do well (performance 
maintained). Chapters 5 and 6 describe how the enablers emerged from the collected data and 
discussed and situated them within existing literature. Without observed case-related 
particularities, which could be integrated into the working definition of resilience enablers, as 
fore-mentioned, our definition can be validated.  
In contrast, the empirical evidence from the NRLA case study substantiated two inductive 
arguments. These need to be considered when updating the proposed definition of project 
resilience. One argument relates to the “perceived” project performance and the other 
concerns a possible way to evaluate project resilience.   
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6.8.1 Project resilience  
The first element, which clearly stands out in our empirical analysis, is that the real 
performance of this project, in the project’s stakeholder perception, is the fact that it still 
alive. Since 1992, when the Swiss first approved the plan, the project faced numerous critical 
events and was stopped more than once. Its execution is a continuously risky venture with 
many compromises. The evidence suggests that the stakeholders’ solidarity, in spite of their 
diverging opinions, is to some extent accountable for the performance. The solidarity was 
founded on strong interests; specifically, the project’s strategic importance for Switzerland’s 
transport policy and its contribution to building European infrastructures. In this light, the 
goal of the stakeholders is “to keep it going.” The overruns and scheduling delays, although 
unfortunate, are seen as secondary63.  
Nevertheless, the empirical analysis of the project system’s behavior provided evidence of 
positive adjustments after critical events occurred. Project actors took measures to counteract 
the critical event’s impacts and to control planning delays. One recurrent outcome observed, 
was the increase of adaptation capacity of the project system.  
Therefore, we propose to update the working definition of project resilience to:  
Resilience describes 1) the project system’s ability to restore capacity and continuously 
adapt to changes 2) to fulfill its objectives in order to continue to function at its fullest 
possible extent, in spite of threatening critical events.  
This definition embraces a developmental perspective, which understands resilience as a 
dynamic process of positive adaptation. This is argued in the studies of Egeland et al. (1993); 
Wildavsky (1988 p:120); Sitkin (1992); Levinthal and March (1981, 1993); Teece et al. 
(1997); Weick et al. (1999); Eisenhardt & Martin (2000); and Porras & Silvers (1991). 
It has more similarities to the notion of ecological resilience than to the concept of 
engineering resilience. As explained in Gunderson and Pritchard (2002), and described in 
detail in Annex 7, the engineering resilience implies maximising the efficiency of the 
processes (with the risk of increasing vulnerabilities) in order to quickly return to the 
                                                 
63 “The voters’ motives did not lie in the economic profitability of both base tunnels but in the regions coming 
closer together and in the sustainable management of ever-increasing mobility” 
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equilibrium, in which the system was found before the shock. Ecological resilience aspires to 
effectively increase the magnitude of consequences the organisation could withstand before 
suffering irreparable changes.     
However, one of the recurrent themes across studies in different fields (e.g. Flach 1997; 
Gunderson 2002), is the general acknowledgement that resilience is a “difficult concept to 
measure.” Based on the insight gained through this exploratory study, and derived from the 
definition of organizational resilience64 of Dalziell and McManus (2004) we suggest a method 
“to measure” resilience at the process level. Project management typically measures process 
performance against a tangible set of key performance indicators (KPI).  The time needed for 
the project performance indicators to recover will be a function of its adaptation capacity, 
which leads to a positive adjustment in restoring its capacity (KPIs recovering). Therefore, 
resilience will be a function of the impact on KPI (∆ KPI) over the response and restore 
capacity period (∆ elapsed time). This is represented in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Measuring the Process Resilience (adapted from Dalziell, 2004) 
                                                 
64 “Resilience may be broken down into two key components: vulnerability and adaptive capacity; The ease with 
which an organization is pushed after a shock into a new state is a measure of its vulnerability, while the 
degree to which it is able to cope with that change is a measure of their adaptive capacity” (Dalziell and 
McManus, 2004). 
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This shows the importance of impact on the KPIs and time elapsed to their recovery as a 
measure of process resilience: R = F (∆ KPI, ∆ t). For instance, a key process in tunnel 
execution, the drilling (boring), measures its performance by the KPI “rate of advancement”. 
In the event of an unexpected critical event, this rate will drop dramatically if the drilling 
needs to be stopped (equaling 0 meters/day). The elapsed time necessary to find a solution to 
restore the drilling process’s efficacy65 and the critical event’s impact on the rate of 
importance (how severe it dropped), could be used to measure resilience.  
As illustrated in the case study, finding a solution to restore the “rate of advancement” implies 
awareness of critical event’s conjecture. This enables an informed decision-making process, 
supported by a group of people with various competencies and skills. This will lead to an 
adaptation or change of processes, equipment, and/or technologies that will enable work to 
resume. Similarly, this logic could be reproduced for all other critical processes. Cost and 
time are traditionally among the most important project KPIs. The aim of this logic would be 
to quantify the costs associated with restoring the efficacy, to complete the set of the 
resources needed, to enable a resilient response. For an accurate result, the foreseen 
contingencies66 (if any) would be deducted from the total sum. This reasoning leads us to 
propose, in the next section, a graphical representation of the “troubled project behavior” 
concept. It places the critical events and associated adjustments in the project life-cycle and 
links them to its performance.     
 
6.8.2 Troubled project behavior 
The graph shows that critical events can occur any time during the project’s life-cycle 
(conceptualization, planning, execution and termination) and will disturb the project’s course. 
As proved in the studies of major projects (e.g. Morris and Hough 1987, Eden, Ackerman, et 
al. 2005), as well as in the NRLA exploratory case study, the critical event's accumulated 
                                                 
65 Example of measuring performance in drilling process: “In September, the west tunnel-lining machine 
exceeded the agreed performance of 600 metres per month for the first time. In the west single-track tunnel, 
54 blocks (648 metres) were concreted up to Tunnel Kilometre 234.750. The gap (1,080 m) that arose due to 
the repairs in the west single-track tunnel is being closed with the small tunnel-lining machine, with which 14 
blocks (168 m) were concreted in September” 
66 A contingency represents a source or capability that is intended to help managers cope with uncertainty (Ward, 
2005) 
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overtime can always be translated into overruns (∆ costs) and delays above the original 
timetables (∆ time).  
 
 
Figure 6-2: Troubled Project Behavior and Performance in Project Life-cycle67 
 
Therefore, the troubled project’s behavior is represented by the deviation from the project’s 
original trajectory. The magnitude of the deviation will depend on the severity of the critical  
 
                                                 
67 Based on empirical findings 
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event’s impact on the project’s performance. This then depends on the capacity of the 
project’s system to restore efficacy and maintain a positive adjustment, understood here as 
project resilience. 
The exercise of reconstituting the troubled project behavior at Gotthard and Lötschberg base 
tunnels led to Figure 6-3. The graphs were constructed based on the data included in the OFT 
report from December 31st, 2007.  
 
 
Figure 6-3: Troubled project behavior – Example of Gotthard base tunnel project  
(Source:  OFT report Dec 31, 2007) 
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Figure 6-4: Troubled project behavior – Example of Lötschberg base tunnel project 
 
The performance of the actual costs and planning versus the objectives established in 1998, 
vary for both tunnel execution projects. It shows that in both cases estimated costs were 
escalated, however only the Lötschberg tunnel was completed on time.  Meanwhile, yearly re-
evaluations over the project’s completion timeline indicate 2018 as the most presumable year 
that the Gotthard tunnel will be complete.  
Interestingly, the severity of critical events, which is evaluated through their impacts on costs 
and the scale of effects, show comparable overspending for the nature of the costs. 
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Figure 6-5: Critical Events Severity Translated in Cost Overruns - Gotthard Tunnel Execution  
(Based on OFT report) 
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Figure 6-6: Critical Events Severity Translated in Cost Overruns – Lötschberg Tunnel Execution68 
 
From the case study description and analysis, these results suggest that the two projects had 
different coping capabilities when confronted with critical events, and therefore had different 
resiliencies.  
Nevertheless, when speaking about the NRLA project as a congregate, one can safely say that 
it showed limited resilience in the key project performers, cost overruns and planning delays. 
However, it manifested strong resilience in pursuing its course. In other words, resilience is 
tied into “the real project performance, as it is perceived by project stakeholders and how it 
emerged from the case study.”    
 
                                                 
68 Based on OFT Reports 
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7 RESILIENCE IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICE 
“Connecting theory and practice is no simple trick; but when it occurs it can trigger 
dazzling insights” (Lake Wobegan Story cited in Van de ven 2007, Chapter 9, p2) 
 
The NRLA case study verified that unexpected critical events have a negative impact on 
project performance. The project system does not recover quickly from their consequences. 
Thus, additional costs and delays over initial planning accumulate, regardless of what caused 
the critical event. Traditional project management practice does not pay enough attention to 
critical events for various reasons. Firstly, the consequences are unknown, they are low-
frequency events, and a resource shortage can happen. Secondly, many have no previous 
experience, multidisciplinary and cross-functional requirements are needed, and project 
managers do not receive credit for problems that never happened.   
The research presented in this thesis explores empirical evidence on project resilience. This is 
a concept that is accountable for a positive adjustment after a critical event, meaning that it 
matters in order to maintain performance. The NRLA insight reveals that the conditions and 
factors enabling resilience could boost project performance. On one hand, a fast decision-
making process, in case of critical events, and on the other hand, quick restoring of process 
efficacy is needed. In an attempt to show the value and usability of this concept, we will close 
the chapter with managerial insights. Included are recommendations for implementation, 
derived from the knowledge gained over project resilience and its enablers. They are 
suggestions on 1) general strategies, which could be adopted at the project governance and 
organization levels, in order to confer general resilience to the project system. And 2) a 
practical application on the process of building resilience, supported examples from NRLA, 
but it can customized for any given project.  
 
7.1 General strategies for building resilience in projects  
Three general strategies should be adopted based on the observed patterns of positive 
adjustments in the NRLA case study. These suggestions take into account the position of the 
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emerged resilience enablers in the existing literature of resilience and project management, as 
well as recurrent themes in resilience research in other fields (socio-psychology and social 
ecological systems)69. They are: 1) Risk – focused aiming to prevent or reduce risk exposure 
2) Resource – focused aiming to increase access to all types of resources and 3) Protection – 
focused aiming to restore efficacy through the mobilization of a project system’s capacity for 
adaptation. The guiding principles of these strategies should be: no elapsed time between the 
occurrence and the communication of critical events, reduced time in resolving the problem 
(quick resolution, prevent escalation, and worsening), and developed capabilities to react and 
respond to critical events. 
 
7.1.1 Risk – Focused Strategy  
The NRLA study brings empirical evidence to the importance of effective risk management to 
successfully cope with unexpected critical events. Specifically through developing and 
monitoring warning indicators, looking forward, and using predictive analytics in the project 
organization, a rapid response is created. When things go wrong, better preparation of the 
project’s system for impacting effects and avoiding delays due to work stops make the project 
run smoother.   
In addition, we suggest that risk management processes should include a specific process that 
identifies the critical events’ sources and evaluates the impact from a systemic perspective. 
By thinking more systemically about risks, managers create the identification context of “key 
risk drivers”. Those are risks that exert influence over a certain number of project 
components. This should enable the mitigation of forming positive feedback loops in the 
project system and impede financial consequences. In the NRLA project, the risk 
management process was reviewed periodically (every 6 months) and continuously improved 
based on the lessons learned. This leads to developing capabilities for effectively managing 
risks, and therefore, increases the project system’s capacity for adaptation, implying resilience 
in the case of unexpected events. 
 
                                                 
69 These themes emerged from the conference Resilience 2008, International Science and Policy Conference held 
in Stockholm (presentations of  Fikret Berkes, Ann Masten, Benjamin Burkhard, Elizabeth Malone, etc.) 
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7.1.2 Resource – Focused Strategy  
The aim of a resource-focused strategy is to increase access to all types of resources (human, 
financial, knowledge, etc.) necessary to solve the crisis that follows a critical event.  
At the project governance level, the strategy can be achieved when stakeholders build and 
preserve project legitimacy during the whole project life-cycle. They share a common vision 
and their goals are aligned with the project. In the NRLA case, these conditions coaxed the 
cohesion of stakeholders and enforced their solidarity in the face of critical events. This 
“warranted” their joint efforts to find the financial resources necessary for the project to 
pursue its course. It also created a context in which the project’s finality could be adapted in 
case significant changes occurred (political, environmental, etc.). 
At the project organization level, the increase in access to resources is enabled through 
effective communications and relationships based on trust. Their importance in successfully 
handling critical events cannot be overestimated, particularly in an organization that has a 
strong mechanistic “command and control” structure. In the NRLA case, effective 
communications (face to face, informal, and diverse) and trusting relationships with suppliers 
enable rapid decision-making when critical events occur. The decisions are based on 
knowledge and skills rather than on formal authority.  
 
7.1.3 Protection – Focused Strategy  
The goal of a protection-focused strategy is to restore efficacy through the mobilization of a 
project’s system with the ability to adapt. Based on these research findings, any project 
system should rely on the following factors to be able to quickly restore its efficacy. Work 
processes are flexible enough to allow for the implementation of changes (technology and/or 
related equipment); Operational slacks for anticipated problems (proactive planning); 
Intervention teams displaying a variety of skills and capabilities necessary to find solutions to 
complex/unknown problems; and Motivated people who show passion and dedication to their 
work while having outstanding skills. 
Work process flexibility can be achieved through the right selection of technology and 
flexibility in contracting practices. Operational slacks and proactive planning ideally need to  
  7-144
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
be embedded in the risk management and safety culture. Last but not least, the employees’ 
motivation develops through positive work relationships encouraged by adequate incentives 
and empowerment mechanisms. 
The intervention measures, in the case of critical events, should consider the sustainability of 
desired effects. Meaning that, it should create a context in which the project system will not 
suffer the same consequences if the critical event occurs again. This implies the project actors 
recognize that the “after critical event environment” is changed, and they should adjust their 
actions appropriately to increase the overall capacity of adaptation. The management will 
obviously judge these suggestions in connection to their ease of implementation, including 
other dimensions, such as time and cost. In the case they are accepted and actually 
implemented, the project organization needs to evaluate their contribution as it actually is as 
opposed to the predicted effectiveness in influencing the project’s performance.  
 
7.2 Toward a Process of Building Project Resilience  
Based on the empirical findings from the NRLA case study, and the identified enablers of 
resilience, we suggest that resilience can either be designed at the project’s inception or 
developed during the project’s life-cycle.  
Resilience Enablers (NRLA case study) Levels of resilience  
Legitimacy and common vision on the project’s 
mission 
Strategy 
Social networks and relationships based on trust 
(BLS,ATG) 
Risk attitude and safety culture (NRLA) 
Effective communication (ATG, BLS) and trust (BLS) 
Proactive planning (BLS) 
Positive work relationships  
Diversity (skills, competencies) 
Culture  
Flat organization layout for direct communication 
(BLS) 
Structure 
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Financial structure (NRLA) 
Flexibility through technology selection resultant in 
low complexity (ATG) 
Flexible contracting practices (ATG) 
Table 7-1: Levels of Resilience in NRLA Project based on Empirical Findings 
 
It can then be embedded into the project’s system at the strategic, cultural, or structural levels: 
as shown in the Table 7-1. 
In this table, the resilience enablers (emerged from the empirical analysis) are assigned to 
project system structural elements as defined by Turner (1999). This highlights the project 
system level where the resilience enablers could be embedded and create the context for the 
implementation of risk-focused, resource-focused and protection-focused strategies. 
Further, the experience of the NRLA case study, led to propose a practical tool consisting in a 
three-sequence process for building project resilience, as described in Figure 7-2.   
 
 
Figure 7-1: Resilience Building Process 
 
The first step is assessing the “resilience opportunity” in a given project. The term 
“opportunity” refers to an evaluation of the need to build resilience. Using the NRLA case 
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study, we identify the critical events likely to occur by nature. We then estimate the likelihood 
that the risk will occur and identify financial consequences by projecting the unfolding critical 
event into the project system. The systematic projection will help in identifying the “key” risk 
drivers and the priorities for the risk management’s investment. The opportunity to build 
resilience is driven by the number of high impact, low probability risks and the project actors’ 
willingness to prepare the project system for previously thought events. In this phase, tools 
and methods specific to the project management process should be used (scenario analysis, 
experience, learned lessons, and benchmarking with similar projects).  
We illustrate this step with the example of critical events due to geological surprises in the 
NRLA project (Figure 7-3). 
The systemic representation of critical event impact on the project system indicates this event 
as a key driver risks.  Its occurrence will impact the technology and process levels. May 
engender unknown changes of work process and lead to work stops. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7-147
 
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
Geology Service provision
Project output
Links
Capacity
Technology
Planning
Costs
Financing
ProcessesComponents
Economic 
Feasibility
Other sources
Revenues
Impact mesures
C8 CE9CE 
11
 
Figure 7-2 : Building Resilience Process _ Step 1: Evaluate the Resilience Opportunity 
 
This systemic representation could be customized for any given project. In synergy with other 
methods (scenario analysis) it can be used to assess the related financial impact and evaluate 
the “opportunity for resilience”.  
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The second step is to benchmark the resilient capabilities already existent within the project 
organization against the ideal case. The resilient project reference is presented in Figure 7-4, 
which reunites the identified resilience enablers and the assigned levels of resilience.  
 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Building Resilience Process _ Step 2: The Resilient Project Reference 
 
This results in a gap analysis. The appropriate measures need to be decided upon and 
implemented in the third step. This will maximize the efficiency of intervention strategies and 
confer resilience to the project’s system in the case of critical events. 
In the NRLA case study, examples of resilient capabilities that already exist are project 
legitimacy, comprehensive risk management processes, flexible contracting practices and 
positive work relationships. Resilient capabilities resulted from the development of the 
capacity to adapt in the face of critical events. Those adaptations were laws that changed the 
project environment and mitigated the negative effects of exogenous critical events; such as 
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environmental claims or award of sections’ execution claims. As a general note, the 
continuous handling of critical events led to measures that made the project organization more 
resilient than it was at the project’s inception. The collateral effect was an improved capability 
to estimate costs and time needed to complete the project. This was reflected in the last three 
year’s reports that costs and scheduling were kept on track.   
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8 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
Knowledge for whom? Action for what? (Suchman, 1971) 
Infrastructure projects deal with unexpected events all throughout their project life-cycle. 
There is a scale within an event, which can be handled as part of a normal management 
process, where unexpected events present both opportunities and risks. However, very often 
events move beyond this scale. Under these circumstances, there is a greater uncertainty about 
the project system’s ability to maintain performance and the consequences of the potential 
impacts. In this study, we set out to investigate how projects cope with the inherent critical 
events that occur at some point in their life-cycle. We chose to do this by developing an 
exploratory case study concerning the execution of one of the most important infrastructures 
of this century, The New Rail Link through the Alps. 
This study has several contributions to project management theory and practice.  
8.1.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The first contribution is, the appropriateness of accommodating the concept of project 
resilience when studying a project system’s behavior when confronted with critical events. In 
addition, the factors and conditions enabling project resilience were found to be constructive 
in maintaining project performance after the critical event. However, it was shown that both 
projects did not behave the same when confronted with similar events. This could be partially 
explained by the differences of the parent organization’s structural attributes in their project 
systems (organization layout, communication channels, and contracting practices). These new 
concepts emerged from empirical research and form the basis for a mid-range theory of 
resilience in a temporary setting, an infrastructure project. Midrange theory is understood by 
Merton (1968), “as a theory which is not derived from general abstract theories but is 
consistent with, and provides important empirical evidence for one or more general theories, 
and contributes therefore to bridging scientific knowledge.”  The discussion of empirical 
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findings highlights the fact that resilience enablers either endorse recurrent themes in other 
studies of resilience, or are new to the theory of resilience, with project organization as a unit 
of analysis. However, they overlap and complete with existent research over critical success 
and failure factors in project management. The NRLA example demonstrates that resilience is 
a “keystone” on the list of the critical success factors and could enable “project performance 
survival” after the critical event.  
The methodological approach - the use of critical events to highlight behavior-based issues 
within the context of an exploratory case study - is to our knowledge, relatively novel in 
project management research and may be useful in further exploration. Along with this 
exploratory case study of a major infrastructure project, a step is made toward the better 
understanding of the troubled project behavior phenomenon. Currently, this is an 
underexplored area in project management studies.  
8.1.2 Contributions to Project Management Practice 
Exploration into the NRLA project highlighted the usability of the resilience perspective in 
temporary organizations with advanced and comprehensive risk management processes.  The 
main argument is that resilience offers project actors the opportunity to manage critical 
events, which are “unknown unknowns”. They are risks that have not been thought of, and 
therefore cannot be assessed and mitigated.  Derived from the empirical analysis of project 
system behavior in the face of critical events, we propose three general strategies. These 
strategies contribute to the development of project resilience that, in turn, help a project to 
maintain its performance after the critical event. These strategies are enhanced by risk-
focused, resource-focused, and protection-focused measures. They are not necessarily costly, 
but are contingent to the organizational layout and management processes inherited from the 
parent organization. These measures relate, on one hand, to the effective management of 
critical events. Effective management is done through: 1) ensured project legitimacy and goal 
alignment, 2) face-to-face and informal communication channels, dialogue with partners, and 
3) enforced risk management and safety culture.  On the other hand, they refer to the ability to 
restore a system’s efficacy after the critical event. The NRLA experience proved that this can 
be achieved through 1) flexibility in work processes, enhanced by technology selection and 
contracting practices, 2) operational slacks for anticipated problems (proactive planning), 3) 
diversity of skills and capabilities, and 4) positive work relationships.  
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The case study revealed a synergy between resilience and the risk management process. This 
led to another practical application, consisting of a three-step tool that can be used to assess 
the resilience in any given project.  
The first step is assessing the “resilience opportunity,” where “opportunity” denotes an 
evaluation of the need to build resilience. This step could be carried-out along with the normal 
risk management process. It consists of identifying high impact, low probability risks which 
are too costly to be addressed. From a resilience perspective, they become critical events and 
could be treated as such. Their potential impact on a project’s system is evaluated by 
projecting the unfolding critical event into the project system, as explained by the tool in 
chapter 6. This “way of doing” enables project managers to tradeoff efforts to address some 
unknown risks with resilient measures. They could decide to go beyond the traditional risk 
management process and protect the project system against “costs to address risks.” This is 
done by taking measures in building (reinforcing) project resilience. However, as previously 
explained, in practice these measures are not necessarily costly, but may be difficult to 
implement given that they refer to inherited project structural attributes.  
The implications of this study for project management practice are described in Figure 7-1 
below. It highlights the differences between the resilience approach and the traditional 
methods. 
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The study revealed synergies between risk management and resilience approach – the tool for 
resilience opportunity assessment put RM methodology into resilience perspective 
Project 
Performance
Mitigate the risk
Punctual measures
Some mitigation measures create 
vulnerabilities
Costly to address high impact – low 
probability risk
Be prepared for unexpected
Proactive measures, enhanced 
collaboration and effective communication
Diminish vulnerabilities (systemic model)
Adapt project scope
Effective and non necessarily costly 
measures to address high impact – low 
propability risks
 
 
Figure 8-1: Resilience Approach vs. Traditional Methods 
8.2 Limitations and Further Research 
“You cannot generalize from a single case” some would say… One reason is that “in 
general, formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, 
whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated.” Flyvbjerg, 200670 
 
According to Yin (1994) one should not try to generalize to other case studies but one should 
generalize case study findings to theory, analogous to the way a scientist generalizes from 
experimental results to theory. Consequently, the basis of the generalization in our case would 
not be on typical points of the project but on the existence of particular factors (attributes, 
processes) that influence the behaviour of troubled projects; in the sense that they could 
enable projects to respect the committed budget and time lines. These attributes and processes 
                                                 
70 Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,  Qualitative Inquiry, Volume 12, 2, 219-245  
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were revealed through the analysis of project behaviour from an original perspective, which is 
the resilience approach. In this light, the analytical generalization in this study leads to a 
middle range theory on the applicability of the resilience construct in the management of 
infrastructure projects and conceptualization of troubled project behaviour. As explained, this 
theory contributes to an increase of the understanding of those conditions and factors which 
account for the positive adjustment when a project faces critical events (resilience enablers). 
Therefore the practical recommendations presented could be understood as general and not 
domain specific. While the results of this study might be generalizable to other projects there 
are several limitations that should be acknowledged.  
Given the nature of the method used, it is difficult to generalize to other major project’s 
developed in different cultural or political settings. Yet, this study raises several important 
questions for further research. For example, what is the appropriate balance between 
centralization and decentralization in a project organization in order to enable effective 
communication for efficient critical event management? Which enablers contribute most to 
the development of resilience and what is their relative importance during the project’s life-
cycle? Further, future confirmatory studies are required to validate the viability of these 
resilience enablers as indicators of resilient functioning that can be relied upon. This research 
creates the context for continuing this valuable line of research. Although not explored in 
great details in this study, the relationships identified between risk management and resilience 
are an emergent consideration and could potentially trigger significant benefits for both the 
literature and practice by developing greater understanding of the synergy between these 
performance enhancing mechanisms.   Finally, we invite further exploration of the conditions 
in which virtuous circles between enablers of resilience and structural attributes of a project’s 
organization are created and sustained. Another avenue for future research is in helping 
project organizations assess their capacity to handle critical events and develop systems to 
signal when the capacity is affected by traditional project management trade-offs (e.g. 
contingency plans vs. additional costs; safety vs. efficiency).  
Encountering what they still know nothing about, places project’s actors in a context which 
does not tell that critical events are avoidable but rather implies the need to create a project 
system flexible enough to adapt and handle crisis. This research proves that resilience is a 
multidisciplinary concept which could help project actors to address this challenge.    
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ANNEX 1: PRE-INTERVIEWS (NOV 2006 – FEB 
2007)71 
List of practitioners and roles  
NAME, FUNCTION INSTITUTION  ROLE IN PROJECT 
Niklaus Scheerer  
Global Wealth Management & 
Business Banking 
UBS AG Project Financing 
Daniel Wild  
Responsible for large infrastructure 
projects 
« Secrétariat d'Etat à 
l'Economie » (Seco) 
Project Developer 
(design, feasibility) 
Dieter Rothenberger  
PPP Responsible for water-related 
infrastructures 
 
« Secrétariat d'Etat à 
l'Economie » (Seco) 
Legal, Contracting 
Massimo Florio 
Professor of Economics of European 
Integration (Jean Monnet Chair), 
University of Milan  
CSIL, Centre for 
Industrial Studies, 
Milan 
Appraisal Methods for 
Infrastructure Projects  
Sorin Geambasu 
Project Manager 
Nestlé Nespresso SA Project Management  
 
                                                 
71 N.B. The questionnaire layout reflects the actual “thinking” at the moment when the pre-interviews 
were realized; until the end of this study this “thinking was refined” and the objectives of the study 
redefined.  
  - 174 -
Expect the unexpected: An exploratory study on the conditions and factors driving the resilience of infrastructure projects  
 
Questionnaire outline 
 Research topic: The concept of resilience in infrastructure projects 
The objective of this questionnaire is to understand what you think about resilience, its 
applicability in the management of infrastructure projects, and what you think about the 
long record of costs overruns and scheduling delays during the implementation of 
infrastructure projects. 
Our approach: Explain the “non-performance” in terms of overruns and delays by using 
the concept of resilience; specifically, the project’s resilience in the face of unexpected 
critical events inherent in its life cycle.  
Definitions of Resilience (to be given after the first concept question/discussion 
“per se”): 
In material science: resilience is the physical property of a material that can return to 
its original shape or position after a deformation that does not exceed its elastic limit.  
In psychology and child development: resilience is commonly used to describe the 
ability of people to cope with stress and catastrophe. 
In ecology: resilience has been defined in two ways, which show two contrasting 
aspects of stability, one focuses on maintaining efficiency of function (engineering 
resilience) and one focuses on maintaining existence of function (ecological resilience). 
In today’s business environment: resilience is widely used to characterize an 
organization’s ability to react to unexpected disruption and to restore normal operations 
(Coutu, D.L. “How Resilience works,” Harvard Business Review - May 2002). 
This research embraces the resilience approach and hypothesizes that in a long run 
project the probability of not having planned changes, shocks, or disruptions is high. 
The project’s viability will depend on its resilience, meaning its ability to amortize 
shocks and anticipate and adapt the changes to fit the infrastructure’s objectives.  
From this perspective, the challenges will: 
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• Formulate the concept of resilience in infrastructure projects, determine its 
variables, and assess their importance for actors and the project’s overall success  
• Create metrics so that resilience can be measured and eventually contrasted with 
risks and performance indicators  
• Propose a tool that will enable the decision makers to trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of resilience, and will reinforce sponsors’ motivation to invest 
in a project with traditional project appraisal methods 
Objective 1: The Resilient Qualities  
Contrary to risk approach, looking at the risk factors causing the projects’ failure and 
trying to mitigate them, we focus on identifying those strengths that enhance the 
project’s success. Specifically, we would like to identify those qualities, assets, or 
protective factors that help a project survive the winds of unplanned changes.  
1. What are the qualities needed in order for a project to succeed? 
Objective 2: The Resiliency Process 
By resilience process, we mean the process of coping with changes which normally 
result in an identification and enrichment of resilient qualities. Specifically, we would 
like to know how the resilient qualities are acquired. 
1. How did you overcome obstacles in past projects?  
2. If we imagine a disruption followed by a reintegration and we think, how is the 
reintegration state different from the one before disruption, does it make any 
sense to discuss: 
• Resilient reintegration – reintegration to a state superior of the one before 
disruption, in which the resilient qualities are stronger 
• Reintegration to homeostasis – reintegration back to the state before the 
disruption  
• Reintegration with loss (whatever loss may mean) 
• Dysfunctional reintegration  
In an affirmative case, can we validate this classification with concrete examples?  
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This portion was only discussed among people with a scientific background, as it 
was too abstract for people with other backgrounds. It’s results come, in part, from 
biographical references.  
Objective 3: Resilience as an Intrinsic Propensity 
In order to reintegrate resiliently, a project needs resources. Therefore we would like to 
know what and where are the resources and motivation needed to reintegrate 
resiliently.  
1. If you could change one thing in an abandoned project, what would it be? 
2. Imagining a project like a system with the poles: DEMAND, OFFER, 
FINANCING STRUCTURE, and ORGANIZATION, which one of these poles 
is much more likely to intervene in order to reintegrate resiliently. 
The answers to these questions depend on the interviewed person’s profile and their role 
in the project’s life cycle. Their agreement that the project’s organization could be a 
means for factual decision-making and flexibility in liberating resources when needed 
was the common denominator.   
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ANNEX 2: CRITICAL EVENT INTERVIEW 
METHOD 
The critical incident technique is a procedure designed to collect important information 
about human behaviour in defined situations. The roots of the method can be traced 
back to 18th century studies by Sir Francis Galton. The technique can best be regarded 
as “an outgrowth of studies in the Aviation Psychology Program of the United States 
Army Forces in World War II” (Flanagan, 1954). The Aviation Psychology Program 
was established in the summer of 1941 to develop job analysis procedures for the 
selection and classification of aircrews. The main objective of these procedures was to 
determine critical requirements. These have been demonstrated to have made the 
difference between success and failure in carrying out an important job assigned in a 
significant number of instances. The characteristics of the techniques developed for 
defining these job descriptions, are the best explained in Flanagan (1953):  
To obtain valid data on the truly critical requirements for success in a specific 
assignment, techniques were developed in the Aviation Psychology Program for making 
systematic analysis of causes of good and poor performance. Essentially, the procedure 
was to obtain first-hand reports, or reports from objective records, of satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory execution of the task assigned. The cooperating individual described a 
situation in which success or failure was determined. 
This technique is seen to be highly reliable because only simple judgements are required 
from the observer. Only reports from qualified observers are included and all 
observations are evaluated by the observer against an agreed statement for the purpose 
of the activity.  
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ANNEX 3: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA 
SOURCES 
 
N° NAME AND POSITION CRITICAL EVENT  
LINK  
SOURCE72
1 Michel Béguelin, Conseiller aux Etats; 
président de la commission Suisse du transport 
1 to 11 CE- I 
2 Adolf Oggi, conseiller fédéral et ancien 
ministre du transport  
1, 2, 3, 4 TSR-I 
3 Moritz Leunberger, conseiller fédéral et 
ministre du transport  
5, 6, 11 TSR-I 
4 Otto Stich, ancien ministre des finances 1, 2, 3, 4 TSR-I 
5 Maura Moretti, Directeur général des chemins 
de fer italiens  
11 TSR-I 
6 Peter Testoni, President Alptransit Gothard  7, 8, 9, 11 TSR-I 
7 Andrea Hämmerle ; conseiller socialiste et 
spécialiste dans la politique de transport  
1, 2 TSR-I 
8 Daniel Blaser, Leiter Management Services, 
BLS AlpTransit AG  
1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 
organizational issues 
CE-I 
9 Elmar Lambrigger, Abschnittsleiter Süd 
 
1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 
organizational issues 
 
CE-I 
                                                 
72 TSR-I are  interviews obtained through “la Television Romande Suisse”; CE-I are unstructutred 
interviews realized with the “critical event interview technique”  
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N° NAME, POSITION CRITICAL EVENT  
LINK 
SOURCE73
10 Heinz Ehbar, Leiter Tunnel und Trasseebau 
GBT, Mitgleid der Geschäftsleitung 
1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 
organizational issues 
CE-I 
11 Giovanni Lombardi*, designer, did the 
feasibility studies for Alp Transit Gothard  
Geology related 
problems 
Risk Management 
aspects 
CE-I 
12 Philippe Arnold der Beauftragte Sicherheit in 
Loetschberg Projekt (Sicherheit) 
 
Sicherheit CE-I 
 
                                                 
73 TSR-I are  interviews obtained through “la Television Romande Suisse”; CE-I are unstructutred 
interviews realized with the “critical event interview technique”  
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ANNEX 4: INTERVIEW LAYOUTS (2008-2009) 
 
1. Introductory statement: We are carrying out a study on the 
behaviour of troubled projects. By this, 
we understand the process and we 
believe that you are especially well 
qualified to explain to us about how the 
decisions were made after the (name the 
critical event). 
2. Request for the general aim: 
(lengthy explanation) 
What would you say the primary purpose 
of the decision making process after the 
(name the critical event) is? 
3. Request for summary: In a few words, how would you 
summarize the general aim of the decision 
making process in the context of (name 
the critical event)? 
Outline for interview to establish the goal description 
Questions and topics dicussed were adapted to the interviewed person’s role and 
expertise. Listed here are examples of questions and topic discussions: 
Data related to the formal organization  
By the organization’s formal structure we understand the chart describing normative 
relationships, chains of command, and subdivisions or grouping elements.   
We would extremely appreciate if you could:   
• Confirm the mission of each “box” in Figure 5. 
• What are the precise responsibility boundaries for each box? 
• How does each box precisely report to one another (regular meetings, flexible 
meetings based on the necessity, formalized communication channels)? 
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Data related to the informal organization 
By informal organization we understand the unpublished “chart,” one that describes the 
relationships that evolve through the interaction of people. 
• From your knowledge, did the project organization develop special 
communication channels beyond the formalized ones? If yes, in what 
circumstances and how were they used? 
Data related to unexpected events 
From secondary data, your web site and materials we received from you, the following 
events have been identified. Their nature is either geological, technological or 
executional related. We would extremely appreciate if you could provide us with a brief 
description of each event, including information on:  
• How are the occurred unexpected events communicated? 
• How were the unexpected events solved? 
i. Who participated in finding the solutions? 
ii. How long did it take? 
iii. What impact did the event have on planning? 
See remarks on geology and execution. 
iv. What kind of measures did you take in order to keep the 
scheduled timetable or overcome incurred delays? 
Change in the general construction schedule 
• Did you make use of the claim management procedures in relation to 
your subcontractors?  
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ANNEX 5: LIST OF THE PROJECT’S CRITICAL 
EVENTS IN CHRONOLIGICAL ORDER74 
1983 
 The Federal Council endorses the construction of a trans-alpine rail 
route, but deems that a decision to construct it would be premature. 
1985  
March 22 Fuel Tax Law 
May 1 International Rail Traffic Convention (COTIF) enters with force. 
November 20 Cheaper piggyback conveyance - reduction in the price of car 
loading  
(subsidized by the Confederation) 
1986  
 Commencement of planning (EWI Elektro-Watt Ingenierung, the 
Confederation, SBB and BLS) 
Examination of five planning scenarios: 
- Lötschberg-Simplon 
- Gotthard base line 
- Splügen 1 
- Splügen 2 
- Ypsilon (Gotthard) 
October 8 National Council passes a motion, the decision-making foundation 
is set for a “New Rail Link through the Alps” incorporating the Y 
proposals on the Gotthard and taking into account the possibilities 
for expansion of the Simplon line 
November 24 EVED (now UVEK / DETEC) sends a letter to cantons in search 
of cooperation and active support for the four transalpine routes: 
- Gotthard 
- Splügen 
- Y line route 
- Lötschberg base line (-Simplon) 
                                                 
74 This is based on data found on BLS Alp Transit web site (2007); the content is endorsed by data 
collected from primary sources and triangulated with data from other secondary sources 
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December 2 Rawil is deleted from the national road network (120:60) 
1987 
December 6 Rail 2000 referendum: 57% vote yes  
1988 
June 29 Founding of TransAlp 2005 (now CISL) (Cantons VD, VS, GE, 
NE, FR, JU, BE) 
1989 
October 24 Federal Council decides on an improved service offering to 
piggyback transport 
1990 
October 17 Proposal of the Republic and canton Valais for a Lötschberg base 
tunnel with a Y solution to Mundbach and Susten 
1991 
March 13 AlpTransit’s decree accepted by the National Council (88:15) 
May Valais compromise proposal: Y solution to Raron and Mundbach 
August Proposal by the state council to the canton of Valais through the 
publication of the brochure: 
 "Valais’ proposal for the Lötschberg base tunnel" 
Sept, 18 AlpTransit’s decree accepted by the Council of States (27:1) 
October 4 Settlement of differences regarding the AlpTransit decree, 
National Council (118:18), Council of States (25:1) 
December 1 AGTC Agreement (European Agreement on important lines of 
international combined transport and associated infrastructures). 
Approved by parliament on 16.12.1992 
1992 
 The European community calls for a road corridor through 
Switzerland for 40-ton trucks. 
May 2 Transit contract concluded (approved by parliament 16.12.1992) 
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September  27 Referendum on AlpTransit’s decree, 63.5% vote yes  
December First Lötschberg information sheet is published by the Federal 
Office of Transport (FOT) containing information about the 
project and organization 
December 1 Confederation decision: the first credit commitment for Lötschberg 
of CHF 250 million  
1993 
February 19 BLS board decides to found BLS AlpTransit AG as a subsidiary 
June 8 Foundation of BLS AlpTransit AG, share capital CHF 100,000: 
100% BLS 
August 12 BLS AT tenders for mandates for project engineers and project 
geologists 
September  1 Confederation transfers responsibility as a client to BLS 
AlpTransit AG 
September  27 
- October 29 
BLS AT plans submission for exploratory tunnel at Kandertal and 
Mitholz lateral audit 
October 4 BLS AT starts a submission for an exploratory tunnel and lateral 
audit in Kandertal 
December 8 The agreement between the Confederation and BLS over the 
construction of the Lötschberg base line is signed 
December 23 Federal Council awards contract to BLS for construction of the 
piggyback corridor for the transportation of trucks with 4m corner 
height (value CHF 158.5 million) 
1994 
January Transport study by canton Valais construction department  
"Transport and infrastructure planning in Valais" 
February 20 Referendum on Alpine Initiative: acceptance vote, 52.0% yes  
February 28 BLS AT submits a pre-project to the Federal Office of Transport 
March 22 Press conference over the pre-projects by BLS AlpTransit 
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April 12 First sod on the Kandertal exploratory tunnel turned by Federal 
Councilor Ogi and cantonal government representatives (Berne 
and Valais). It was done together with the public. 
April 30 Award for the construction work on the Kandertal exploratory 
tunnel (9.5 km), by the board of BLS AT 
May 18 Board of BLS AT awards the new mandates for project designs 
July 25 Commencement of construction at the Mitholz lateral audit 
August 1 In an interview on Radio Suisse Romande, Federal President 
Stich announces that the Gotthard alone will be sufficient 
August 10 Commencement of the construction of the exploratory tunnel in 
Frutigen 
August 10 Board of BLS AT decides to intervene with communications 
and a set of arguments for the necessity of the Lötschberg 
tunnel 
August 17 Notwithstanding the program to rationalize federal finances, 
the Federal Council decides not to defer to Lötschberg 
August 18 Press conference by cantonal government representatives 
Ramseier (GE), Schaer (BE), Bornet (VS), and national 
councillor M. Béguelin, all  against the cancellation of 
Lötschberg 
September 14 Federal Councilor Ogi informs the media of the status on the 
NRLA project 
October 15 National councilor Béquelin resigns as vice-chairman of the 
board of BLS AlpTransit AG 
November ARENA broadcast National councillor Ed Belser versus National 
councillor Chr. Wanner, Lötschberg side presents a united front 
December 1 TransAlp 2005 (now CISL) organizes active political support 
through a permanent secretariat 
December 9 Mrs Yvette Jaggi, city president of Lausanne, is elected to the BLS 
AT board 
December 30 Luzerner Zeitung reports that Director Max Friedli favours 
the Gotthard, if there is not enough money, the Lötschberg will 
not be built 
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1995 
January 19 Inspection, with BUWAL and Federal Office for Area Planning, of the 
pre-project and materials management of the Lötschberg base line 
February Study by Coopers & Lybrand on the economic feasibility 
February 3 Transalp 2002 (now CISL) organizes a policy meeting at the Berne 
Rathaus. 400 personalities from the world of politics and economics 
take part.  
Manifesto from representatives of the seven cantonal governments of 
western Switzerland to the Federal Council 
February 10 ARENA broadcast National Councilor Chr. Blocher versus Cantonal 
Government Councilor Dori Schäer and City President Yvette Jaggi 
February 19 Closed Federal Council meeting over the NRLA project 
February 
19/20 
Federal Council retains network variant.  
Instructs EVED (now UVEK / DETEC) and EFD to draw up 
financial models.  
Car loading on the Lötschberg to be examined 
February 20 Presidents of parties and fractions are invited to a discussion with 
representatives of the Federal Council: consisting of Federal 
President Ogi and Federal Councillor Stich (financing problems) 
April 5, 12 Federal Council decides on a second credit of CHF 855 million.  
Releases Sedrun intermediate working point, but blocks Amsteg, 
Faido, and Ferden intermediate working points. 
April 12 Federal Council approves Lötschberg pre-project 
June 20 Council of States approves Bloetzer application (23:3); CHF 50 
million released for Ferden 
June 27 Federal Council sets up a working group for the financing of public 
transport. 
June 30 Additional applications to Federal Council to be submitted with 
conditional project, including Steg-Baltschieder pre-project 
August 25 Public transport finance working group presents a report to the 
media. 
Variant 5: simultaneous construction of both base tunnels, but 
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Lötschberg to be only a single-track. 
Variant 8: staggered construction first Gotthard, then Ceneri, and 
then Zimmerberg. 
August 31 BLS AT submits project for Ferden lateral audit to BAV 
August 31 North and south the projects for Lötschberg are deferred (meanwhile, 
Gotthard is allowed to submit all) 
September 13 Federal Council decides on public consultation regarding public 
transport finance proposals to be due on November 15, 1995 
September 20 BAV commissions BLS AT to examine proposed variants five and 
eight 
September 20 National Council decides on the second credit of CHF 855 million, 
including CHF 50 million for the Ferden intermediate working 
point (according to Bloetzer application in the Council of States) 
October 3 BLS receives authorization from EVED (now UVEK / DETEC); 
according to which the Ferden lateral audit can be submitted.  
However, the planning approval procedure for the base tunnel 
north-south is deferred until a later date. (Gotthard allowed to 
submit plans) 
November 1 Federal Councilor Leuenberger becomes chairman of EVED (now 
UVEK / DETEC) and replaces Federal Councilor Ogi 
November 13 
- December 13 
Planning approval procedures for the municipalities of Ferden, 
Gampel, and Steg 
December 23 BLS AlpTransit AG is allowed to present its position on variant 
five to the Public Transport Finance Working Group 
December 23 BLS AT presents EVED (now UVEK / DETEC) with the results of the 
evaluation commissioned on September 20 
1996 
January 17 First meeting of the representatives of the Public Transport Finance 
Working Group, Gygi, and Friedli with the federal party’s 
parliamentary working group. 
This working group, voting 6:2, proposed the simultaneous 
construction of the Lötschberg according to variant five, to the 
Federal Council. 
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February 12 "Regio Sempione" is founded in Brig 
February 27 BLS can present itself to Federal Council Leuenberger (incl. BLS 
AlpTransit AG) 
March 12 BE/VS: NRLA manifesto for the Lötschberg-Simplon axis is signed 
by federal and cantonal parliamentarians, heads of fractions, 
governors, prefects, and mayors of the municipalities 
March 22 In Berne, 130 politicians, at municipality, cantonal, and federal 
levels, as well as business and tourist organizations, demand the 
full construction of the Lötschberg branch 
April 24 Federal Council decides on the simultaneous commencement of 
both base tunnels in a re-dimensioned form.  
At Lötschberg, the Niesen flank tunnel, Frutigen by-pass, and car 
loading are deferred. Modified variant 5.1 is envisaged 
June Preliminary construction work starts on the Ferden lateral audit 
June 26 Federal Council passes a motion over the construction and financing 
of public transport infrastructure. 
June 26 Ecoplan economic feasibility study of the Lötschberg-Simplon axis is 
carried out on behalf of TransAlp 2002 (now CISL) 
July 2 Federal Council passes a motion on the financing of public transport to 
Parliament 
December 10 Council of States decides, after a repeated vote 23:22, against the 
application of the consultative commission to build the Lötschberg 
and Gotthard at the same time. The Commission wanted to defer 
the Lötschberg. 
1997 
February 4 Kandertal exploratory tunnel is fully driven at 9.45 km  
March 3 Commencement of pre-project approval procedure for the Raron 
tunnel portal 
April 17 BLS AlpTransit AG reports on the Lötschberg-Simplon tunnel system 
(The Lötschberg base tunnel and Simplon tunnel combined are shorter 
than the Gotthard base tunnel) 
April 22 Business meeting of the Berner Oberland chamber of commerce;  
400 participants adopt a resolution in favor of the Lötschberg base 
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tunnel. 
May 9 National Council Transport Commission retains a network variant but 
wishes to give preferential treatment to the Lötschberg, Zimmerberg, 
and Ceneri tunnels. 
June 3 Planning approval decision by EVED (now UVEK / DETEC) for the 
Ferden lateral audit 
June 18 National Council adheres to network variant with (124:35)  
June 19 National Council decides to chronological sequencing of the NRLA by 
votes 95 to 48. 
First the Lötschberg, Ceneri, and Zimmerberg tunnels will be built 
September Competition launched for design of the bridges over the Rhone at 
Raron 
November 5 Federal Council releases two tranches of credit of CHF 55 million 
for the Lötschberg (Ferden and Mitholz lateral audits) 
December 1 Federal Council adopts funding regulations for major rail projects to 
get the attention of Parliament 
December 6 At their meeting in Domodossola, authority representatives from Italy 
and Switzerland highlight the importance of the goods transport axis to 
the Genoa port (TransAlp 2002, now CISL) 
December 9 Council of States retains the Gotthard and Lötschberg network 
variant; the Ceneri and Zimmerberg tunnels are envisaged for the 
second phase 
1998  
February 13 Call for tenders for driving the Ferden lateral audit. 
April 20 –  
May 19 
Public planning submissions for project modifications in the 
municipalities of Steg, Niedergestelns and Hohtenn (displacing the 
tunnel portal approx. 100 m west) 
September 27 Referendum vote for the mileage-related heavy vehicle tax with a 
57.2% vote yes 
October 29 Information event by the Berner Oberland economic commission 
on financing public transport (FinÖV) 
Chair: National Councilor Seiler 
Participants: 
State Councilor W. Schnyder VS - For 
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Ignaz Reutlinger (Com. FinÖV - Against) 
National Councillor H.U. von Allmen - For 
November 29 Referendum on the construction and financing of the public 
transport infrastructure: a 63.5% vote yes 
December 4 Public invitation to tender for the major construction phase of the 
north base tunnel and the Steg lateral audit’s west base tunnel  
1999 
June 25 Obtained planning approval for the south base tunnel (canton 
boundary to Steg)  
July Public invitation to tender the Raron tunnel phase 
July 5 First blasting operation in the Mitholz base point to drive the 
Lötschberg base tunnel project 
October 19 BLS AlpTransit board awards construction phase contracts for the 
Steg lateral audit/base tunnel and the material management centre at 
Raron 
December 6 Fatal accident in the Ferden lateral audit 
2000  
January 1 BLS AlpTransit moves from Berne to Thun 
February 15 Contract awarded of the for the north base tunnel phase (in Mitholz) 
and the mandate for publicity work by the board of BLS AlpTransit 
May 4 Official opening of the Eya construction site at a rail station in Raron 
May 30 Award of the Raron-Ferden base tunnel phase contract given by the 
board of BLS AlpTransit AG 
July 28 Official delivery of the first tunnel boring machine for the Steg phase 
in Schwanau to the Herrenknecht’s company premises 
August 11 Christening ceremony for the north Lötschberg base tunnel at the 
Mitholz base point with tunnel sponsor Dori Schaer-Born  
August 14 Arrival of the TBM drilling head at Steg/Niedergesteln 
September 18 Completion of the Ferden lateral audit according to schedule, Ferden 
base point phase is given an extension 
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September 22 Commencement of the tunnel driving operations with the first TBM in 
Steg/Niedergesteln and the christening of the Steg lateral audit with 
the tunnel sponsor, Marlies Schnyder.  
Simultaneous unveiling of the BLS AlpTransit locomotive 
September 28 Award of the Rhone bridges contract and work on connection to the 
Rhone valley line is given by the board of BLS AlpTransit 
September 29 Board of BLS AlpTransit assigns the Ferden construction phase 
contract 
2001 
February 22 Delivery of the second tunnel boring machine, for the Raron-Ferden 
phase, arrives at the Herrenknecht’s company premises 
May 1 Commencement of the tunneling work from the Ferden base point 
May 1 Assembly of the second TBM in front of the south portal at Raron 
May 28 Public planning order for the line route between the north portal and 
the base line link to the original BLS line in Wengi-Ey 
June 7 Opening of the BLS AlpTransit Information Centre in Raron 
July 4 Tunnel christening and commencement of tunnel driving operations 
using the second TBM begins in Raron with tunnel sponsor, Ruth 
Kalbermatten  
August 24 The contract for the preliminary Frutigen phase is awarded by the 
board of BLS AlpTransit AG 
September 28 The Raron TBM rotates into the Triassic tunnel 
October 25 Opening day at the construction site in Raron 
November 14 First information is given to the St. German population about 
lowering the ground level 
December 12 Stabilization of the settlement in St. German.  
A joint group, consisting of BLS AlpTransit, local authorities, and 
private representatives, handles damage; remedial measures are 
introduced. 
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2002 
January 17 The board of BLS AlpTransit awards a contract for the construction of 
the Widi bridge 
February 27 The hazardous geological zone, at the Jungfrau wedge, also at the base 
tunnel level in Ferden, was crossed successfully 
April 2 Commencement of silo demolition in Frutigen 
April 8 Start of remedial measures in St. German 
April 11 Meeting with ARGE Ferden, GBI, Syna, SUVA, and BLS 
AlpTransit in Thun to resolve the conflict situation at the Ferden 
site 
April 11 Because of rock containing asbestos, driving with the tunnel 
boring machine in Steg is stopped  
April 13 The TBM in Steg starts up again. SUVA gave the green light after 
cleaning the machine and based on measurements 
April 18 Work stopped on the Ferden construction site by the GBI trade 
union 
May 2 Half of the Lötschberg base tunnel has been driven 
May 14 The board of BLS AlpTransit awards the contract for the final large 
construction phase of the Lötschberg base tunnel - the Engstlige open-
cut tunnel 
June 01 A drilling jumbo on the Ferden site catches fire.  
The fire was extinguished and only material damage was caused, 
no-one was injured. 
August 5 A proposal from various sources to excavate the short section between 
Mitholz and Frutigen (the west tube), during the first phase of 
construction, is given while the contractors and installations are still on 
site 
Constructing this section of the tunnel, about 6 km in length, would be 
considerably costlier after the completion of the first phase 
The corresponding report is sent to the Federal Office of Transport 
September 13 The first TBM arrives at its destination 
After driving 8,925m, it has reached the connection to the Ferden 
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section 
November 8 The new bridge over the Widi is brought into service and opened to 
traffic 
Nov, 12 The DETEC grants planning permission for the dual-tube Engstlige 
tunnel; this means all permissions for the construction work on the 
Frutigen link have been granted 
December 13 The first breakthrough at the Lötschberg base tunnel between Ferden 
and Steg is celebrated.  
The breakthrough is made at km 38.647, between the tunnel blasted 
from Ferden and the tunnel driven by TBM from Steg 
2003 
January 29 The cavern for the Adelrain fork is excavated 
March 28 The new 132 kV line between Wimmis and Frutigen is brought into 
service 
April 2 The tunnelers on the east tube cut through the Ferden carboniferous 
zone 
The tunnelers from the south, in Ferden, have successfully conquered 
a geologically difficult area 
April 11 In Ferden, the west tube towards the south, the workers place the 
concrete as the first element of the tunnel’s inner lining 
May 5 Work starts on the Lötschen fork cavern 
May 14 In the Frutigen-Mitholz west tube, a breakthrough is made 
successfully 
June 30 At the end of the six-month period, with three exceptions, all contracts 
for the technical rail infrastructure were awarded 
July 22 The Federal Office of Transport approves the changes to be made to 
the track installations in the Frutigen station area 
September 10 In the Raron east tube, the tunnelers set another world record for TBM 
tunnel-driving through hard rock at this diameter: 50.1m in 18 hours 
September 20 In September, the tunnelers driving south from Mitholz reached the 
highest point of the tunnel in the west tube on September 20 and the 
highest in the east tube on September22 
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October 2 The tunnelers working south from Ferden had reached the contract 
phase boundary on April 2, 2004.  
Then, on October 29, 2003, the TBM from Raron made the 
breakthrough at this point 
October 31 About 80% of all materials required for building the embankment in 
the Wengi Ey had been delivered by the end of October 
November  In the Ferden west tube, in the southern direction, concreting of the 
side strips commences. Work starts on the Galdi channel cable duct 
block 
December 12 The breakthrough between Frutigen and Mitholz is made successfully 
in the east tube 
December 12 The dismantled TBM (from the Raron east tube) passes through the 
portal and is then fully disassembled outside the tunnel 
December 17 The Lötschen crossover meets the east tube 
The breakthrough from the Hundsprung shaft to the Mitholz lateral 
audit is made successfully 
December 18 The west tube, being driven north from Ferden, reaches the boundary 
between the cantons of Valais and Berne 
December 31 At the end of 2003, the south tunneling operations in Mitholz 
unexpectedly encounter sedimentary rock 
This had not been predicted. The length of the sedimentary zone is 
as yet unknown 
By the end of the year, a large proportion of the implementation 
projects were in the approval phase while some had already been 
approved 
2004 
January 7 At the Eya installation area in Raron, BLS AlpTransit hands over the 
area previously used to make tunnel lining rings to the TU ABL 
January 13 Due to the risk of avalanches, the Ferden construction site had to 
be evacuated twice and tunneling operations suspended (January 
13-15 for 48 hours and January 20 for 8 hours) 
January 28 The access and ventilation tunnel in Ferden opens up into the west 
tube at the Ferden north crossover 
January 31 The geological conditions for the tunneling teams heading south 
from Mitholz deteriorate throughout January with no 
improvement in sight. After the modifications and repairs to the 
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crushers, carried out over Christmas 2003 on the Ferden north 
tunneling operations, the tunneling teams get back up to speed 
In the last week of January, the tunnellers manage to achieve a 
fantastic result of 65 m dug 
February 11 The Raron TBM is dismantled. The last element of the TBM leaves 
the Raron site 
February 24 In the east tube of the Mitholz-Frutigen section, the concreting teams 
place the first elements of the inner lining 
March 7 In the Lötschberg branch, a drilling jumbo catches fire. The 
cause: a defective hydraulic hose, luckily no-one is injured 
March 15 On March 15, in the sedimentary rock, which had been a problem 
since January, additional and ever larger anthracite deposits are 
encountered 
The tunnel driving rate drops dramatically and a breakthrough by 
the end of 2004 is no longer possible. 
In the Raron east tube (TBM), the first element of the inner lining 
is placed at the boundary of the contract section 
March 29 Raron portal and operations centre’s work on the west head wall 
begins 
April 24 The two tunneling teams driving south from Mitholz come to a 
standstill because of problems with the rock. The trial bore that had 
been started, has to be aborted 
April 30 The inner lining in the Ferden-Lötschen west tube is completed 
May 14 The head of the Hundsprung shaft is completed 
May 16 Tunnel-driving operations is resumed in south Mitholz  
May 6 Raron east tube TBM: concreting the inner lining begins 
June 17 In the Mitholz south tunnel-driving operations, a trial bore about 50m 
long is drilled  
No change in the rock is discovered and the average driving rate is 
only about 1.7m per working day. (For comparison: in November 
2003, the average daily driving rate through granite was 9.3m) 
June 20 During the excavation work on the Widi tunnel, the construction 
crew encounters a rock line which is substantially higher than the 
geological survey had predicted  
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In order to ensure that the completion date of “July 2006” can be 
met, it is crucial to revise the construction schedule, with a 
considerably more intensive construction program  
The result: additional expenditures on construction and logistics, 
leading to increased costs 
June 30 At the end of June, the work on the technical rail infrastructure can be 
summarized as follows:  
Production of the mechanical and electro-technical components is 
proceeding apace 
The modified ventilation concept for the outfitting stage is available  
On June 30, in the Wengi Ey, about 700,000m3 of material had been 
delivered 
The material is being used to build the embankment for the displaced 
original BLS mainline section and for landscaping. This means that 
virtually all the material required for completion has been placed.  The 
interior finishing work (on the tunnel lining) on the Ferden south 
tunnelling operations is now complete 
July 1 Just over half of the Engstlige tunnel carcass has been completed 
(1362.5 meters of tunnel, or 53%) 
The Engstlige underpass’s south side’s concrete is done 
Interior finishing work on the Ferden south tunneling operations in the 
east tube is complete, apart from 240m of side strip 
July 20 Despite a minor rock-fall, tunneling work in the Ferden north section 
is making satisfactory progress; as well as the interior finishing work 
July 26 The Mitholz south tunneling team is still stuck in the 
carboniferous rock 
July 31 Towards the end of July, serious damage to the Mitholz avalanche 
protection tunnel is reported. The tunnel has to be closed off for 
safety reasons and traffic is routed via an emergency road. The 
civil engineering department for the canton of Berne is the 
contractor for the tunnel  
August 16 The results of the trial bore, on August 5 (length: 251m), in the 
Mitholz south section of the tunnel indicate a slight improvement 
in the rock (good-quality sandstone and grey wacke) 
August 30 Both tunneling operations have to stop for safety work 
Resumption is envisaged for mid-October, 2004 
September 20 The carcass of the southern bridge in Raron is complete and is handed 
over to the Lötschberg base tunnel general contractor 
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September 28 Tunneling is resumed in Mitholz 
October 31 The west tube between Raron and Lötschen (which was being blasted) 
is handed over to the general contractor of ARGE Bahntechnik 
Lötschberg 
Nov, 16 The Federal Office of Transport grants planning permission for the 
maintenance and intervention centre in Frutigen 
December 6 Installation of the slab track begins in the west tube in Raron 
December 20 Ferden north: the east tube reaches the section boundary at km 31.872 
December 21 Ferden north: the west tube reaches the section boundary at km 31.647 
2005 
January 15 The west tube between Lötschen and Ferden (which is being driven by 
the tunnel boring machine from Steg) is handed over to the general 
contractor of ARGE Bahntechnik Lötschberg 
January 15 Construction on the maintenance and intervention centre in Frutigen 
begins 
January 28 The Frutigen operations centre is handed over to the general contractor 
of ARGE Bahntechnik Lötschberg. The building houses the west and 
east operations centers as well as the local control centre 
February 21 Work on the Steg lateral audit is completed 
March 16 Mitholz: the last of the excavated material to be transported by 
conveyor belt is brought out of the tunnel. Trucks will be used to 
remove the material from the last remaining blasting operations 
March 19 The work on the side strips, in the east tube between Ferden and 
Lötschen, is completed 
April 6 The general contractor of ARGE Bahntechnik Lötschberg takes over 
the Tellenfeld intervention area 
April 28 The main breakthrough is made at the Loetschberg base tunnel in the 
east tube of the Mitholz south tunneling operation. 
A continuous tunnel tube extending from Frutigen to Raron has 
become a reality 
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May 4 Construction of the track bed in the eastern area of the Frutigen station 
is complete 
June 12 The new electronic signal box in Frutigen station is brought into its 
first stage of service 
July 6 The pedestrian subway at Frutigen station is inaugurated 
August 30 Tunnel contractor ABL takes over the north bridge, over the Rhone, 
for outfitting 
September 30 The first containers are transported into the Lötschberg base tunnel 
(Lötschen East operations centre) 
The 160m long high-speed points at the Ferden North cross-over are 
installed 
December 13 The gravel plant in Raron produces the final aggregates for the 
concrete 
In the second half of 2005, many carcass structures, which had been 
completed, were handed over to the general contractor ABL for 
outfitting 
Within this six-month period, most of the preparatory work for 
commissioning was carried out 
2006  
January The track laying teams work simultaneously on two fronts to speed up 
the construction process. The transitional ventilation system for the 
entire base tunnel starts operating 
February The tests for the tunnel control system start 
February 12 The carcass of the Ferden escape tunnel system is completed 
March 26 In the Steg access tunnel near the portal, a karst penetration 
occurs. The portal area is inundated.  As a counter-measure, an 
overflow pipe to the existing settlement basin is constructed 
June 1 Trial operation starts on schedule 
June 6 The first electric trial run in the Lötschberg base tunnel is a success  
(Test Zone 3 - the section between Raron and Ferden in the east tube). 
June 15 The Schwandi Ey floodplain reinstatement work is completed and 
accepted 
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July 1 Commissioning tests for the tunnel control system start in July 
July 6 The last twelve containers are transported into the tunnel and installed 
in the Mitholz west operations centre 
July 7 The gap in the track is closed almost exactly in the middle of the 
tunnel, in the east tube 
July 24 The "golden spike" ceremony celebrates the joining of the two sections 
of track on July 7 
September 9 The "3rd connection" is made on the north ballast track section 
This completes the installation work on the track of the entire 
Lötschberg base line 
October 2 Tracklayers connect the rails from the south bridge in Raron to the 
SBB Rhone valley line tracks 
October 4 For the first time, a train can travel in the tunnel at a speed of 
230kph (test zones 2 and 3) 
October 6 The Federal Office of Transport grants operating approval for the 
132-kV installation 
October 9 The load tests on the Rhone bridges are successful 
October 13 The first ETR 470 (Cisalpino) runs in test zones 2 and 3 
November  The catenaries, which run through the entire Lötschberg base line, are 
switched on 
November  The Federal Office of Transport grants approval for electric train 
journeys through the entire Lötschberg base tunnel. At 18:00, the 
first electric train travels through the entire tunnel 
December 16 At 00:30, the German Railway’s ICE-R test train, at km 44.880 in the 
east tube, reaches a speed of 280kph, breaking the Swiss record 
During the second half of the year, the general contractor of ABL 
takes over numerous carcass structures for outfitting 
 
2007 
February 11 Probably the most successful test during the commissioning process 
takes place. It involves checking whether the signal boxes can handle 
30 locomotives simultaneously 
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In all, 35 locomotives were used 
March 8 The mechanical equipment in the Mitholz access tunnel is ready for 
the "1st partial test”  
This completes the installation work on the mechanical equipment 
March 9 The Federal Office of Transport officially approves "operative trial 
operation”  
The first shift vehicle test is at 03:00 on March 16, 2007  
April 14 Dismantling the temporary construction facilities is completed 
April 17 The Mitholz mobile sub-station is in place and brought into operation 
at its newly-built location 
May 11 An extensive rescue exercise is held inside the tunnel. 350 "injured" 
and "seriously injured" are rescued, cared for and evacuated 
June 14 The Federal Office of Transport officially awards the operating license 
for the Lötschberg base line 
 
 
 
15/16 June 
BLS AlpTransit AG hands over the Lötschberg base line to the 
operator, BLS AG 
Some 1,200 VIPs take part in the hand-over ceremony and the 
subsequent celebrations 
On June 16, 2007, the "people's ceremony" takes place; some 
30,000 visitors attend 
2009 
mid-June  Some six months ahead of schedule, the Herrenknecht Gabi 1 
TBM reached its target destination of Amsteg under the Gotthard 
Massive of the Swiss Alps. This final breakthrough by the first 
machine in the Erstfeld-Amsteg section constitutes the 
achievement of an important milestone on the project. 
2010 
October, 15 Breakthrough at Gotthard;  Switzerland becomes the world leader 
in tunneling 
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ANNEX 6. CODING CATEGORIES 
  
Level of 
reference
Personal (P)
Organizational (O)
Governance (G)
Technology (O-T)
Communication (O-C)
Performance, Control & Outcomes 
(O-PCO)
Goal statement (O-G)
Processes 
issues (O-PI)
Collaborative
Behavior (O-PI-CB)
Social Networks
(O-PI-SC)
Culture
Risk attitude (O-CR)
«Bricolage» (O-CB)
Solidarity (O-CS)
Technology (G-T)
Communication (G-C)
Performance, Control & Outcomes (G-PCO)
Goal statement (G-G)
Culture
Risk attitude (G-CR)
«Bricolage» (G-CB)
Solidarity (G-CS)
 
.  
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ANNEX 7: RESILIENCE BACKGROUND  
Definitions of Resilience 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines resilience as 1) the act of rebounding or 
springing back and 2) elasticity. The origin of word is in Latin, where “resilio” means 
to jump back. In a mechanical sense, the resilience of a material is the quality of being 
able to store strain energy and deflect it elastically under a load without breaking or 
being deformed (Gordon 1978). However, since the 1970’s, the concept has been used 
in a metaphorical sense to describe systems that undergo stress and have the ability to 
recover and return to their original state.    
Concept Grounding 
Academic research into resiliency began 40 years ago with the studies of Norman 
Garmezy on why children of schizophrenic parents did not suffer psychological illness 
when they were growing up with parents who did. He concluded that “a certain quality 
of resilience played a greater role in mental health than anyone had previously 
suspected” (cited by Diana L. Coutu, in HBR). Since then, various theories have 
emerged about what makes the resilience in people, systems, and business.  
Ecological Resilience  
In ecology, resilience is defined in two ways. This verified two contrasting aspects of 
stability, one that focuses on maintaining efficiency of function (engineering resilience) 
vs. one that focuses on maintaining existence of function (ecological resilience). 
Engineering resilience focuses on efficiency and depends on constancy and 
predictability – all attributes of an engineer’s desire for safe design. Ecological 
resilience focuses on persistence. Despite change and unpredictability, all attributes 
embraced by evolutionary biologists and by resource managers need a safe – fail design 
(Gunderson 2002, p. 5-6). Holling (1973) first emphasized these contrasting aspects of 
stability to draw attention to the tensions between efficiency and persistence, constancy 
and change, and between predictability and unpredictability. In this light, the definition 
of engineering resilience (Holling 1996 cited by Gunderson 2006 p.4) conceives 
systems to exist close to a stable, steady state. Engineering resilience is then described 
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as the speed of return to the steady state following a perturbation (Pimm 1984; O’Neil 
et. Al. 1986; Tilmann and Downing 1994 cited in Gunderson 2002 p. 4). The definition 
of ecological resilience (Walker et al. 1981; Holling 1996; cited in Gunderson 2000), 
conceives conditions far from any stable, steady state. It places them where instabilities 
can shift or flip a system to another stability domain. In this case, resilience is measured 
by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system is restructured 
with different controlling variables and processes.    
However, the differences between the engineering resilience and ecological resilience 
are so fundamental that they become alternative paradigms for researchers. Table 4-2 
summarizes the seminal work and contributions of these two streams. Gunderson cites 
them in his book Resilience and the Behavior of Large – Scale Systems p. 3-48. 
 
ENGINEERING RESILIENCE ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 
 
Treats how far a system has moved 
from an equilibrium in time and how 
quickly it returns, as a measure of 
stability  
 
Is measured by the return time of an 
ecosystem after a disturbance (Haydon 
1994, cited in Gunderson 2002, p. 127)- 
- There is an implicit assumption that 
systems exhibit only one equilibrium 
steady state 
Is defined as the ability of ecosystems to 
resist lasting change from disturbances 
(Gunderson et al. 1997, cited in Gunderson 
2002, p. 127) 
Is measured by the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be absorbed before a 
system redefines its structures by changing 
the variables and processes that control 
behaviour (Holling 1973)  
 
  
The differences between the two streams are captured in Figure 4-3, in which the 
stability landscapes are used to represent the dynamics of a system. 
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A7 1: Engineering vs. Ecological Resilience 
 
The ball represents the system state (Carpenter et al 1999; Scheffer 1998 cited in 
Gunderson 2002 p.5, p.255). The state can be changed by disturbances, which move the 
system along a stable landscape. a) Engineering resilience (speed of recovery) is a local 
measure and it is determined by the slope of the landscape b) Ecological resilience 
corresponds to the width of a stability basin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The factors based on literature that are accountable for the increase in ecological 
resilience are 1) species diversity, 2) keystone species and redundancy, 3) loss and 
Distinguishing between the two types of resilience is relevant in assessing which type of 
resilience is relevant for this study.  Based on their intrinsic characteristics and declared goals 
of this thesis, ecological resilience is most appropriate and legitimate. Project systems are 
complex systems organized through the interactions of a set of elements, which is similar to 
ecological systems (Gunderson 2002). Resilience helps to understand the dynamisms and 
vulnerabilities projects go through when in face of distresses. Therefore, it would not be 
suitable to consider engineering resilience. This considers that only one unique equilibrium 
state exists and could be designed. From this perspective, the study seeks to understand the 
conditions of persistence and not equilibrium states.  
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replacement of keystone species, and 4) spatial heterogeneity and refugia (Gunderson 
2002, p.127-157).  
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ANNEX 8: LIMITATIONS OF PLANNING TOOLS 
The table below summarizes the advantages and limits of the most commonly used tools 
for planning (scheduling) and controlling.  
 
Overview of traditional tools for project planning and control (based on Nicholas, 2004)   
TOOL APPLICATION STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES  
Gant Charts  Widely adopted 
in all domains 
which depicts the 
relationship 
between the 
WBS(work 
breakdown 
structure) planned 
and done 
 Easy to use to 
monitor work in 
progress 
Often maintained 
manually 
 
Does not explicitly show 
the interrelationships 
between the different 
elements of projects and 
therefore will show neither 
the effect of one delayed 
work element on the others, 
nor the effect of shifting 
resources.  
In large projects Requires 
computerized project 
systems  
Network 
Scheduling 
Procedures  
Is a must in large 
projects 
Shows 
interdependencies 
between project 
elements 
Enables planning 
and scheduling to be 
performed separately  
Are elaborated based on 
the “precedence” concept 
meaning that shows that 
tasks that must be completed 
before others can be started. 
(finish-to-start networks = 
FS) 
Precedence 
Diagramming 
Method (PDM) 
Belongs to the 
family of methods 
which use networks 
Shows 
interdependencies 
between project 
elements 
Enables planning 
and scheduling to be 
performed separately 
Besides the FS 
situations allows for 
relationships start-to- 
start, finish-to-start, 
and start-to finish and 
for time lags between 
these relationships 
Are based on the 
assumption that “any 
projects can be defined as a 
sequence of identifiable, 
independent activities  with 
known precedence 
relationship”- this is not the 
case in reality since the work 
to do cannot be always 
anticipated – “projects 
evolve as they progress” 
Program 
Evaluation and 
Review 
Is termed as 
critical path method 
because uses critical 
Shows 
interdependencies 
between project 
Addresses uncertainty in 
duration by using three time 
estimates (optimistic, most 
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Technique 
(PERT) 
path to calculate 
expected project 
duration, and slack.  
Developed for 
projects in which 
uncertainty is 
associated with the 
nature and duration 
of activities. 
elements 
Enables planning 
and scheduling to be 
performed separately 
Allows 
incorporating of 
uncertainty in 
schedules estimations 
the “three estimates 
are related through a 
“ßeta distribution” 
likely and pessimistic)  
Were criticized because 
provide overoptimistic 
estimates. 
Too much focus on 
critical path make managers 
to ignore the “near critical 
paths” which may become 
critical and jeopardize the 
objectives 
Assumes that activity 
times can be estimated and 
are independent, which is 
not always the case (e.g. 
shift of resources) 
 
Time estimates are still 
“guesses” and could be 
biased by estimators and 
contractual arrangements  
Critical Path 
Method (CPM) 
Belongs to the 
family of methods 
which use networks 
 Uses critical 
path to calculate 
expected project 
duration, and slack 
and gives emphasis 
to project costs. 
 
Is deterministic 
and includes a 
mathematical 
procedure to 
estimates the trade-
off between 
duration and cost of 
project.   
Show 
interdependencies 
between project 
elements 
Enable planning and 
scheduling to be 
performed separately 
In addition to PERT 
allows costs to be 
explicitly included in 
scheduling  
 
 
Requires further 
development to take into 
account the administration 
costs (decrease with the 
progress of project), the 
overhead costs and the 
incentives/penalty costs 
related to the contractual 
arrangements 
 
Common limitations of the network scheduling methods: 
No activity can be repeated and no “looping back” to predecessors are possible 
The duration time/activity is limited to the Beta distribution (PERT) or deterministic 
(single estimate) for CPM 
There is only one terminal point and the way to reach it is to complete all the activities 
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before.  
Must be employed when potential advantages overpass the cost and time spent on using 
them 
 
GERT 
(Graphical 
Evaluation 
and Review 
Technique) 
Advanced 
modeling and 
scheduling method 
 Surmounts the 
limitations of PERT 
and CPM  
In addition to beta 
allows alternative time 
distribution as well as 
looping back 
Requires time and costs to 
use it 
 
The overview of the available tools, which are derived from traditional project 
management theories in the scope to ensure that projects will unfold according to the 
plan to a successful end, it becomes clear that although these methods form the 
necessary foundation for project management, all of them are limited to their underlying 
assumptions and therefore not sufficient for dealing effectively with arising risk and 
uncertainties in projects.   
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